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In the century or so that syllogisms have received the attention of psychologists, their
interpretation both as and within particular types of discourse has been largely down-
played. A significant element in the guidance of interpretation is information structure
as expressed in prosody. This thesis explores the rôle of int nation in syllogistic dis-
course and its effect on reasoning.
A theoretical analysis of the information structures of syllogisms is presented which
produces two classes of intonation patterns, the ‘contextually concordant’ (CC) and the
‘contextually neutral’ (CN), putatively corresponding to two discourse types. These
are then investigated in a series of experiments. The initial observational study aims
at confirming the use and significance ofCC andCN patterns in a syllogism solving
task. The remaining two experiments employ a purpose-builtvoice synthesiser to in-
vestigate the effects of imposingCC andCN contours on premises, first in a syllogism
solving task and then in a syllogism evaluation task.
The results show that bothCC andCN intonation patterns are indeed used by par-
ticipants and bear a systematic relationship to both the number and accuracy of conclu-
sions they draw. When used in the presentation of syllogisms, however, these patterns
do not influence the production of conclusions, only the evaluation of them. It is there-
fore argued that the discourse types to which they relate depnd upon whether the
syllogism is interpreted as a proof or as a problem.
Further work based on these findings could aim to probe the informational links
between conclusions and premises and thereby elucidate thecoherence of arguments.
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It is almost a century since psychologists first turned theirattention to the ancient form
of argument known as the syllogism.1 Experimental participants with no training in
logic, while performing better than chance, make many mistakes in syllogistic reason-
ing tasks, according to the definitions of classical logic. Over the years, a variety of
extra-logical factors has been found to influence their performance. (See Chapter 2
for an overview). For the most part, these results have been taken as evidence for or
against different theories of the nature of the human reasoning mechanism. Perhaps it
is the pared down, systematised characterisation of them that encourages this, but in
concentrating thus on syllogisms as paradigms of inferencethese studies have largely
ignored them as models of discourse. As a result, two significa t issues have been
taken for granted and therefore sidelined, namely (1) that te purpose of a syllogism
is to demonstrate deductively sound reasoning and (2) that experimental participants
understand and aim for this. There are, however, very good reasons for believing that
neither of these is necessarily true.
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2005) distinguish between ‘skeptical’ and ‘credu-
lous’ attitudes which lead to very different interpretations of and within discourse. The
former is akin to the logical quest for truth under all possible interpretations of a given
set of propositions, but with a localised, contextualised conception of the possibilities
more in tune with the multiplicity of contemporary, specialised logics than with the
old-fashioned, monolithic approach. The latter seeks truth only in the guise of the one,
particular interpretation which it is the assumed intentioof a discourse partner to con-
vey. In the latter case, but not the former, there is a presumption that the statements
presented are related to each other, thereby constraining the search for the correct in-
1Störring (1908) is believed to be the earliest study (Politzer, 2004).
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terpretation. Ordinary language users switch with complete facility between these two
modes of operation as occasion demands: a credulous attitude serves for the reception
of information for so long as no doubt or confusion as to the int nded model arises,
at which point a skeptical view that suspends earlier assumptions and contemplates
alternative models assists the process of repair.
This conception of the difference between exposition and deduction as types of
discourse has formed the basis of accounts of reasoning withconditionals in respect
of both the suppression ofmodus ponens(Byrne, 1989; Stenning and van Lambalgen,
2005) and variation in performance of Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1966; Stenning
and van Lambalgen, 2004). In the latter case, the claim is that the task creates a sit-
uation calling for skeptical reasoning, but differences inthe content of the materials
evoke logics tailored to different needs. The problem confrting the participant is
usually compounded, however, by an inadequate specification, if not understanding, of
the nature of the task by the experimenter. They are therefore at liberty to form a con-
ception of the discourse in question that is at odds with thatheld by the experimenter,
with the result that the responses given by the one are misconstrued by the other.
Clearly, the potential for such natural reinterpretation of the experimental discourse
extends beyond these two paradigms. Indeed, there is plentyof evidence that studies of
syllogistic reasoning have been subject to very much the same difficulties. Participants
have long been known to perform better with materials cast inreal-world terms than
with abstract ones (Wilkins, 1928), but Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) go so far as
to suggest that this is in fact due to the contextualisation of i ference by the problem
statement itself. The well-established tendency for participants to generate or accept
as valid conclusions they believe to be true and reject thosethey believe to be false
(Janis and Frick, 1943; Morgan and Morton, 1944; Evanset al., 1983; Oakhill and
Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhillet al., 1989) also fits this picture. Indeed, Henle (1962)
found that syllogisms embedded in everyday contexts not only led participants to fail
to distinguish between validity and truth, but also to restate premises according to their
own judgements and even to reject the task itself as defined tothem.
More specifically, though, Stenning and Cox (2006) suggest that, in the context
of syllogisms, exposition and deduction are reflected in ‘rash’ and ‘hesitant’ infer-
ence patterns which are mediated by sensitivity to ‘information packaging’ (Vallduvı́,
1992). It is this, they argue, that variously triggers or inhibits the drawing of implica-
tures (Grice, 1975, 1989), leading to a complex set of interac ions that influence the
form and, to a limited extent, accuracy of conclusions drawnby participants. Their
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account is constrained, however, by a view of information packaging restricted to
subject-predicate ordering, or ‘grammar’, rather than more orthodox information struc-
tural constructs such astopic/commentandfocus/ground, which have a discourse-level
aspect. The claim of this thesis is that such constructs offer a more integrated account
of the difference between the discourse types involved which addresses more fully the
degree and accuracy of conclusion-drawing by participants. This claim is pursued in
the remaining chapters as follows.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to syllogisms, first from a historic -logical perspective
and then from a psychological one. It begins with a groundingin the forms and proper-
ties of syllogisms, along with the terminology used to referto and describe them in the
rest of the thesis. This is followed by an overview of psychological studies involving
syllogistic reasoning tasks and the major effects that havebeen identified therein. The
final section considers in greater detail Stenning and Cox’s(2006) explanation of some
of these effects in terms of credulous and skeptical interpretations of the experimental
discourse and their relation to information packaging. While the general idea of a kind
of ‘para-Gricean’ pragmatics of deduction is accepted, however, it is argued that an
important aspect of information structure, namely intonation, has been neglected.
Chapter 3 attempts to elucidate the elusive concepts underlying the term ‘informa-
tion structure’ and their manifestation in prosody and apply the resulting insights to the
syllogistic form. It begins with something of a mystery tourth ough the terminologi-
cal and definitional jungle that covers the territory. Underlying notions of constituency
and context are used as tools to assist in teasing out the relationships between various
theories and clarifying the terms used. This enables Stenning and van Lambalgen’s
distinction between expositive and deductive discourse tobe recast entirely at the level
of information structure by way of two putative classes of intonation patterns, the ‘con-
textually concordant’ (CC) and the ‘contextually neutral’ (CN). These two classes are
then populated on the basis of a systematic analysis of the information structures of
the complete set of syllogisms.
In Chapter 4, the hypothesis that credulity and skepticism are reflected inCC and
CN patterns, respectively, is put to the test. The concepts of focus and topic are op-
erationalised for the purpose of empirical investigation and pplied in a study of the
syllogism solving task in which participants’ own prosodicstructuring of premises
is elicited. Both classes of intonation patterns are observed in use and shown to be
systematically related to participants’ conclusion drawing behaviour. Rather than de-
lineating individual differences in interpretation between participants, however, they
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appear to distinguish across the board between the different outcomes of reasoning,
namely whether or not a conclusion is drawn and, in either case, whether or not this is
logically correct.
Chapter 5 is a digression into the construction of an artificial voice for the purpose
of incorporating controlled intonation into subsequent experiments. The process of
building a unit selection voice for the FESTIVAL speech synthesis system is outlined
and the application of each step to the domain of syllogisms is detailed. In particular,
the choice of vocabulary and optimisation of the voice’s coverage of bothCC andCN
patterns is explained. Attention is also given to problems with the system arising out
of the exacting requirements of the application and the modificat ons necessary to their
solution.
Chapter 6 reports an experiment to determine whether or not int national structur-
ing can be used to influence the conclusion drawing behaviourof participants. In an
adapted syllogism solving task, the artificial voice was used to present premises var-
iously with CC andCN contours. The results show no difference whatsoever in the
number or accuracy of conclusions given in response to the two classes of intonation
patterns. It is suggested that the difference between theseresults and those of the initial
study might be that intonation forming part of the product ofreasoning is not powerful
enough to influence the process of reasoning.
In Chapter 7, a revised hypothesis is tested. A further experiment using the artificial
voice is described, this one being an adaptation of the syllogism conclusion evaluation
task. The results this time show a significant, if modest, effect of intonation pattern
on the accuracy of participants’ judgements. While giving possible support to the
salience of the process/product distinction, though, it also raises questions concerning
confidence in and believability of conclusions.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. The results of the three experiments are drawn
together to support a revision of Stenning and van Lambalgen’s distinction between
exposition and deduction, at least in the context of syllogistic reasoning, into one be-
tween demonstration and examination. It is also suggested that much of the research
in this field may in fact have less to do with logic in itself than with the completetriv-
iumof logic, grammar, and rhetoric. Finally, proposals for investigations following on
from the results reported here are put forward. Aside from consolidatory work, these
include refinement of the concept of demonstration by exploring further the prosody
of conclusions.
Chapter 2
Syllogistic reasoning: logic and
psychology
2.1 A brief history of syllogisms
2.1.1 Aristotle
The syllogism as a form of argument or proof was first introduced and analysed by
Aristotle in his Prior Analytics, building on the work on classes and predication in
his Categoriesand on propositions in hisOn Interpretation. It consisted of just two
premises which together related three terms by having one, the ‘middle’, in common,
such that a conclusion relating the other two terms, or ‘extremes’, necessarily followed.
For example:Some birds are swansandAll swans are white, soSome birds are white.
The premises and conclusion were all simple propositions which predicated one
term of another, either wholly or in part. Propositions could be universal or particular,1
and affirmative or negative, giving rise to four types. For example:
Universal Affirmative: All swans are white. (Or Every swan is white).
Universal Negative: No ravens are white. (Or No raven is white).
Particular Affirmative: Some birds are swans. (Or Some bird is a swan).
Particular Negative: Some birds are not swans. (Or Some bird is not a swan).
1In fact, Aristotle contemplated a third possibility: the indefinite. This, however, was simply the
case in which the proposition was not explicitly stated as universal or particular and therefore its scope
was unclear. The logical consequences of such propositionsalways turned out to fall in line with one or
other of the explicit cases and so were unproductive. Later treatments effectively ignored them.
5
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In addition, each premise might have the middle as either subject or predicate,
with the extreme being the other. This meant that the terms inthe two premises taken
together could appear in any one of three possible arrangements, or ‘figures’. In the
first figure, the middle was the subject in one premise and the predicate in the other. In
the second, the middle was the predicate in both premises, while in the third, it was the
subject in both. For example:
First figure: Some birds are hawks.
All hawks are hunters.
(Hence,Some birds are hunters.)
Second figure: All swans are birds.
No horses are birds.
(Hence,No swans are horses.)
Third figure: All swans are birds.
All swans are white.
(Hence,Some birds are white.)
The substance of Aristotle’s examination consisted of working through every com-
bination of figure and type of predication and showing which ones led to necessary
conclusions and which did not. He considered ‘perfect’ those syllogisms in which the
conclusion followed plainly from the premises, without further elaboration, and found
that only syllogisms in the first figure satisfied this condition.2 Syllogisms in the sec-
ond and third figures were ‘imperfect’ and required to be transformed into their equiv-
alents in the first figure in order to prove their conclusions.Such transformations were
effected by truth-preserving, logical manipulations of one or both of the premises, the
most notable being ‘conversion’, in which the subject and predicate terms exchanged
places, as illustrated in the following examples:
Universal affirmative: All swans are birdsconverts toSome birds are swans.3
Particular affirmative: Some birds are petsconverts toSome pets are birds.
2The semantics of predication in this context is containmentor inclusion of one class by or in another
and its transitivity Aristotle took as self-evident.
3Aristotle’s prior writings make it clear that the sorts of things that terms refer to and to which his
syllogistic system applies are carefully circumscribed, in accordance with his overarching empiricism,
such that the existential assumption underlying this conversion is warranted. Later, mediaeval writers
invoked the doctrine ofsuppositionto the same effect. Modern logicians, by contrast, are content
to admit the truth of assertions concerning non-existent enti i s, which would invalidate it. The set-
theoretic solution to this is to make the explicit assumption hat there are no empty sets. All well-framed
psychological experiments based on the system therefore include this assumption in some guise.
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Universal negative: No horses are goatsconverts toNo goats are horses
Particular negative: Some birds are not swansdoes not convert.
It should be noted that only the particular affirmative and the universal negative con-
verts wholly, while the universal affirmative converts but partially and the particular
negative does not convert at all.
2.1.2 Scholasticism
Aristotle, it seems, was not overly concerned with the orderin which the premises were
stated, as this does not affect what conclusions do or do not necessarily follow. Rather,
he distinguished them on the basis of whether they containedthe ‘major’ term or the
‘minor’. Unfortunately, his definition of these is a little obscure and varies between
the figures. His pupil and successor, Theophrastus, followed by the Scholastics of
the Middle Ages, adopted the view that the major term was thatwhich appeared in
the conclusion as the predicate and the minor term that whichappeared there as the
subject. Pursuing this more grammar-oriented approach into the premises led to the
reconstruction of the system in four figures instead of three, since either term could be
introduced in the first place as either subject or predicate.Th fourth figure comprises
the ‘counter-figurals’: a class of syllogisms excluded fromAristotle’s scheme in which
the major term is introduced as a subject and the minor term isintroduced as a predicate
and they therefore exchange grammatical rôle s in the conclusion.4
As an aid to this analysis, the convention was established ofpresenting the premises,
named by reference to the terms they introduced, in the ordermajor, then minor. In
the examples that follow, they are described for illustrative purposes by surscripts in
which M denotes the middle term, P the major term, S the minor term, and an arrow
signifies that the term at its tail is predicated of the term atits head.
First figure:
M ←− P
All hawks are hunters.
S←− M
Some birds are hawks.
(Hence,
S←− P
Some birds are hunters.)
4It would be wrong to think that Aristotle simply overlooked these. He considered them as part of
his examination of his first figure and rejected each one for having no necessary conclusion. The precise
reason for this is not clear. One possibility is that he failed to exhaust the application of his own rules of
conversion to them. Perhaps more likely, though, is that hisconception of the semantics of containment,
particularly its asymmetry or directionality, rendered the complete inversion of terms in a conclusion
nonsensical.
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Second figure:
P←− M
All swans are birds.
S←− M
No horses are birds.
(Hence,
S←− P
No horses are swans.)
Third figure:
M ←− P
All swans are white.
M ←− S
All swans are birds.
(Hence,
S←− P
Some birds are white.)
Fourth figure:
P←− M
Some birds are hawks.
M ←− S
All hawks are hunters.
(Hence,
S←− P
Some hunters are birds.)
The particular sequence of proposition types in a syllogismso ordered was termed
its ‘mood’. With four types available to each of three propositi ns, there were therefore
64 potential moods. Since every mood could appear in every figure, there were in total
256 possible syllogisms. In the result, however, only 19 of these proved to be valid.
These, along with their interrelationships, were memorised using sophisticated sets of
mnemonics built around code letters for the four types of proposition:
A - Universal affirmative (All)
E - Universal negative (No)
I - Particular affirmative (Some)
O - Particular negative (Some...not)
This remained effectively the state of the art until term logic was abandoned in
favour of mathematical logic, following the work of Boole, Frege, and Russell in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
2.2 Overview of psychological investigations
2.2.1 Introduction
Psychological studies of syllogistic reasoning by untrained participants have employed
several variations of the task, including deciding the validity of multiple candidate
conclusions to pairs of premises (Woodworth and Sells, 1935; Sells, 1936), selecting
valid conclusions from sets of alternatives (Chapman and Chapman, 1959; Dickstein,
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1975), and producing conclusions given just the premises (Johnson-Laird and Steed-
man, 1978; Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984). A number of them, especially the earlier
ones, used only selected syllogisms and focussed on specificrrors, while most of the
more recent ones have presented participants with all possible variations and sought
to develop more general theories of reasoning. Johnson-Laird and Steedman’s (1978)
study, in particular, broke new ground and broadened the scope of psychological inves-
tigations into syllogistic reasoning, by employing for thefirst time the task of actively
drawing conclusions from pairs of premises. Since previousst dies had limited them-
selves to the mere evaluation of syllogisms presented in their entirety according to
scholastic convention, they perhaps had more to do with participants’ reactions to the
canons of classical logic than with their own inferential processes.
The elimination of the conclusion from the specification of asyllogism, entailed
by the new task, leads to a further reformulation of the problem space. There are just
64 possible permutations of the two premises alone, but, surpri ingly, 27 of them now
yield logically valid conclusions. This is because the distinction between major and
minor, rooted in the canonical conclusion, is lost. Participants are free to order the
terms in their conclusions whichever way round they see fit and, depending upon the
convertibility of the quantifier, some are valid either way while others are not. Obvi-
ously, the terms ‘figure’ and ‘mood’ do not survive this revision of the task unaltered.
Figure is now best expressed as the pattern of terms in the twopremises -AB-BC,
BA-CB AB-CB, or BA-BC - and mood excludes the quantifier in the conclusion.
Taken together, these studies show that, on average, partici nts make mistakes in
about half of the cases, which on the one hand is quite considerable but on the other is
significantly better than chance (Dickstein, 1975; Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978),
and that there are a number of factors that influence their performance. These factors
fall into three main categories, namely those that are structu al features or properties of
syllogisms, those that are abstractions over the logic of syllogistic reasoning, and those
that are cognitive or behavioural traits of individual participants. The most notable of
these in each case are outlined in the following subsection.
2.2.2 Factors influencing syllogistic reasoning
2.2.2.1 Structural factors
To begin with, the mood of a syllogism mediates acceptance ofa c nclusion as valid.
Certain types of premises are said to create an ‘atmosphere’in which a conclusion of
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the same type is more likely to be accepted than one of a different type (Woodworth
and Sells, 1935; Sells, 1936). Specifically, a negative premis generates a negative
atmosphere, even if the other premise is positive, and a particular premise produces
a particular atmosphere, even if the other premise is universal. The effect is more
pronounced for valid conclusions than for invalid ones and must therefore result from
mediation of a separate inferential process (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984, p. 7).
Another factor affecting performance is the convertibility of premises. Participants
often opt for invalid conclusions when either or both of the pr mises can not be fully
converted. (That is, those inAll andSome...not. It will be recalled that only those
in SomeandNo convert fully.) In many cases, such erroneous responses would be
correct if the premises were fully convertible (Chapman andChapman, 1959). The
explanation for this has taken a number of forms, some stronger than others, but in fact
most of the evidence is in respect ofAll (see Dickstein, 1981, for a review).
Thirdly, the figure of a syllogism impacts powerfully on boththe form and accuracy
of conclusions drawn by participants. Premises whose termsare in the orderAB-BC
evoke a bias towards conclusions in the orderAC while those orderedBA-CB evoke a
bias towardsCA conclusions.5 That is, there is a strong tendency for terms to occupy
the same positions in conclusions as they do in premises. These biases are manifest in
invalid conclusions as well as valid ones. Furthermore, where a conclusion is valid in
only one order, the ease with which the syllogism is solved reflects the compatibility of
that order with the figure of the syllogism, both in respect ofthe time taken to produce
a conclusion and the number of correct conclusions produced. Premises whose term
ordering is symmetrical, i.e.AB-CB or BA-BC, evoke little or no bias in conclusion
term ordering and are of intermediate difficulty (Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978).
Figure also contributes to the difficulty of a syllogism in another way. The re-
sponse that there isNO VALID CONCLUSION (NVC) is elicited proportionately least
from premises with terms orderedAB-BC. This is followed byBA-CB, thenAB-CB,
with the the orderBA-BC producing the largest percentage ofNVC responses. The
effect is independent of the existence or non-existence of valid conclusions.6 It oc-
curs when participants are required to respond quickly, as well as after they have been
allowed to reflect on and modify their answers, suggesting that i might be the result
of failure to create a unified representation for both premiss in a problem in the first
place (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984).
5The latter are canonical according to scholastic logic, butthe former are not.
6In fact, the orderBA-BC generates the greatest number of logically valid conclusions.
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2.2.2.2 Logical factors
The relative difficulty of different syllogisms can also be linked to an abstract property
they may be considered to possess in virtue of model-based theories of reasoning, of
which ‘mental models’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983) is the prime exmplar. According to
this theory, syllogistic reasoning proceeds via three steps. First, a model of the state of
affairs described by the premises is constructed. Next, an ‘informative’ conclusion, i.e.
one that relates the end terms directly, is produced by scanning the model. Then, an
alternative model is sought that remains consistent with the premises but not with the
conclusion and the process is repeated as necessary. Applied exhaustively, this proce-
dure generates the correct answer in all cases, yielding a classification of problems in
terms of the number of models required to solve each one. However, different theories
- and even different formulations of the same theory - disagree over the numbers in
particular cases, such that the only reliable distinction is between syllogisms requiring
just one model to solve correctly and those requiring more than one. It has been shown
that multiple-model problems elicit more erroneous respones from participants than
do single-model problems (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984; Johns n-Laird and Byrne,
1991).
Abstracting over the detail of both model- and rule-based thories, ‘individual iden-
tification algorithms’ (Stenning and Yule, 1997) yield another performance-related fac-
tor, this time influencing primarily the order of end terms inconclusions. While model-
based theories seek to encapsulate whole states of affairs by positing as many entities
as necessary, these algorithms focus explicitly on discovering a single, ‘critical’ in-
dividual that must exist, given the truth of both premises.7 This reveals that in the
great majority of cases the existence of the critical individual is entailed by just one of
the premises. This is termed the ‘source’ premise, while theo r is the ‘conditional’
premise. A full description of this individual is constructed using all three terms in the
syllogism, with the two from the source premise coming first,in order, followed by the
remaining one from the conditional. Stenning and Yule show that hat the order of the
end terms in such a description is an excellent predictor of the order of terms in conclu-
sions drawn by participants. That is, according to theirSource Founding Hypothesis,
a conclusion will contain the end term from the source premisin the subject and the
end term from the conditional premise in the predicate.8
7The reader is reminded of the ‘no empty sets’ assumption.
8Additionally, this framework identifies a distinct step from the individual description to a quantified
statement in which much of a problem’s difficulty might reside.
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2.2.2.3 Individual differences
The different reasoning styles of ‘visualisers’ and ‘verbalisers’ lead to their experienc-
ing different degrees of difficulty in solving the same syllogism (Ford, 1995). More-
over, the efficacy of logic instruction on them is significantly affected by the congru-
ence or otherwise of its mode of delivery, graphical or sentential, with their preferred
mode of reasoning (Monaghan and Stenning, 1998). However, St nning and Yule
(1997) present individual identification algorithms framed both diagrammatically and
as a species of propositional calculus and argue that represntational differences reside
at a level of implementational detail too fine-grained for curent theories to capture.
Instead, Stenning and Cox (2006) suggest that Ford’s results might be accounted for
by reference to premise ordering. Updating the term ‘canonical’ to denote cases in
which the source premise comes first, followed by the conditional, they observe that
visualisers tend to perform better than verbalisers on non-canonical orderings.
Leaving preferences for different modalities aside, then,conclusion drawing has
been shown to be influenced by preferences for different interpretations of the premises,
as revealed by theimmediate inferencetask. Here, participants are instructed to assume
the truth of a single premise and then evaluate a second relating the same two terms.
‘Hesitancy’ is the tendency to respondCAN’ T TELL when the correct answer is either
TRUE or FALSE and ‘rashness’ is the tendency to respond eitherTRUE or FALSE when
the correct answer isCAN’ T TELL. These behaviours are exhibited variously by dif-
ferent groups of participants according to whether the order of the terms in the second
premise is the same as in the first (‘in-place’) or reversed (‘out-of-place’). Aside from
the significant minority of participants who are neither rash nor hesitant at all, most are
either rash in-place (RI) or hesitant out-of-place (HO) only. Smaller numbers are both
RI andHO or RI andRO (rash out-of-place) (Stenning and Cox, 1995).
In the full reasoning task, these traits mediate the overallinfluence of several struc-
tural factors in a raft of complex interactions (Stenninget al., 1996; Stenning and Cox,
2006). So, premise order is a strong influence on conclusion term order in all cases -
that is,AC conclusions predominate - but especially so forHO participants. Likewise,
the figural effect on conclusion term order is powerfully manifest across the board
- end terms in conclusions generally retain the grammaticalrôle s they have in the
premises, where these differ - but again much more so forHO participants. Greater
differences are linked to particular premises and quantifiers, notably the negative ones.
In direct contrast to the other quantifiers,No, especially when in the second premise,
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encourages participants to place the end term from its premis in the predicate of the
conclusion. This time, though, the general effect is significantly less pronounced in
HO participants than in others, while forRO participants it is reduced whenNo is in
the first premise. ForRI participants, on the other hand,Some...notin the first premise
has an effect like that ofNo.9 The figural effect interacts with some of these specific
effects to enhance or, curiously, reverse them.
2.3 Discussion: interpretation and inference
Stenning and Cox’s (2006) findings, summarised in the last part of the previous section,
are given by way of a riposte to a ‘scandalous’ suggestion. That is that inference in
the syllogistic reasoning task does not proceed on the back of interpretations of the
individual premises, but instead follows an altogether different course from which they
are invisible. This suggestion comes from investigations carried out by Newstead and
colleagues into two types of supposed errors of misinterpretation (Newstead, 1989,
1995; Newstead and Griggs, 1999; Robertset al., 2001). These are errors of illicit
conversion, which have already been described, and errors of ‘implicature’, which are
embedded in Grice; Grice’s (1975; 1989) highly influential account of the relationship
of ‘conversation’ to logic.
Grice contends that ordinary, everyday conversation differs rom the pursuit of
logical deduction in that its purpose is to convey information held by one participant to
another, who, it is assumed, does not currently hold that information. In other words,
its aim is to transmit a single, coherent conception, or model, of the world or some
state of affairs from the speaker to the hearer. This aim is held in common by the two
participants and their shared, implicit understanding of it enables them to co-operate
in its fulfilment. As a result, utterances are both generatednd interpreted with respect
to a set of shared conventions (’maxims’) which streamline the process. They do this
by licensing assumptions, called ‘implicatures’, additional to the actual propositional
content of an utterance and not logically determined by it. They are derived instead
from the choice of just that content and the particular form of its delivery, given the
alternatives available in the context of utterance. In thisway, a speaker can leave many
details unstated for the hearer to fill in, resulting in the economical transmission of the
intended model.
9Rashness in-place is also the only trait that has an impact onreasoning accuracy, tending to generate
more invalid conclusions.
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By contrast, the aim in logic is not to convey a particular model, but to demonstrate
the logical dependence or independence of propositions under any possible interpre-
tation of them. So, the assumptions of conversation are absent and the drawing of
implicatures over and above the explicit propositional content of utterances is not li-
censed. Untrained individuals, it is claimed, make logicalerrors on account of their
failure to relinquish these ingrained habits of interpretation. The standard example
of this in the domain of syllogisms is the error of mistaking the quantifierSometo
meanSome but not allrather thanSome and possibly all. This is said to be due to
the inappropriate application of what Grice termed the maxis of Quantity, which, in
paraphrase, state that a speaker should give neither more nor l ss information than the
situation demands. A hearer presented withSomeassumes that it excludesAll because
if the speaker had known and intendedAll that is what he would have said instead.
Consequently, givenSome A are B, the hearer draws the implicatureSome A are not B,
and vice versa.
Newstead (1989) investigated this pair of errors and the twopossible errors of illicit
conversion, namely thatAll A are BentailsAll B are AandSome A are not Bentails
Some B are not A. Using two different tasks as diagnostics, he found that both types
of misinterpretation of premise statements were indeed comm n. Implicature-style er-
rors were revealed by requiring participants to indicate which Euler’s Circle diagrams
corresponded to each of several different premise statements, while conversion-style
errors were manifested in an immediate inference task. Furthermore, the reasoning
errors that would be expected as consequences of these interpretational errors were
indeed committed in a syllogism solving task by the same participants who made the
interpretational errors. The conclusion, however, was that conversion provided the
better explanation overall, since it also accounted for thegreat majority of potentially
Gricean reasoning errors that were committed, namely thoseinvolving Some...not. Er-
rors involvingSome, explicable solely in Gricean terms, were surprisingly rare in the
reasoning task, given the results of the interpretation task.
This last, curious finding was pursued in a follow-up study (Newstead, 1995).
There, several combinations of variants on both the interpretation and reasoning tasks
were employed. Again, Gricean errors proved to be very common in the pure inter-
pretation task, but less so when participants were requiredto generate their own infer-
ences than when required to evaluate candidate inferences presented to them. Fewer
still were made in the evaluative condition of the full syllogism task and hardly any
in the conclusion-generation condition. From this it was concluded that the processes
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of interpretation and reasoning are in fact so distinct thatey invoke entirely differ-
ent mechanisms, such that the former has no significant impact on the latter. It is this
rather startling result that has been challenged by Stenning and Cox (2006).
They claim that this, along with much previous research intosyllogistic reasoning
performance, is flawed due to the combination of an inadequatconception of the task
of deduction and an over-restrictive focus on specific implicatures and the potential er-
rors associated with them. These failings derive, at least in part, from shortcomings in
Grice’s theory itself. This, it will be recalled, presented‘conversation’, or exposition,
as a form of discourse in which logic is augmented with pragmatics in order to achieve
the goal of communicating information. In so doing, Grice cast logic as exposition
stripped of pragmatics and communicative purpose. That is,perhaps inadvertently, he
failed to acknowledge proof, or deduction, as a form of discourse also, intended to
conveysomethingand possessed of a pragmatics of its own. A pivotal element inthis
is the notion of logical independence.
A conclusion is said to be logically dependent upon one or more premises if its
truth value is completely determined by the truth values of th se premises under any
interpretation of them. If there is at least one interpretation which leaves it open for
the conclusion to beTRUE or FALSE, then it is logically independent of the premises.
So, a grasp of deductive discourse is indicated by a willingness to concludeCAN’ T
TELL as distinct from eitherTRUE or FALSE when appropriate. Crucially, though,
Newstead (1995) did not offer participants the option of respondingCAN’ T TELL in
the immediate inference task. The effect of this is to conflate the responsesFALSE and
CAN’ T TELL in opposition to the responseTRUE. In obscuring this vital distinction, the
test therefore failed to separate participants with an understanding of logical validity
from those wedded to assumptions of informativity.
Reflecting on the fact that bothTRUE andFALSE express logical dependence also
leads to a broader conception of implicature than the traditional. Newstead (1995)
adopts the orthodox view that respondingTRUE to the conclusionSome A are not
B when given the premiseSome A are Bis an error of Gricean implicature whereas
respondingFALSE is not. FALSE is, however, just as erroneous an answer asTRUE and
can be arrived at by much the same sort of reasoning. SinceSomeis just as compatible
with All as withSome...not, the speaker’s failure to qualify his statement leaves the
hearer at liberty to assume that the onlyAs in the intended model are those that have
been mentioned, i.e. that, within the local context of the discourse,All A are Bis TRUE
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andSome A are not Bis FALSE.10
Another possibility is that the speaker elected to useSomeas opposed to any other
quantifier precisely because he was unsure of the truth or falsehood of any other as-
sertion. The Gricean account assumes that the speaker is omncient. Furthermore, as
Stenning and Cox point out, Gricean theory does not even provide a principled basis
for excluding implicatures in the reverse direction -Some B are not A, for example -
which is in fact as good a definition of conversion error as anyother. Consequently,
limiting the investigation to just the paradigm cases is notsufficient to capture the full
range of potential interpretational behaviour. Every possible combination of quanti-
fiers and term orders in both the immediate inference and fullreasoning tasks must
be exploited in order to track down the sorts of implicaturesthat participants actually
draw.
The critical point here is that the demands of informativityin ‘conversation’ only
determine that implicatures, defined now more broadly as conclusions bothTRUE and
FALSE in either direction, may be drawn by the hearer, whereas in the absence of
those demands heCAN’ T TELL. What is missing from the theory is an account of
how the hearer knows, or can be expected to know, which particular implicatures are
warranted and which are not. Stenning and Cox argue that it ishe linguistic devices
of information structure, or ‘information packaging’ (Vallduvı́, 1992), that provide this
detailed guidance. These are asymmetrical structures which signal what an utterance
is intended to be informative about and what information it is intended to convey. In
so doing, they circumscribe the range of alternatives from which the utterance was
chosen.
Under this conception of the difference between expositoryand deductive dis-
course, the transition from everyday language use to full competence in logic requires
the realisation of two distinct insights: not only that statements may be logically inde-
pendent of each other, but also that the propositional content of an utterance is neither
modified nor constrained by its linguistic structuring of the information it contains.
This framework enables Stenning and Cox to characterise thedifferences between
rashness and hesitancy, in- and out-of-place, on the assumption that these two points
can be grasped at least semi-independently of each other andto different degrees by
different individuals. Thus, one who is bothRI andRO, although wedded to the idea of
drawing implicatures, is not constrained by subject-predicate ordering and is therefore
10See Stenning (1996) for a more naturalistic discussion revolving around the exampleSome boys are
runningwhich makes obvious the introductory nature of this use ofS me.
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free to draw them in both directions. One who isRI only, on the other hand, while sim-
ilarly unable to resist drawing implicatures, is guided by the linguistic structure and
consequently restricted to classically ‘Gricean’ errors.In contrast, one who isHO per-
haps does show some grasp of logical independence but remains sufficiently influenced
by subject-predicate ordering to prevent them drawing someut-of-place conclusions
that are in fact valid. One who is bothHO andRI, though, is so influenced by it that it
overwhelms any other factors.
The flaw in this argument, however, is that theories of information structure in
fact advert to subject-predicate ordering very little (seeChapter 3). That distinction is
primarily a grammatical one, as Stenning and Cox’s own use ofthe alternative term
“grammar” for it acknowledges. Now, syntactic alternatives do provide some ability
to tailor the presentation of propositional content, but even Vallduvı́’s (1992) heavily
syntactically influenced treatment deals more with left- and right-dislocation than with
subject and predicate. The primary vehicle for conveying information structure, in
English at any rate, is not word order but prosody, especially ntonation. So, if Sten-
ning and Cox’s underlying theory is right, the articulationf statements signalled by
intonation should feature as a factor in the performance of syllogistic tasks.11
Once attention is turned to information structure as manifested in prosody, it may
immediately be noted that this element of the linguistic signal is not apparent in writ-
ten materials. This is not to say that they lack information structure; rather, it is for
the reader to recover it from context. Syllogisms, however,provide minimal context
and participants are therefore at liberty to impose on them whatever structures make
sense to them. Hitherto, this aspect of the task has neither been controlled for nor
investigated, so the strategies that participants use to assign information structure to
premises in syllogisms are simply not known. This, then, is the basis for the series of
experiments that form the core of the present work.
11Indeed, although their analysis is cast entirely adequately in terms of the interaction of two vari-
ables, it is nonetheless dissatisfying to have the explanation for rashness apparently based on adherence
to information structure when in one direction but on disregard for it when in the other. Similarly, it
is odd to findRI+RO andRI+HO to be near opposites when they share the single most prevalent trait
in common. In English, the at least bi-directional articulations of information structure have a clear
advantage over the uni-directional one of subject-predicate ordering in the search for a more uniform
treatment.
Chapter 3
Information structure in syllogisms
3.1 Theories of information structure
3.1.1 Introduction
Information structure is one of the less well-defined components of linguistic systems
and this is reflected in the profusion and confusion of terms that have been coined to
describe it. However, as this lack of consensus has become anincreasingly apparent
impediment to progress, so commentaries on it have at least begun to draw out the
parameters of agreement and disagreement, as shall be seen.Crudely put, information
structure concerns what an utterance is ‘about’ and, for this purpose, identifies some
part of it as having some rôle distinct from the rest. The bipartite, asymmetrical ar-
ticulations that result from this are generally recognisedas themselves falling into two
categories.
First are those that distinguish the part of an utterance that identifies the matter with
which it is concerned from the remainder, which conveys something concerning that
matter. In this tradition, Halliday (1967) calls thethemethat which acts as the ”point
of departure for the clause as a message” and therhemethe thrust of the message. The
examples in 3.1 (from Halliday, 1967) show three different assignments of theme (in
bold) and rheme (the remainder) for the same proposition.
(3.1) a. John saw the play yesterday.
b. YesterdayJohn saw the play.
c. The play John saw yesterday.
Many writers prefer the termtopicover theme, its complement being usually thecom-
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ment rather than the rheme. (e.g. Hockett, 1958; Gundel, 1974, 1988; Schmerling,
1976). So, for example, Hockett observes straightforwardly that topic and comment
are suggestive of ”the most general characteristic of predicative constructions ...: the
speaker announces a topic and then says something about it.”The majority, however,
do not insist on the topic being the leftmost constituent in every case, especially in spo-
ken English. Thus, Vallduvı́ (1992) notes that both 3.2 and 3.3 are entirely acceptable.
(3.2) a. Where can I find the flatware?
The forks are in the cupboard...
b. butthe knives I left in the DRAWER.
(3.3) a. Where can I find the flatware?
The forks are in the cupboard...
b. but I left the knives in theDRAWER.
The second category contains those distinctions based on the relative prominence
of the elements in an utterance, such that one is ‘foregrounded’ as against the rest.
In English, with its fairly constrained word order, this is achieved by prosodic accen-
tuation of the foreground constituent (Ladd, 1996).1 The examples in 3.4 show the
same proposition worded the same way but with three different accenting patterns.
(Accented words are indicated bySMALL CAPITALS.)
(3.4) a. The dog bit theBOY.
b. TheDOG bit the boy.
c. The dogBIT the boy.
While 3.4a is, all other things being equal, the most naturally narrative-sounding of
the three, i.e. appropriate in actual or putative response to the open question “What
happened next?” they are each easily imagined as answers to ju t ne of the following
three specific questions about different aspects of the sameevent.
(3.5) a. Whom did the dog bite?
b. What bit the boy?
c. What did the dog do to the boy?
1In languages with freer syntax it is typically done by movingthe constituent to a prominent position
in a more fixed intonation contour. See Vallduvı́ (1992) for numerous cross-linguistic examples.
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The accented element is commonly referred to as thefocusof the utterance, while
the remainder has received a variety of names, includingground (Vallduvı́, 1992),
background(Dahl, 1974; Chafe, 1976),presupposition(Chomsky, 1971; Jackendoff,
1972), andopen-proposition(Prince, 1986). The distinction between the ‘open’ and
specific uses of 3.4a is often cast as being between ‘broad’ focus (Ladd, 1996) and
‘narrow’ focus (Selkirk, 1984), which attests to the fact that, although first and fore-
most attributes of individual words, accents can in some sense be associated with larger
constituents.
Instead of focus and ground, Halliday (1967) used the termsnewandgiven, respec-
tively, in an attempt to highlight what the distinction is believed to signify, which is
that the former contains what is genuinely informative in the utterance while the latter
provides the setting for that information. However, it has long been clear that neither
term should be taken literally. On the one hand, something may be ‘given’ in virtue of
implication or general background knowledge rather than explicit prior mention. On
the other hand, something may be ‘new’, i.e. informative, despit having been recently
mentioned, in virtue of there being other possible occupants of its position at that stage
of the discourse.
Now, evidently these two characterisations of ‘aboutness’can be conceived of sim-
ply as representing the same thing seen from opposing standpoints, with the difference
lying in the object of primary interest. Indeed, in very simple statements the two coin-
cide exactly, presenting the positive and negative images of the same photograph, as it
were. This is typically seen in cases of broad focus, such as 3.6, adapted from Vallduvı́
(1992). (Topic is indicated byT , comment byC, ground byG, and focus byF .)
(3.6) a. Tell me about John. What does he do?
b. [T John] [C drinksBEER].
c. [G John] [F drinksBEER].
In the majority of cases, however, there are spans which belong neither to the topic,
on the one hand, nor to the focus, on the other, giving rise to adyn mic tension in the
overlap between ground and comment. This is illustrated in the narrow focus variant
of 3.6, adapted from Vallduvı́ (1992) and Dahl (1974), shownin 3.7.
(3.7) a. Tell me about John. What does he drink?
b. [T John] [C drinksBEER].
c. [G John drinks] [F BEER].
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This dynamic is whole-heartedly embraced in the FunctionalSentence Perspective
of the Prague School (Sgall, 1967; Sgallet al., 1986; Firbas, 1992), which adopts a
view of the sentence as a vehicle for getting from one pole to another. It is unsurprising,
then, that topic and focus, each the most commonly used term in its category, are the
names it employs for those poles. A contrastingly reductiveresolution of the conflict is
offered by Vallduvı́ (1992). This conflates the two distinctons into a single, tripartite
articulation in which the ground is subdivided into alink (essentially equivalent to a
topic) and an optionaltail, each of the three constituents being functionally distinct.
Thus, 3.6 and 3.7 become 3.8 and 3.9, respectively (Vallduv´ı, 1992, adapted, withL
indicating link andt tail).
(3.8) a. Tell me about John. What does he do?
b. [G [L John]] [F drinksBEER].
(3.9) a. Tell me about John. What does he drink?
b. [G [L John] [t drinks]] [F BEER].
Explicitly hybrid approaches are rare, however, as the difference between the two
viewpoints has, in truth, as much to do with the nature of the enquiry as with its object.
All too common, though, has been blurring of the distinction, as scholars have grap-
pled with their intuitions regarding what is admittedly a slippery notion, resulting in
not merely a confusion of terms but more of a continuum of theories than the dual clas-
sification suggests. The Prague School on its own is home to multiple variants, some
pursuing a ‘combining approach’ that conflates theme with given while others adopt
a ‘separating approach’ which draws out differences between th two (Fries, 1983).
Moreover, with particular reference to English, the furthes paration of theme from
topic has been suggested, the former being the strictly positional starting point of the
message, as in Halliday’s (1967) scheme, and the latter the substance of what the mes-
sage is about (Downing, 1991). From this it can be seen that the underlying dichotomy
that is and has been all too easy to lose sight of is essentially th t of the relationship
between semantics and syntax, on the one hand, and semanticsand pragmatics, on the
other. To put it another way, theories of information structure are all attempts to under-
stand the relationship between constituency and context, but such attempts are prone
to emphasising one over the other.
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3.1.2 Constituency versus context
Constituency-oriented approaches are concerned with the in ernal organisation of an
utterance as a system, its parts working together to achievethe communicative pur-
pose of the whole.2 The parts are therefore not merely complementary but functio -
ally interdependent and defined by their relationships to each other. Context-oriented
approaches, on the other hand, are concerned with those conntions which locate an
utterance, or, rather, elements of it, within the wider communicative situation. This is
a more open-ended enquiry in which those elements are related not to each other but
to further elements outside the utterance in some over-arching model, be it of the text
or discourse, the cognitive states of the participants, or the world.
Now, the first observation to make about these two kinds of approaches is that only
constituency-oriented ones have a particular associationwith analysis at the level of the
clause. Context-oriented approaches are really concernedwith the status of sub-clausal
elements, i.e. words or phrases. Unfortunately, the highlighting of one or more of them
produces a pattern of ‘foregrounding’ and ‘backgrounding’that is all too tempting to
construe as an articulation of the clause. To do so, however,is to mistake variations
in discrimination for relations of import, as the contrastsexpressed thereby are not
between neighbours in the utterance, but between elements in the larger model which
are alternative candidates for occupying each particular slot in the utterance.
What is a more obvious point to make is in fact also a corollaryto the first one. The
constituency-oriented approach is not properly concernedwith context. It identifies
constituents simply by reference to the rôles they play in the delivery of the clause’s
message. This inevitably casts one of them as being in some way ‘prior’ to the rest.
Again unfortunately, this insinuates the idea that it is ‘prior’ to the clause or message
itself and therefore part of the context. This is a misapplication of the rôle outwith the
scope of its definition, which is internal to the clause, leading to confusion of the slot
with the filler.
There are other ramifications to this distinction, but at this juncture it is perhaps best
to illustrate the differences by reference to other formulations. Three competing char-
acterisations have been chosen for this purpose. They are Gundel’s (1999) division of
2For most treatments, ‘utterance’ here can be replaced with ‘statement’ and ‘communicative’ with
‘informative’, but broader coverage is possible. For example, Gundel (1988) presents the following
definition of topic: “An entity, E, is the topic of a sentence,S, iff in using S the speaker intends to
increase the addressee’s knowledge about, request informati n about, or otherwise get the addressee
to act with respect to E.” For the purposes of the present work, however, the narrower conception is
satisfactory.
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given and new into two types, ‘referential’ and ‘relational’, Vallduvı́’s (1992) compar-
ison of “topic-comment” and “focus-ground”, and Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman’s
(2003) distinction between “topic/comment” or “theme/rheme” on the one hand and
“background/kontrast” or “given/new” on the other.
Gundel (1999) presents two types of given and new framed in terms very close to
the distinction drawn here. The referential type “describes the status of an expression
vis-a-vis a model of the world, the discourse, or the speaker/hea er’s mind”, while the
relational type concerns “two complementary parts, X and Y,of a linguistic presenta-
tion, where X is given in relation to Y, and Y is new in relationto X.” The main goal
of this characterisation is to distinguish pragmatically or c gnitively oriented analyses
from ‘linguistic’, ‘grammatical’, or structural ones. Thes are obvious matches to the
orientations of the two approaches as described above. However, the idea that both
are variations on the articulation of given and new leads to ac nflation of the two ap-
proaches, importing referential attributes to elements onthe basis of relational status.
This is illustrated by the use of the following example (originally from Gundel, 1980)
to demonstrate the logical independence of the two types. The claim is that the pitch
accent on SHE arises from the relational newness of the embedded subject with respect
to its topicalised predicate, in spite of the presumed referent’s undoubted givenness.
(3.10) Who called?
Pat said SHE called.
This is essentially the error of foregrounding/backgrounding producing articula-
tion that was mentioned above. The question sets up a situation containing a default
predicate with an open-ended subject. In the answer, the subj ct’s ‘newness’ is due to
its contrast not with the predicate but with other putative subjects that are contextu-
ally available. That is, it is new in that position independetly of the predicate’s being
given in its position and irrespective of the relationship between the two. In 3.11, the
subject is still accented, even though the predicate is also, whereas the ‘relationally
deaccented’ subject in 3.12 carries with it a note of contradiction that is not warranted:
(3.11) Who drove?
Well, Pat said SHE WALKED.
(3.12) Who drove?
?Well, Pat said she WALKED.
Consistent with this assimilation of contextual elements to constituents is the in-
clusion of focus/presupposition (Chomsky, 1971) in the relational category. The more
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conventional view places it alongside focus/ground ratheran topic/comment. Treat-
ments oriented around propositional content, though, as infact both Chomsky’s (1971)
and Gundel’s (1999) are, necessarily fixate on the clause, viewing one constituent as
an instantiated positional variable that completes the proposition. It is symptomatic of
them to privilege the focus as a special case of accenting attached to this constituent.
With respect to topics, though, Gundel avoids the error of ‘priority’ mentioned
above by distinguishing between a ‘syntactic topic’ and a ‘semantic or pragmatic
topic’. This enables her to account for examples of non-referential topics such as the
left-dislocated phrases in 3.13 and 3.14, taken from?.
(3.13) Most middle-class Americans, when they look at the costs plus the benefits,
they’re going to be much better off.
(3.14) Any company, if they’re worth 150 million dollars, you don’t need to think
of ....
Noting that phrases such as these are pronounced with stresson the quantifier and
that they typically have a partitive reading, she argues that the quantifier is part of the
syntactic topic but not part of the semantic/pragmatic one.3.13 and 3.14 can therefore
be paraphrased as 3.15 and 3.16,respectively.
(3.15) (As for) Middle-class Americans, when most of them look at the costs plus
the benefits, they’re going to be much better off.
(3.16) (As for) companies, if any one of them is worth 150 million dollars, you
don’t need to think of ....
In this way, the constituent and the contextual components of inf rmation structure
are shown to cross-cut each other, not be coextensive, with referential givenness and
newness being attached to the latter and expressed through intonational variation.
In Vallduvı́’s (1992) analysis, the two dimensions are certainly not coextensive, yet
they are both firmly tied to clausal constituency. The tripartite articulation that this pro-
duces has already been mentioned, but it is the characterisation of both focus/ground
and topic/comment underlying it that are of primary interest here. Not unlike Gundel’s,
Vallduvı́’s interest resides essentially in propositional content and its delivery, leading
to the near-complete binding of focus/ground to constituent structure. However, as the
distinction between this and topic/comment is rigorously maintained, this imports the
contextual aspect of the one into the other in quite a fragmentary way. In so doing, this
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heavily constituency-oriented approach diverges instructively from Gundel’s (1999)
conception of new/given, particularly the referential variety, and highlights a genuine
difficulty in respect of constituency-based analyses.
That Chomsky’s focus/presupposition is now to be found in the focus/ground cat-
egory is a minor, if telling, point. More significantly, explicitly excluded from it are
notions of focus concerned with the referential status of discourse entities. Characteri-
sations of the salience of entities, such as ‘identifiability’ (Chafe, 1987) and ‘activation’
(Lambrecht, 1994), are at the heart of Gundel’s referentialgiven/new, but in Vallduvı́’s
view they are precluded from playing any part at all in information packaging, because
they apply to elements below the level of the clause. By much the same token, promi-
nence due to accenting is considered to be a heterogeneous phenomenon, only some
of whose instantiations are expressions of information structure. Specifically, the ac-
cent that identifies the focus is the only necessarily informational one, while there is a
‘tune’ which is a sufficient, but not necessary, topic marker. Any other accenting, or
deaccenting, of elements in an utterance must, perforce, beunrelated to information
structure.
Illustrative of this exclusionary stance is the discounting of some varieties of nar-
row focus, such as in 3.17a, adapted by Vallduvı́ from van Deemt r (1992). That this
is indeed a case of narrow focus is attested by Ladd’s (1996) example of it, shown in
3.17b (withSMALL CAPS added).
(3.17) a. The men in the hospital looked horrible. Especially theOLD men.
b. I didn’t give him three francs, I gave himFIVE francs.
For ?, the informationally relevant analysis stops at observingthat the focus phrase
as a whole (‘the old men’ in his example; ‘five francs’ in Ladd’s) is realised with a
focal pitch accent on one of its elements. In spite of the recognition that it signals
givenness and newness, the fact that this accent is not on thephrase-final head noun
is considered a deaccenting phenomenon driven by pragmaticfac ors concerning ref-
erential status solely at the phrase level. It is therefore ttally unconnected with the
specifically clause-level packaging of a proposition. Thisis to be distinguished from
cases in which the focal accent is displaced from one phrase to another, as in 3.18, also
from Vallduvı́ (1992), which does have structural consequences. In 3.18a, the phrase
‘on the table’ constitutes all or part of the focus, but in 3.18b it is part of the ground
(thetail, in Vallduvı́’s terminology).
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(3.18) a. John[F left a note[F on theTABLE]].
b. John[F left [F a NOTE]] on the table.
Tellingly, though, where there is ambiguity between broad an narrow focus, as il-
lustrated here by the multiple bracketings of both strings,the extent of the focal con-
stituent is determined, according to Vallduvı́, by referenc to the context.
The lack of any necessary marking of topics is, as Vallduvı́ recognises, a point of
weakness for topic/comment theories in general. Topics arein fact claimed to exist
on a variety of grounds, including accenting, deaccenting,dislocation, and contextual
status. Given this apparent miscellany, there is arguably no means of identifying top-
ics qua topics reliably and consistently in every case. Theoretical responses to this
difficulty take one of two basic forms. One is to admit the possibility of topicless con-
structions, such that a whole statement may be a comment not direc ed to any particular
thing. The absence of the topic marking(s) of choice in any given case is then unprob-
lematic. The other is to adopt a strictly positional approach, insisting that the topic is
always the leftmost, say, constituent in an utterance, dislocated or not. This guaran-
tees an unequivocal identification in every case, albeit notinfrequently of a constituent
completely unmarked in virtually every other sense. On thispoint, Vallduvı́ notes that
there is in fact a degree of congruence between topics and grammatical subjects that
has not gone unnoticed before (van Oosten, 1986).
Vallduvı́ opts to admit the possibility of topicless constructions, but also, surpris-
ingly, allows topics to be realised in a variety of ways. It seems that a ‘link’, as it is
here termed, can be realised by any one of
1. a distinctive accent by itself. (e.g. as in 3.3, earlier.)
2. a distinctive accent plus left dislocation. (e.g. as in 3.2, earlier.)
3. possibly left dislocation by itself. (Left as an open research question.)
4. No overt marking at all. (Used with non-contrastive subjects.)
In this last case, the appeal is again made to context in orderto determine whether
there is a topic or not. In fact, though, it frequently appears to be context that drives the
determination, even when there is overt marking. For examples, the link interpretation
of ‘the knives’ in 3.3 is said to be ‘forced’ on it by the contex.
This multiplicity of realisations appears to be motivated partly by cross-linguistic
factors. However, the recurring significance of context suggests that it is primarily
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necessitated by the particular semantics adopted. Following Heim (1982), information
is said to be stored on ‘file cards’, each entity introduced into the discourse having
one. It is the function of a link to identify an existing card as the locus of information
update. There is, then, an imperative in many instances for there to be a link.
As its name and hybrid nature imply, the rôle of a link in Vallduvı́’s scheme is
to ‘anchor’ an utterance in the prior discourse. This is a common conception of top-
ics, shared not only with Gundel (1999) but also with Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman
(2003), who distinguish between “the part of an utterance that relates it to the discourse
purpose, and the part that advances the discourse.” However, this view of theme and
rheme, as they term them, is contrasted with the explicitly contextually-oriented dis-
tinction betweenkontrastandbackground(Vallduvı́ and Vilkuna, 1998), which con-
cerns “parts of the utterance - actually, words - which contribu e to distinguishing its
actual content from alternatives the context makes available.” These two dichotomies
are thus conceived of as dimensions that cross-cut each other, introducing an element
of discontinuity into constituents. This is illustrated in3.19, which is adapted from
Steedman (2000).
(3.19) Q. I know that Marcel likes the man who wrote theMUSICAL.





















Steedman (2000) keys this directly to a version of ‘Alternative Semantics’ (Kart-
tunen, 1976; Karttunen and Peters, 1979; Rooth, 1992; Büring, 1997) wherein the con-
text contains two sets of candidates for the content of a given constituent, one each for
theme and rheme. This makes it clear that the kontrast/background distinction is not
so much a relational one between neighbouring constituentsas a discriminatory one
between the salient features of competitors for a given slot. F r Kruijff-Korbayová
and Steedman, then, the notion of theme is free to be considered “tightly related” to
the “notion of a center of attention” (Groszet al., 1995; Walkeret al., 1998), whereas
in Vallduvı́’s view the latter concerns the referential status of sub-clausal entities and
is therefore completely unrelated to information structure.
This more decoupled characterisation has the flexibility for other schemes to be
cast straightforwardly into its terms. For example, broad focus effectively corresponds
to the combination of rheme and kontrast, while narrow focusis more specifically kon-
trast found within rheme. Kontrast within theme, on the other hand, is comparable to
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Vallduvı́’s (1992) overtly signalled link. The framework also enables broader perspec-
tives to be taken on issues such as the rôle of pitch accents and the number and nature
of the levels of structure involved.
Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman distinguish between theories in the tradition of
Bolinger (1965) that give all pitch accents fundamentally the same interpretation and
those, notably of the Prague School, that consider there to bdifferent kinds of accents
specific to the constituents to which they are attached. The former take the categori-
cally context-oriented view that accentuation expresses th same fundamentally con-
trastive idea wherever it appears. Vallduvı́ and Vilkuna’s(1998) terms, kontrast and
background, actually belong to this camp. More constituency-i fluenced approaches
of the latter kind, on the other hand, effectively limit thisto kontrast within theme,
treating kontrast within rheme as a distinct and non-contrastive expression of focus.
(Additionally, these should in turn be distinguished from theories at the even more
constituency-bound end of the scale, such as Vallduvı́’s (1992), which separate out the
functionality of accents other than the focal from information structure altogether.)
As for the possibility that there is more than one level of information structure,
in fact the only case that Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman cite is that of Halliday
(1967), whose conceptions of theme/rheme and given/new arealso fairly distinctly
constituency- and context-oriented, respectively. Indeed, the only real drawback of
viewing them as levels rather than dimensions is that it doesn t allow the interaction
of the two to be adequately addressed. The great majority of theories, as has been
seen, do not distinguish clearly between the two dimensionsand therefore take them to
exist at one and the same level of structure. This also gives rs to both the possibility
of recursion and its denial. Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman note that, while most
analyses admit mild forms of recursion, usually involving co-ordination or subordi-
nation, extreme positions are also possible. Clearly, strongly propositionally-oriented
approaches can allow no recursion, as they allow no information structure below the
clause level. Intermediate positions that merge constituency with foregrounding and
backgrounding, on the other hand, have the capacity to view utterances as ‘Russian
dolls’ of nested structures.
Of the three very different conceptions of the dichotomy at the heart of information
structure, then, this last comes closest to embodying that between constituency and
context. Even it does not succeed entirely, though. Indeed,relating theme not just
to the context but to the discourse purpose is arguably a greater merging of the two
orientations than occurs in either of the other two. However, it is also perhaps more of
Chapter 3. Information structure in syllogisms 29
a pragmatic connection than a definitional one, as it in all likelihood comes from the
speaker-oriented viewpoint of Steedman (2000). This provides an alternative means
of identifying a theme to the purely positional one considere by Vallduvı́ which is
yet constituency-based. It is that what is theme and what is rheme is decided by the
speaker and signalled by them by means of phrasing. Now, in practice, a speaker
is likely to adopt a discourse-level theme as an utterance-lev l theme. This is not
unlike Gundel’s empirical connection between relationally nd referentially given, but
weaker in that it concerns the maintenance of coherence relations across the discourse.
At the utterance level, though, this is achieved through thefelicitous handling of the
contextual component so as to establish a referent in commonwith the themes and/or
rhemes of other utterances. That is, discourse dynamics arise out of the interplay
between the two distinctions, not just one of them.
Turning, finally, to present purposes, though, the speaker-based approach is not
appropriate, as the intention is to compare a speaker-independent analysis of syllo-
gisms as minimal texts with the productions of a number of different speakers. Of the
text-based theories, Halliday’s (1967) clause-initial view of theme is the most purely
constituency-oriented. Given the restricted nature of theconstructions under investi-
gation, however, there is no possibility of this identifying as theme anything other than
the grammatical subject. Not only are subject and predicateless ambiguous terms than
theme and rheme, they also enable a clearer connection with Stenning and Cox (2006)
to be made. Staying with Halliday, new and given will be used for context-oriented
description. However, this must be informed b y the insightst at the fundamental con-
cept underlying the is one of contrast and that this constitutes a dimension of analysis
intersecting with that of theme/rheme rather than a separate layer parallel to it.
The two dimensions having been independently covered in this way, the terms topic
and focus are free to be used in relation to certain intersections of them, much as they
can be located within Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman’s framework. For one thing,
this permits a topic to be considered either marked or unmarked, according to whether
it is accented or deaccented, respectively. In thus giving meaning to phrases such as
‘subject-focussing’ and ‘predicate-topicalisation’, this arrangement of terms affords a
degree of descriptive flexibility appropriate to the explorat ry nature of the study at
hand.
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3.1.3 Predication and prosody
With the foregoing definitional matters settled, attentionmay now turn to the prosodic
realisation of information structure in predicative statements3, such as occur in syllo-
gisms. In English, as has been seen, given or repeated items ar normally deaccented,
while new or contrasting items are marked with pitch accents. The main stress in a a
sentence, marking its focus, is generally carried by arguments rather than predicates.
In short, simple statements where the predicate is an intransi ive verb, this tends to
produce subject-focussing. This occurs especially if the satement serves to introduce
the subject into the discourse:
(3.20) a. MyKNEE hurts.
b. Your BROTHER called.
c. TheSUN came out.
d. HerCAR broke down.
Where, however, the subject is given and can be readily recovered from the context,
it is likely to be deaccented as the topic and the predicate focussed instead. This is
Schmerling’s (1976) explanation for her well known pair of examples, each reporting
the death of a former president of the US at the start of a conversation, the first of
which was expected but the second not:
(3.21) a. TrumanDIED.
b. JOHNSON died.
Predicate-focussing also tends to happen when statements dal with generic subjects,





Gussenhoven (1983) terms the subject-focussed cases ‘eventiv ’ readings and the predicate-
focussed ones ‘definitional’ or ‘contingency’ readings. The former are considered to
3This section draws significantly on Ladd (1996). As there,CAPITALS are used informally to signal
accenting.
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deliver unitary items of entirely new information (‘news’), whereas the latter single
out their subjects as already contextualised and distinct from the truly informative el-
ements that are the predicates. Ladd (1996) observes that contingency sentences in
fact often have a secondary accent on the subject argument. This seems to have the
effect of introducing the subject, but only to serve as the locus of the real import of the
statement, which is delivered by the predicate.
Contingency readings, then, are paradigm examples of topicand comment, in
which newness in the predicate is focussed. Gussenhoven’s co ception of them is
the straightforward one of an unmarked topic, produced by givenness in the subject,
whereas Ladd’s observation highlights the interaction of constituency and context more
fully. There, the topic is marked because, although it is given, it is newin subject po-
sition in the sentence. That is, even though it is in some sense contextualised, it still
requires to be picked out as the subject from among other possible subjects.4 In even-
tive readings, by contrast, both subject and predicate are completely new. When the
subject contains the only argument, that attracts the focusand the predicate is left un-
marked.
Where the predicate contains a transitive verb and, consequently, a second argu-
ment, the difference in realisation between the two types ofreadings becomes more
subtle. All other things being equal, it is the object argument that is the single most
informative element, because, even if both arguments are new, th one in the subject
is part of the ‘point of departure’ of the clause whereas the on in the predicate is
part of its message. Therefore, focus is drawn to the predicate n eventive as well as
contingency readings. The difference between the now unmarked subject and that of
a Gussenhoven-style contingency reading then comes down tophrasing alone. That
is, of course, unless the subject is secondarily accented, which remains likely in many
cases. This is illustrated in 3.23, where 3.23a is a repeat of3.4a and 3.23b is its secon-
darily accented equivalent.
(3.23) a. The dog bit theBOY.
b. TheDOG bit theBOY.
Also possible, though, is an unmarked topic in the predicate. This occurs when the
object argument is in fact given and therefore deacccented.Focus then reverts to the
subject, or, less commonly, the verb. These correspond to the ther two narrow focus
variations on ‘the dog bit the boy’ shown in 3.4.
4See also example 3.1.2, earlier.
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Still more marked accenting patterns arise in phrases containi g combinations of
given and new elements that serve to distinguish topics fromother entities which are
not only salient but also similar. In these cases, the degreeof contrast produces an exag-
gerated, low-high ‘tune’, as illustrated by the following examples taken from Vallduvı́
(1992) and Steedman (1991)5 6:
(3.24) a. S1: I know Mary’s undergraduate degree is in physics, but what subject
is her doctorate in?
S2: Mary’s doctorate is in CHEMISTRY.
b. S1: Oh, I didn’t know both of them have a doctorate...
S2: Yes, butMary’s doctorate is inCHEMISTRY andAnna’s doctorate
is in LAW .
As touched upon earlier (see example b) Ladd (1996) uses the phrase ‘five francs’
to illustrate similar effects occurring in foci. Stress on the first element (FIVE francs)
clearly signals narrow focus on the amount in a context wherethe currency can be
taken for granted. Stress on the second (four FRANCS), however, might signal narrow
focus on the currency specifically or broad focus on the sum ofoney as a whole. In
fact, much the same ambiguity can occur in introductory, as opposed to contrastive,
topics.
These, then, are the intonational building blocks of the articulations to be expected
of the sort of predications found in syllogisms, on the assumption that such discourse
is not so unnatural as to distort them significantly. The combination of generic quan-
tifiers and situationally embedded terms, the latter being effectively necessitated by
the ‘no empty sets’ assumption, makes the use of secondarilyaccented, introductory
contingency readings seem likely, at least in first premises, where there is as yet no
context beyond the introductory rubric. That is, if the situation is said to involve peo-
ple of different nationalities and occupations, the first premiseSome Hungarians are
busdriversis likely to be realised with accents on bothHungariansandbusdriversin
a pattern similar to that in 3.23b.
In second premises, by contrast, a variety of given/new patterns is possible, arising
out of the potential for repetition of quantifiers, the guaranteed reuse of the middle
5Steedman’s view is that this tune actually identifies all true topics, or themes. However, in less
contrastive contexts it is often very difficult to distinguish it from a standard high accent, as Steedman
himself acknowledges (Steedman, 2004). This is especiallythe case with sentence-initial topics, which,
as has been explained, are common.
6Reformatted slightly, with some detail omitted, for consistency and clarity
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term, the strong syntactic parallelism of the premises, andthe bipolar nature of the
predications involved. Therefore, the full range of subject- and predicate-focussed
patterns, featuring both marked and unmarked topics, may beexp cted.7
3.2 Information structure in exposition and deduction
3.2.1 Contextually concordant and contextually neutral in tonation
It is now possible to relate credulity and skepticism more close y to information struc-
ture and intonation. It will be recalled that the essential dfference between them is
the presence or absence of the assumption of logical dependence, i.e. that successive
statements are in some way linked to previous ones. This is a difference over the ap-
plicability of the contextual component of information structure. If exposition allows
given and new to function as normal, then both subject and preicate can be topicalised
or focussed. Credulous processing therefore has the capacity to generate rash implica-
tures both in- and out-of-place. If, in contrast, deductiondiscounts context, then only
theme-rheme structure remains to indicate that what a statement is ‘about’ is its subject.
Skepticism, therefore, limits the potential for hesitancyover inference to out-of-place
instances only.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the idea in relation to the explicit contextualisation of second
premises. Obviously, in the immediate inference task, participants are free to impose
and, indeed, vary the information structure of statements as they see fit. In 3.1(i),
credulous processing gives rise to the possibility of a rashin-place implicature relating
to the given subject term (Koreans), whereas in 3.1(ii) the potential is for a rash out-
of-place implicature concerning the given predicate term (nurses). Ignoring givenness
and newness, on the other hand, skeptical processing restricts the scope of hesitant
inference to the subject term and the consequent blocking ofinferences relating to the
predicate term (nurses) in both cases.
Following on from this, then, it is possible to posit two distinct sets of intona-
tion contours that reflect the two different kinds of interpretation. The first set contains
those variants which respect patterns of given and new and the second those that ignore
them. For present purposes, the former shall be termed ‘contextually concordant’ (CC,
7Of course, it is possible that forward scanning may induce these more marked patterns in first
premises also, in anticipation of continuation or contrastto come, but the impulse is not as strong.
Second premises lacking such emphasis where it is warrantedsound definitely odd and, for this speaker
at least, are difficult to produce, whereas this is not true for first premises.
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(i) FigureBA-BC (ii) Figure AB-CB
e.g. All Koreans are golfers All golfers are nurses
Some (Koreans) are nurses SomeKoreans are (nurses)
Rashness⇒ [Some (Koreans) are not nurses] [Some (nurses) are not Koreans]
Hesitancy →/ [Some nurses areKoreans] [Some nurses areKoreans]
Figure 3.1: Topic-based rashness and subject-based hesitancy. Second premise sub-
ject term is shown in San serif font. Given term is shown in rounded brackets.
or simply ‘concordant’, for short) and the latter ‘contextually neutral’ (CN, or just ‘neu-
tral’). Now, obviously the two resolve to the same thing in the case of discourse-initial
statements, which the prompts in the immediate inference task and the first premises
of syllogisms may be taken to be. The real differences emergein s cond premises,
where the particular combinations of mood and figure generate a variety of given/new
patterns. Pre-empting the work of the next section a little,his is illustrated informally
in Figure 3.2 using the example syllogisms from Figure 3.1.
(i) FigureBA-BC (ii) Figure AB-CB
All K OREANS areGOLFERS All GOLFERSareNURSES
CC: SOME Koreans areNURSES Some KOREANS are nurses
All K OREANS areGOLFERS All GOLFERSareNURSES
CN: Some KOREANS areNURSES Some KOREANS areNURSES
Figure 3.2: CC and CN intonation of two sample syllogisms.
It follows from this, though, that the immediate inference task, even as improved
by Stenning and Cox, can not lay these behaviours fully bare.Founded as it is on the
interpretation of premises in isolation, it fails to control f r the contextual component
and over-emphasises syntax. This might, indeed, be the reason why the primary mani-
festation of the various behaviours in the full reasoning task is in the surface ordering
of conclusions - term, subject-predicate, and theme-rhemeord ring are all equivalent
here, after all - rather than more substantively in whether or not conclusions are actu-
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ally drawn, or whether or not they are logically correct.8
Fortunately, this revised account also makes feasible the obs rvation of interpreta-
tional behaviour ‘in situ’ in the full reasoning task, wherethe combinations of mood
and figure do give control over patterns of given and new, instead of indirectly via
the immediate inference task. The principles detailed in the previous section can be
used to create projections of the expected contents of both theCC andCN classes of
intonation contours, allowing them to be empirically verified and compared more di-
rectly to performance in the full task. It should be obvious that theCN class in fact
contains only one member which serves in all contexts and that this is identical to the
first premise instance in theCC class. The next subsection therefore concentrates on
describing the derivation of second premiseCC contours.
3.2.2 Prediction of concordant intonation patterns
3.2.2.1 Figure
Table 3.1 profiles the terms in each of the four figures according to their givenness and
newness, both independently and in conjunction with subject and predicate. From this
it can be seen that figureAB-BC represents a simple topic shift from the first premise
and so conforms to Ladd’s (1996) conception of a contingencyreading. The symmet-
rical figures, occupying the lower half of the table, are straightforwardly contrastive,
featuring topics unmarked due to simple repetition. FigureBA-CB is the most unusual,
as it features the introduction of a completely new topic followed by focussing of the
previous one.
Thus, it is to be expected that figureAB-BC will have a secondarily accented subject
term and a focally accented predicate term. In the two symmetrical figures, the middle
term will be completely deaccented, with the other thereforreceiving the focal accent.
The subject term in figureBA-CB will receive an exaggerated accent owing to highly
contrastive nature, while the predicate is focally accented. In all bar AB-BC, there
is some degree of contrast expressed in the overall pattern of given and new which
might be manifested in a degree of exaggeration of the focal accent, but this will not
be assumed here.
8Perhaps it also explains the somewhat anomalous combination of RI+HO, or evenRI without RO.
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givenas subject newas predicate
Table 3.1: Givenness and newness of second premise subject and predicate terms in
the four figures.
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3.2.2.2 Mood
The combination of elements embodied in mood requires a moresophisticated analy-
sis. Aside from the question of the simple repetition or alternation of the quantifiers as
tokens, the strong parallelism of premise statements requir s that account also be taken
of continuation or contrast with respect to the properties they represent. This is further
complicated by the peculiarities ofSome...not, which appears in part in both subject
and predicate, shares its subject token withSome, and expresses its scope and polarity
independently. These apparent difficulties can, however, be turned to advantage and
used to drive the analysis.
The nub of the problem lies in the treatment of polarity, which can be considered in
either of two ways. If syntactic parallelism is the guide, then it can be thought of as a
bifurcated property expressed more or less independently in both subject and predicate.
Contrast with a preceding statement can then potentially occur in the polarity of either
or both of these. If, on the other hand, a more traditional conception of polarity as an
atomic property is adopted, then contrast is keyed to overall polarity and its locus of
expression.
Using the bifurcated approach,Some...notis the only quantifier that is negative
in the predicate, being positive and, indeed, identical toSomein the subject.No, on
the other hand, is the only quantifier negative in the subject, but identical to the two
positive quantifiers in the predicate. In the unitary view, they are both negative, but
Some...notis the only quantifier that expresses its polarity in the predicate.
Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) profile the 16 moods according to these two approaches.
In each, the givenness or newness of the quantifier in the second premise is coded in
respect of three properties. The first in both cases is the same and represents sim-
ply whether or not the quantifier in the subject is identical to the previous one. The
second and third codes represent either (a) subject polarity and predicate polarity, as
independent components, or (b) quantifier polarity and its locus of expression.
It must be borne in mind that the interpretation of the second- a third-place codes
differs between the two tables and, whereas only the first twointeract in the first table,
all three interact in the second. Consequently, the absenceof a star does not indicate
an identical profile. What it does signify is that the practical upshot is the same, which
is obvious in the case of the unitary quantifiers. Polarity expr ssion is given in all of
these instances, so any change in polarity is necessarily subsumed under a change in
subject quantifier. In the remaining case ofSome...notsucceeding itself, there is of
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(a) Subject identity, subject polarity, and predicate polarity
First premise
All Some No Some...not
All GGG NGG NNG NGN*
Second Some NGG GGG NNG GGN*
premise No NNG NNG GGG NNN*
Some...not NGN* GGN* NNN* GGG
(b) Subject identity, quantifier polarity, and locus of polarity expression
First premise
All Some No Some...not
All GGG NGG NNG NNN*
Second Some NGG GGG NNG GNN*
premise No NNG NNG GGG NGN*
Some...not NNN* GNN* NGN* GGG
Table 3.2: Profiles of the givenness (G) or newness (N) of the 16 moods using different
conceptions of polarity. Stars indicate significant differences between the two concep-
tions.
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course no contrast of any kind to mark.
Turning to the starred cases, the fundamental difference they highlight is the com-
plete opposition ofSome...noto eitherAll or No, depending on the approach taken.
When the bifurcated approach is adopted,Some...notproves to be the inverse ofNo,
as the polarities of both their subjects and predicates differ. With the unified approach,
it is the inverse ofAll, because they each express different polarities in different lo-
cations. Since this latter is arrived at using a more conventional view of polarity and
its results accord with the logical semantics of the quantifiers, this is the approach that
will be favoured.
3.2.2.3 Projected realisations
Combining the mood and figure profiles for a given syllogism enables its second
premise to be characterised as a sequence of given and new elements. From this se-
quence, an ‘ideal’CC intonation contour for the premise can be projected by employ-
ing the following assumptions, which are mainly drawn from the earlier discussion of
English intonation, notably its argument-centric and phrase-final tendencies:
• The given term is deaccented (and is usually all or part of thetopic).
• Newness in the quantifier or the copula leads to accentuationof those items when
immediately followed by the deaccented, given term.
• Focal stress on the new term is narrow if it immediately follows a given quan-
tifier or copula and broad otherwise; the difference may be difficult to detect in
practice, but the former is apt to involve complete deaccenting of the non-term
item whereas the latter is not.
Table 3.4 presents an example that illustrates the application of this method by
contrasting the consequences of the two approaches to polarity previously discussed.
It employs the four syllogisms that feature the transition fromNo to Some...notor vice
versa in the two symmetrical figures. They and the intonationl labelling scheme used
are chosen in anticipation of the observational study report d in Chapter 4, which also
features further examples using the favoured approach. Thecomplete set of contours
for all 64 syllogisms is implemented in Prolog as part of the materials for the experi-
ments described in Chapters 6 and 7.
For each premise, the first line profiles givenness and newness, the second (itali-
cised) gives an informal, orthographic representation in which accented words are in
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Subject Predicate Focus
quantifier end term copula end term location
1. No A are B
Some C are not B
NN N N G
Some C are not B
X*? H* L-L% Predicate
2. Some A are not B
No C are B
NN N N G
No C are B
X*? H* L-L% Predicate
3. No B are A
Some B are not C
NN G N N
Some B are not C
X*? *? H* L-L% Predicate
4. Some B are not A
No B are C
NN G N N
No B are C
X*? *? H* L-L% Predicate
Table 3.3: Projections of intonation patterns of second premises in four syllogisms,
based on givenness and newness of elements, according to the bifurcated approach to
polarity.
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Subject Predicate Focus
quantifier end term copula end term location
1. No A are B
Some C are not B
N N GN G
Some C are not B
X*? H* L-L% Predicate
2. Some A are not B
No C are B
NGN N G
No C are B
H* L-L% Subject
3. No B are A
Some B are not C
N G GN N
Some B are not C
X*? *? H* L-L% Predicate
4. Some B are not A
No B are C
NGN G N
No B are C
X*? H* L-L% Predicate
Table 3.4: Projections of intonation patterns of second premises in four syllogisms,
based on givenness and newness of elements, according to the unified approach to
polarity.
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bold, and the third is an underspecified ToBI representationof i tonation.9 *? indi-
cates that a pitch accent may or may not be present; X*? indicates that a pitch accent
is present, but does not specify which one. (For full detailsof ToBI labels and their
use, see the ToBI conventions (Beckman and Hirschberg, 1994).)
What the example primarily shows is that the bifurcated approach is too simplistic,
generating a rather clumsy stressed positive copula inSomenotAB,NoCB. In the unified
approach, on the other hand, whenNo follows Some...nothe newexpression of the
givenpolarity is subsumed under thenewness of the subject quantifier. In fact, the
shift from two independently located polarities to one ‘movable’ polarity guarantees
that the copular verb itself is never accented. In the example given, this makes the
difference between subject- and predicate-focussing.
9Underspecification of the ToBI labelling is mainly the result of uncertainty over the intonation of
marked topics, the debate over which was mentioned earlier.
Chapter 4
Prosodic analysis of spoken solutions
to syllogisms
4.1 Introduction
Having derived the two classes of intonation patterns, an observational study was un-
dertaken to determine whether or not the predicted patternsare employed by partici-
pants in the conclusion generation task and, if so, whether or not they bear any system-
atic relationship to the conclusions drawn. The aim was to rec rd, transcribe, analyse,
and annotate participants’ spoken delivery of the premisesand their conclusions as
they carried out the task.
The ToBI specification (Beckman and Hirschberg, 1994) was chosen as the for-
malism for transcription and analysis, because, besides being well known and used,
it is geared towards sentence-level pitch accents and employs a relatively small set of
discrete tone labels to denote them. ToBI specifies 4 “tiers”of analysis, one each for
orthography, tone labels, “break index” labels, and miscellan ous annotations. The
break index tier was omitted, on the assumption that it wouldcontribute nothing to the
identification of information structure for the purposes ofthe study. The miscellaneous
tier was used to demarcate several layers of structure, namely syllogisms, individual
statements (i.e. premises and conclusions), and subjects and predicates. This facilitated
automatic processing of the annotations, exploiting ToBI’s decree that the nuclear pitch
accent, i.e. the focal accent, is the last pitch accent in a phr se.
In spite of these advantages, the resource- and labour-intensive nature of the anal-
ysis still rendered it impractical to conduct on a large-scale. Consequently, it was
decided that a small number of participants would be tested on the full set of syllo-
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gisms, but only the responses to a defined subset of syllogisms would be submitted to
acoustic analysis. This brought the study within the boundsof feasibility while allow-
ing the results to be compared to previous work. The next requi ment, then, was a
means of defining such a subset as would reliably yield variation between participants.
Usefully detailed hypotheses were difficult to formulate atthis stage, however, as
the different conceptions of information packaging provide no straightforward map-
ping between Stenning and Cox’s (2006) categories and the ones used here. Even if it
were the case that credulous processors producedCCcontours and skeptical processors
producedCN ones, the precise relationship of these subgroups to the various combi-
nations ofRI, RO, andHOthey identified is not well defined. Given the idiosyncratic
nature of the effects associated with the latter groupings,it was therefore not possible
to assign clear predictions as to either contour group with any certainty. Instead, some
very broad principles were drawn out regarding where in the problem set a division
betweenCC andCN intoners might be most plainly visible.
To begin with, the analysis of given and new by figure in the last chapter showed
that figureAB-BC contains a simple topic shift, such that theCC contour is in fact
the same as theCNone. Moreover, the other diagonal figure,BA-CB, also generates a
secondarily accented contingency reading, albeit more exagger ted. In the absence of
empirical data, though, it is difficult to judge how much moreexaggerated. The two
symmetrical figures, on the other hand, generate markedly contrastiveCCpatterns that
are clearly distinct from theCN one. Mood provides less obvious guidance, but it is the
two negative quantifiers between them that create the greatest potential for variation.
These considerations map well onto Stenning and Cox’s results. Notwithstanding
their detailed findings, the influence of the diagonal figureswa as strong as in every
other such study. Moreover, their model also reports main effects for all the quantifiers
apart fromNo, which generates differential effects among participants. Selecting only
those symmetrical syllogisms which containNoproduced a set of 14 syllogisms. Those
whereNo is repeated were excluded on the grounds that its effects vary as between
premises and may therefore counteract. The final set, then, contained 12 syllogisms,
all of which can be seen to have generated considerable response variation in both
experiments reported. They are detailed in Table 4.1.
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Syllogism 1st Premise 2nd Premise FigureSolution Solution
quantifier quantifier quantifier term order
NoAB-AllCB No All AB-CB No AC/CA
AllAB-NoCB All No AB-CB No AC/CA
NoAB-SomeCB No Some AB-CB Some...not CA
SomeAB-NoCB Some No AB-CB Some...not AC
NoAB-SomeCnotB No Some...not AB-CB (none) (none)
SomeAnotB-NoCB Some...not No AB-CB (none) (none)
NoBA-AllBC No All BA-BC Some...not CA
AllBA-NoBC All No BA-BC Some...not AC
NoBA-SomeBC No Some BA-BC Some...not CA
SomeBA-NoBC Some No BA-BC Some...not AC
NoBA-SomeBnotC No Some...not BA-BC (none) (none)
SomeBnotA-NoBC Some...not No BA-BC (none) (none)
Table 4.1: Specifications of the 12 syllogisms used for prosodic analysis.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Materials
The primary materials were papers setting the immediate infere ce and syllogistic rea-
soning tasks. The immediate inference paper contained all 32 possible pairings of
syllogistic statements which together involve only two terms. The order of presenta-
tion of the pairings was randomised for each participant. Listed next to each pairing
were the three permissible responses,TRUE, FALSE, andCAN’ T TELL. Participants
were instructed to indicate which of these responses applied to the second statement if
the truth of the first was assumed. This was illustrated with an example in which the
first statement was “No Murrels are Lellims” and the second was “Some Lellims are
Murrels”. They were told,
If you decided that “Some Lellims are Murrels” must be false if “No Mur-
rels are Lellims” is true, then you would circleFalseon the paper and say,
“No Murrels are Lellims. Some Lellims are Murrels. False.”
The syllogistic reasoning paper contained all 64 possible pairings of syllogistic
premises which together involve three terms. The order of presentation of the pairings
was randomised for each participant. Each pairing was followed by a line on which
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to write a conclusion. Participants were instructed to indicate what third statement of
the same form must also be true if the truth of the two premiseswas assumed, or else
that there was no valid conclusion. This was illustrated with an example in which the
premises were “All Nallims are Marrens” and “No Nallims are Lorroms”. They were
told,
If you decided that, say, “Some Lorroms are Marrens” must be tru if
both “All Nallims are Marrens” and “No Nallims are Lorroms” are true,
then you would write “Some Lorroms are Marrens” above the underline
on the paper and say, “All Nallims are Marrens. No Nallims areLorroms.
Some Lorroms are Marrens”.
If, however, you decided that no conclusion could be drawn about Mar-
rens and Lorroms, then you would write “No Valid Conclusion”above the
underline and say, “All Nallims are Marrens. No Nallims are Lorroms. No
Valid Conclusion.”
Aside from fully randomising the order of the immediate inference paper, there
were a number of other differences between these materials and those in Stenning and
Cox (2006). First of all, the earlier experiment used singleletters to denote entities in
premises and conclusions, e.g.Some As are Bs. When spoken, though, these produce
signals that are very difficult for software to calculate accurate intonation contours
from. What are required are full words containing open vowels and voiced conso-
nants. However, using actual, meaningful words would introduce the possibility of
conclusions being influenced by belief bias (see Chapter 1).Consequently, nonsense
words were used, e.g.Some Mullums are Nannels.1
Secondly, Stenning and Cox (2006) reused the same three lettrs, A, B, andC,
in every syllogism and, moreover, assigned them the same rôles throughout:A was
the end term in the first premise,C that in the second, andB the middle term. This
confuses the standard variables used in the specification offigure with the tokens used
in particular instances of syllogisms. Whether or not it hada significant impact on
the results of the earlier experiment by way of a practice effct is not known, but in
any case it could not be followed here, as it might interfere with participants’ own
assignment of discourse-old and discourse-new intonationpatterns. In the procedure
finally used, each term was assigned a nonsense word randomlyfr a pool of 53 and
each word used was barred from reuse for a minimum of 4 syllogisms thereafter. For
the sake of consistency and so as to accustom participants tothe f rms of words used,
the same procedure was used to generate the immediate inference papers.
1I am grateful to Prof. Bob Ladd for his timely advice on this matter and his examples of appropriate
nonsense words. Any deficiencies in the set of words finally used are due to me.
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Lastly, in the earlier experiment, premises and conclusions were arranged verti-
cally with respect to one another on the page and with solid horizontal lines separating
the former from the latter, in the manner of mathematical problems. Since the aim
of the present study was to access, if possible, participants’ li guistic interpretations,
premises and conclusions were presented sequentially on the same line, in the manner
of sentences in a text.
4.2.2 Participants
Participants were 13 students at the University of Edinburgh who had responded to an
advertisement placed in the University’s Student Employment Service. The responses
of a fourteenth participant were discarded on the grounds offailure to adhere to the
rubric.
They were required to be native speakers of British English and have no formal
schooling in logic. The first of these was necessitated by thediff rences in intonation
between varieties of English. They were each paid 5 pounds for taking part.
4.2.3 Procedure
The basic form of the task was the same as that of Stenning and Cox (2006), but
the spoken responses of the participants were recorded and analysed as well as their
written answers. Each participant was seated alone in a sound-proofed recording studio
for the duration of the task. This was to guarantee that the sound quality of the speech
signal was high enough to permit analysis by software. They wre presented with the
immediate inference paper and given a sound check in order toset the recording level.
They were then required to complete the paper in their own time, sound being recorded
throughout. When they had done so, it was removed and replaced with the syllogistic
reasoning paper, which they were again required to completein their own time with
sound recording throughout. Nearly all participants took approximately an hour to
complete the two.
For both papers, the participant was instructed to respond teach problem first
by circling or writing down their conclusion on the paper andthen by saying aloud
both the given statements and their conclusion. This instruction was added following
trials of the materials with 4 participants, all of whom readout the given statements
as soon as they were encountered in a highly repetitive manner which indicated no
interpretation of them, as though“announcing” the problems before engaging with their
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contents. From this it was concluded that attempting to access processingthrough
intonation was doomed to failure and the study’s target intona i ns should be those
associated with theproductsof participants’ reasoning, i.e. those that reflected the
structures that participants had settled on in reaching their conclusions.
The written responses to both papers were marked and recorded. The spoken re-
sponses to the selected subset of 12 syllogisms were annotated according to the ToBI
guidelines using thexwaves speech analysis software package produced by Entropic
Research Laboratory Inc. (Shore, 1988; Talkin, 1989). Standard software tools2 were
then used to collate, order, and format the annotations. Theprocessing included au-
tomatic identification and labelling of sentential focus. Samples of annotation files
before and after processing are shown in the Appendix.
4.2.3.1 Analysis coding
A two-stage operationalisation of the concepts of focus andtopic was used to assess
the fit of the processed annotations to the theoretical projecti ns produced in Chapter
3. Exact fits could not reasonably be relied upon, due partly to annotator error and
partly to the artificiality of the task conditions resultingin unnaturalness in partici-
pants’ speech. This could be manifested in forced, overstres ed, or over-enunciated
responses or, conversely, in flat and apparently undifferentiated deliveries. Focus was
used as a first cut analysis, while topicalisation allowed a more detailed look at selec-
tive deaccenting.
Focus was assessed with reference to its location in the subjct or predicate in both
premises and the conclusion of each syllogism. As previously noted, ToBI deems the
last pitch accent to be the focal one and the annotation files were processed accordingly.
The projected second premise contours for the syllogisms inthe subset were analysed
on the same basis for comparison. These projected locationsare hown in Tables 4.2
and 4.3.
Topicalisation was coded with reference to the accenting pattern of the constituent
in the second premise that contained the middle term. The codnsists of a single
letter prefix denoting the constituent, followed by a two-digit number denoting the
accent pattern. The prefix is T (Topic) if the relevant constituent does not contain the
focus and C (Comment) otherwise. The digits are binary, denoting the presence (1) or
absence (0) of an accent on the two elements in the constituent, in the order in which
2sed, gawk, andsort under UNIX
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Syllogism Subject Predicate Focus Topicalisation
quantifier end term copula end term location code
NoAB- NNG N G
AllCB All C are B
H* L-L% Subject T00
AllAB- NNG N G
NoCB No C are B
H* L-L% Subject T00
NoAB- NNG N G
SomeCB Some C are B
H* L-L% Subject T00
SomeAB- NNG N G
NoCB No C are B
H* L-L% Subject T00
NoAB- N N GN G
SomeCnotB Some C are not B
X*? H* L-L% Predicate C10
SomeAnotB- NGN N G
NoCB No C are B
H* L-L% Subject T00
Table 4.2: Projected intonation patterns of second premises in the 6 figure AB-CB syl-
logisms selected, based on givenness and newness of elements.
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Syllogism Subject Predicate Focus Topicalisation
quantifier end term copula end term location code
NoBA- NNG G N
AllBC All B are C
X*? H* L-L% Predicate T10
AllBA- NNG G N
NoBC No B are C
X*? H* L-L% Predicate T10
NoBA- NNG G N
SomeBC Some B are C
X*? H* L-L% Predicate T10
SomeBA- NNG G N
NoBC No B are C
X*? H* L-L% Predicate T10
NoBA- N G GN N
SomeBnotC Some B are not C
X*? *? H* L-L% Predicate T10
SomeBnotA- NGN G N
NoBC No B are C Predicate T10
X*? H* L-L%
Table 4.3: Projected intonation patterns of second premises in the 6 figure BA-BC syl-
logisms selected, based on givenness and newness of elements.
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they appear. So, an unmarked topic is coded T00, while one marked with stress on a
quantifier is T10.
The codes for the projected contours are also shown in 4.2 and4.3. It should be
noted that this method identifies the focal constituent in syllogismNoAB-SomeCnotB,
according to ToBI rules. This is acceptable, however, as thecopular stress there is
both salient and distinctive. The coding for the true topic would be T01. Similarly,
neutral intonation in figureAB-CB would be coded C01, but in figureBA-BC it would
be T00. Overall, the projected concordant and neutral codesaccount for only five out
of a possible eight.
In the first cut of the data, the focus and constituency labelling in the processed
annotation files was used to generate summaries of focus placement in the subjects
or predicates of premises and conclusions. Then, the individual tone labels, together




Table 4.4 compares the effects of structural factors on written performance of the syllo-
gistic reasoning task in this study with representative figures taken from Johnson-Laird
and Bara (1984) and Inder (1987), as summarised in Polk and Newell (1995). 1984
figures are for the untimed condition. Correctness is calculted with respect to legal
responses only, i.e. excluding those containing the middleterm or an invalid quantifier.
Atmosphere is calculated with respect to legal, non-NVC responses, conversion with
respect to incorrect, legal, non-NVC responses, and the figural effect with respect to
legal, non-NVC responses in figuresAB-BC andBA-CB only.
The results are broadly comparable, suggesting that the modifications to the task
made for the purposes of this study did not unduly affect performance of it. Likewise,
although the figures for the selected subset of 12 syllogismsare lower across the board
than for the full set of 64 and especially for conversion errors, they still follow the same
pattern.
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Study N Correct Atmosphere Conversion Figural
% % % %
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984)20 40 69 28 90
Inder (1987) 3 61 84 54 70
Present (64 syllogisms) 13 61 83 43 72
Present (12 syllogisms) 13 55 77 27 n/a
Table 4.4: Comparison of structural effects in the present study with prior results
4.3.2 Focussing and topicalisation
Table 4.5 shows the breakdown of focussing behaviour in the three constituent state-
ments of a syllogism. First premises are overwhelmingly predicate-focussed (96.8%),
as are conclusions when they are drawn (96.8%). In contrast,a small but significant mi-
nority of second premises are subject-focussed (18.7%). Focussing in second premises
is cross-tabulated with topicalisation behaviour in Table4.6. There, subject-focussing
is seen to be exclusively associated with code T00 and, with only ne exception, the
inverse is also true. Of the remaining cases, only three could not be classified under
one of the eight possible codes. The four predicted codes (T00, 10, C10, C01) ac-
count for the great majority of responses (79.4%) and only one unpredicted code (T11)
features significantly (14.2%).
In Table 4.7, topicalisation is broken down by syllogism. There is a virtually com-
plete division of response types between the two figures. C10, 01, and T00 occur,
with one exception, entirely in figureAB-CB, while T10 and T11 occur entirely in fig-
ureBA-BC. All four predicted codes occur in the figures where they werepredicted to
occur and, conversely, do not appear where they were not predicted to appear. T00,
Focus Statement
location 1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion
Subject 5 29 3
Predicate 150 126 92
NVC response - - 57
No data 1 1 4
Total 156 156 156
Table 4.5: Focussing in premises and conclusions
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Focus Topicalisation code
location C00 C10 C01 C11 T?? T00 T10 T01 T11 —Total
Subject 29 29
Predicate 12 32 4 2 1 49 4 22 126
No data 1 1
Total 12 32 4 2 30 49 4 22 1 156
Table 4.6: Focussing and topicalisation in second premises
(a) FigureAB-CB
Syllogism Topicalisation code Total
C10 C01 C11 T?? T00 T10 T01 T11 —
NoAB-AllCB 8 5 13
AllAB-NoCB 4 1 8 13
NoAB-SomeCB 1 6 6 13
SomeAB-NoCB 7 1 5 13
NoAB-SomeCnotB 9 2 1 1 13
SomeAnotB-NoCB 2 7 4 13
Total 12 32 4 29 1 78
(b) FigureBA-BC
Syllogism Topicalisation code Total
C10 C01 C11 T?? T00 T10 T01 T11 —
NoBA-AllBC 1 8 1 3 13
AllBA-NoBC 1 6 6 13
NoBA-SomeBC 1 9 1 2 13
SomeBA-NoBC 9 4 13
NoBA-SomeBnotC 9 1 3 13
SomeBnotA-NoBC 8 1 4 13
Total 2 1 49 4 22 78
Table 4.7: Distribution of patterns of topicalisation between syllogisms
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though, which was the only one predicted to occur in both figures, appears just once
in BA-BC. This confirms the implications of the relationship revealed in Table 4.6 that
T00 effectively does not appear in neutral intonation patterns and subject-focussing
occurs exclusively in figureAB-CB.3 Calculated with respect to that figure alone, then,
subject-focussing occurs in over a third of cases (37.7%). Given that T10 is the pre-
dicted concordant code forBA-BC and T11 was not predicted, the latter would appear
to correspond to neutral intonation of that figure, overstressed.4
In both figures, the use of concordant intonation outweighs neutral, but less so in
AB-CB thanBA-BC(56.2% against 69%; 62.5% overall). There, the imbalance isfairly
consistent, both in absolute and relative terms, with the concordant outnumbering neu-
tral by roughly 2 or 3 to 1.NoBA-SomeBCperhaps has a particularly small number of
neutral responses, but the only real exception isAllBA-NoBC, where the numbers are
equal. InAB-CB, the imbalance can largely be accounted for by C10, but nonetheless
the distribution between the other concordant pattern, T00, and the neutral, C01, is
more uneven. There is arguably a general tendency in favour of C01 which is coun-
tered inNoAB-SomeCBand reversed inAllAB-NoCB. C10 was predicted for just one
syllogism,NoAB-SomeCnotB, and its only really significant appearance is in just that
one, for which it is the clearly dominant pattern.
Moving on to reasoning performance associated with intonati l behaviour, Table
4.8 shows the distribution ofNVC responses.NVC accounts for nearly two fifths of
all responses (38.5%). The overall distribution is organised almost exactly according
to mood: those syllogisms featuringSome...not, for which it is the correct answer,
elicit the mostNVC responses, followed bySome, while those inAll garner the least.
There is a more diffuse figural bias, with responses to figureBA-BC syllogisms ranking
broadly higher up the table than those toAB-CB, reflecting the overall majority ofNVC
responses in that figure (58.3%).
Half of all NVC responses are delivered after one of the three major concordant
3Additional analysis of the patterns involved reveals that the single, exceptional case of T00 in
figure BA-BCin fact conforms exactly to the paradigm of neutral intonation, with just a solitary pitch
accent signalling focus on the sentence-final term. Of the 29occurrences in figureAB-CB, only two
do not conform to the projected pattern focussing the subject term, having instead narrow focus on the
quantifier.
4Or consistently misanalysed by the annotator. The difficulty in distinguishing between broad and
narrow stress combined with the likelihood of over-stressing lends considerable support to the idea that
the remaining unpredicted patterns, C11 and T01, should be assimilated to C01 and T11, respectively.
However, given the consistency evidenced by these results and the marginal differences involved, this
approach has not been followed.
5This column is for missing or incomplete data, i.e. the combined figures for the columns previously
labelled T?? and —.
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Syllogism Topicalisation code Total
C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ???5
NoAB-SomeCnotB 8 (9) 2 (2) 0 (1) 1 (1) 11 (13)
NoBA-SomeBnotC 6 (9) 1 (1) 3 (3) 10 (13)
SomeAnotB-NoCB 1 (2) 4 (7) 3 (4) 8 (13)
SomeBnotA-NoBC 4 (8) 1 (1) 3 (4) 8 (13)
SomeBA-NoBC 4 (9) 3 (4) 7 (13)
NoBA-SomeBC 2 (9) 1 (1) 1 (2) 0 (1) 4 (13)
SomeAB-NoCB 2 (7) 0 (1) 1 (5) 3 (13)
NoBA-AllBC 0 (1) 1 (8) 1 (1) 1 (3) 3 (13)
AllBA-NoBC 1 (6) 2 (6) 0 (1) 3 (13)
NoAB-SomeCB 0 (1) 2 (6) 0 (6) 2 (13)
NoAB-AllCB 1 (8) 0 (5) 1 (13)
AllAB-NoCB 0 (4) 0 (1) 0 (8) 0 (13)
Total 9 (12) 9 (32) 2 (4) 4 (30) 18 (49) 4 (4) 13 (22) 1 (3) 60 (156)
Table 4.8: Distribution of NVC responses by syllogism and topicalisation code, in re-
verse order by total. (Overall totals in brackets.)
intonations of second premises (51.7%) and just over a thirdafter one of the two neutral
ones (36.7%). Proportionately, however, the latter account for more than the former
(40.7% against 34.1%).
Amongst the concordant codes, only C10 shows a strong tendency towardsNVC
(75.0%), which is the correct answer in its limited sphere ofoperation. Both T00 and
T10 lean in the opposite direction (13.3% and 36.7%, respectively), but with markedly
different distributions. The bulk of T00 responses is gathered at the base of the table
but includes noNVCs. What few of these there are are in the minority found higher
up. T10 responses, by contrast, are more evenly spread down the table and display
the more gradual tailing off ofNVCs seen in the overall totals. That is,NVC responses
following T00 topicalisation are effectively limited to those syllogisms where it is the
correct answer, whereas T10NVCs are no more discriminating in this regard than the
aggregate.
Turning to the neutral codes, C01 can be characterised in much the same terms as
T10 is above. Although in total it contributes a smaller proportion of NVC responses
(28.1%), its general pattern of distribution is very similar in size and shape, differing
only in a slightly more rapid tailing off. T11 also shares theshape, but this time in
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Syllogism Topicalisation code Total
ID C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ???
NoAB-AllCB 6 (8) 5 (5) 11 (13)
AllAB-NoCB 2 (4) 1 (1) 8 (8) 11 (13)
NoAB-SomeCnotB 8 (9) 2 (2) 0 (1) 1 (1) 10 (13)
NoBA-SomeBnotC 6 (9) 1 (1) 3 (3) 10 (13)
SomeAnotB-NoCB 1 (2) 4 (7) 3 (4) 8 (13)
SomeBnotA-NoBC 4 (8) 1 (1) 3 (4) 8 (13)
NoAB-SomeCB 1 (1) 3 (6) 3 (6) 7 (13)
NoBA-SomeBC 4 (9) 0 (1) 0 (2) 0 (1) 4 (13)
AllBA-NoBC 3 (6) 0 (6) 1 (1) 4 (13)
SomeBA-NoBC 4 (9) 0 (4) 4 (13)
SomeAB-NoCB 1 (7) 0 (1) 2 (5) 3 (13)
NoBA-AllBC 1 (1) 0 (8) 0 (1) 1 (3) 2 (13)
Total 10 (12) 16 (32) 3 (4) 22 (30) 21 (49) 2 (4) 7 (22) 2 (3) 83 (156)
Table 4.9: Distribution of correct responses by syllogism and topicalisation code, in
reverse order by total. (Overall totals in brackets.)
the context of much higher proportions ofNVC responses throughout (59.1% overall).
Bearing in mind there is a general figural bias, it may therefore be noted that, within
their respective figures, neutral codes are associated withmuch higher proportions of
incorrectNVC responses than concordant ones.
Following on from these observations, then, Table 4.9 showsthe distribution of
correct responses between codes and syllogisms. Just over half of all responses are
correct (53.2%) and over three fifths of these relate to syllogisms in figureAB-CB
(62.7%). However, the results are again organised largely by mood. The table is all
but bracketed by syllogisms inAll, with those in figureAB-CB at the top and those in
BA-BC at the bottom. Inside the brackets, syllogisms inSome...notrank above those in
Some.
The three concordant topicalisation codes account for nearly two thirds of all cor-
rect responses (63.9%) while the two neutrals take up over a quarter (27.7%). Pro-
portionately, the success rate of the former is also much higer than the latter (58.2%
against 42.6%).
The highest scoring concordant code is C10 (83.3%), due entirely o its concen-
tration of NVC responses where this is correct, observed above. T00 also fares very
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well (73.3%), this time due primarily to the twoAB-CB syllogisms inAll. The two in
Somegarner almost as many responses but only half of them are corrct, while those
in Some...notare significantly underrepresented but, on the whole, high-scoring. T10
is the least successful of the three, being the only one to achieve less than half marks
(42.9%). This, though, is effectively due entirely to syllogismNoBA-AllBC, at the bot-
tom of the table; the rest of the marks are distributed ratherev nly at a ratio very close
to 2:1.
C01 is the higher scoring of the two neutral patterns, even thoug only half of the
conclusions following it are correct (50.0%). This ratio persists into the detailed fig-
ures, except for the highest and lowest, which counterbalance. With only a third of
all responses correct (31.8%), T11 scores the lowest of all five major patterns. Inter-
estingly, although its responses are fairly well spread, the correct ones occur almost
entirely in the two syllogisms inSome...not. Overall, then, and especially considering
the figural bias, it may be noted that concordant patterns areassociated with much
greater proportions of correct answers than neutral ones.
The gist of the above findings is summarised in Table 4.10. This clearly illustrates
the complementarity of C10 and T00, with the former stronglyassociated with correct
NVC responses and the latter with correct non-NVC responses. C01, in contrast, shows
no comparable association with response type or correctness. The greater difficulty of
BA-BC syllogisms is apparent in the scores for T10 and T11, but the former greatly
exceeds the latter, particularly in the number and accuracyof its non-NVC responses.
Turning now to conclusion form, Table 4.11 shows the distribution of conclusions
whose terms appear in the orderAC compared to those in either of the two valid term
orders. In total, exactly half are so ordered (50.0%), with only slightly more of these
coming from the figureBA-BC syllogisms than fromAB-CB (53.3% against 46.7%).
Aside from this minor figural imbalance, however, there is little obvious organisation
Response Topicalisation code Total
Type C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ???
NVC 9 (9) 4 (9) 2 (2) 3 (4) 10 (18) 2 (4) 6 (13) 1 (1) 37 (60)
Non-NVC 1 (3) 12 (23) 1 (2) 19 (26) 11 (31) 1 (9) 1 (2) 46 (96)
Total 10 (12) 16 (32) 3 (4) 22 (30) 21 (49) 2 (4) 7 (22) 2 (3) 83 (156)
Table 4.10: Summary of correct NVC and non-NVC responses by topicalisation code.
(Overall totals in brackets.)
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Syllogism Topicalisation code Total
ID C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ???
AllBA-NoBC 5 (5) 3 (4) 1 (1) 9 (10)
SomeAnotB-NoCB 2 (3) 1 (1) 3 (4)
SomeBA-NoBC 4 (5) 0 (1) 4 (6)
NoBA-SomeBC 3 (7) 1 (1) 1 (1) 5 (9)
NoBA-AllBC 0 (1) 4 (7) 1 (2) 5 (10)
AllAB-NoCB 0 (4) 1 (1) 5 (8) 6 (13)
SomeAB-NoCB 1 (3) 0 (1) 2 (3) 3 (7)
SomeBnotA-NoBC 1 (4) 1 (1) 2 (5)
NoAB-AllCB 2 (6) 2 (5) 4 (11)
NoBA-SomeBnotC 1 (3) 1 (3)
NoAB-SomeCB 0 (1) 1 (4) 2 (5) 3 (10)
NoAB-SomeCnotB 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (2)
Total 0 (2) 6 (20) 1 (2) 12 (24) 18 (31) 6 (9) 2 (2) 45 (90)
Table 4.11: Distribution of AC conclusions by syllogism and topicalisation code, in re-
verse ratio order by total. (Overall totals in either valid term ordering in brackets.)
in the overall distribution. However, a considerable disparity is revealed when the
neutral and concordant patterns are compared. The latter provide nearly two thirds of
the well-formed responses (63.3%) whereas the former supply only one third (32.2%).
There is less between them, though, when their respective proportions ofAC responses
are considered (52.6% and 41.4%).
Looking at the concordants individually, C10 is negligible. The T00 responses are
split evenly according to whetherNo is in the first premise or the second. The over-
whelming majority of the former are themselves evenly divided between the syllogisms
with All andSomein the other premise and show a tendency away fromAC ordering
(40.0%), whereas almost all of the latter occur withAll and most areAC (63.6%).
Something similar can be said of T10, except that the basic split i weighted slightly
towardsNo in the first premise, where there is no preference for term ordering (50.0%
AC), while No in the second premise elicits a strong tendency towardsAC conclusions
(90.0%), and there is a small but significant set of responseslinked to Some...notin
either premise which manifests a strong tendency againstAC ordering (28.6%).
Of the neutral codes, C01 displays an overall inclination away fromAC conclusions
(30.0%). This is reflected in the detail, where the responsesare distributed more or less
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evenly. The only exception is in syllogismSomeAnotB-NoCB, where it is effectively
reversed (66.7%). T11, in contrast, shows exactly this preference overall (66.7%).
Half of this is attributable to just the one syllogism,AllBA-NoBC, with the other half
accrued sparely but evenly across the remainder. In fact, T11 supplies exactly the same
number ofAC responses as C01 but only half the number of well-formed conclusions
overall.
Finally, it remains to consider the behaviour of participants as individuals. Table
4.12 shows the numbers of topicalisation codes broken down this time by participant,
along with their scores for rash and hesitant behaviour in the immediate inference task.
Surprisingly, there is no strong distinction between participants in terms of their into-
national preferences, use of all five significant patterns being spread broadly across the
sample. No participant uses fewer than three of them and all bar two favour concor-
dant over neutral patterns to greater or lesser degrees. None of the interpretational traits
from Stenning and Cox (2006) appears to have any bearing. Forthe sake of complete-
ness, Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 give the totals by participant ofNVC, correct, andAC
conclusions, respectively, similar to those given above for individual syllogisms. They
likewise reveal no clear differentiation in the participant population.
Participant Hesitant/Rash Topicalisation code
HO RI RO C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ???Total
1 2 2 1 4 2 1 5 12
2 1 4 5 1 1 4 2 2 2 12
3 0 4 7 1 1 4 2 3 1 12
4 1 4 4 2 2 2 5 1 12
5 1 2 0 2 4 5 1 12
6 0 3 4 1 4 1 3 2 1 12
7 0 0 5 1 1 5 5 12
8 2 1 2 3 1 2 4 2 12
9 0 4 8 1 4 1 5 1 12
10 0 0 1 1 2 3 5 1 12
11 3 4 2 1 3 1 1 5 1 12
12 0 2 4 5 3 3 1 12
13 5 4 4 1 2 3 4 2 12
Total - - - 12 32 4 30 49 4 22 3 156
Table 4.12: Distribution of patterns of topicalisation between participants.
Chapter 4. Prosodic analysis of spoken solutions to syllogisms 60
Participant Topicalisation code
C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ??? Total
4 2 (2) 2 (2) 0 (2) 5 (5) 1 (1) 10 (12)
1 1 (4) 1 (2) 1 (1) 5 (5) 8 (12)
6 1 (1) 3 (4) 0 (1) 2 (3) 2 (2) 0 (1) 8 (12)
8 1 (3) 1 (1) 0 (2) 2 (4) 2 (2) 6 (12)
3 1 (1) 0 (1) 2 (4) 0 (2) 2 (3) 0 (1) 5 (12)
12 1 (5) 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (1) 5 (12)
13 1 (1) 0 (2) 1 (3) 2 (4) 1 (2) 5 (12)
7 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (5) 2 (5) 4 (12)
2 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (4) 1 (2) 2 (2) 0 (2) 3 (12)
11 1 (1) 1 (3) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (5) 0 (1) 3 (12)
10 1 (1) 0 (2) 0 (3) 1 (5) 0 (1) 2 (12)
9 1 (1) 0 (4) 0 (1) 0 (5) 0 (1) 1 (12)
5 0 (2) 0 (4) 0 (5) 0 (1) 0 (12)
Total 9 (12) 9 (32) 2 (4) 4 (30) 18 (49) 4 (4) 13 (22) 1 (3) 60 (156)
Table 4.13: Distribution of NVC responses by participant and topicalisation code, in
reverse order by total. (Overall totals from Table 4.12 in brackets.)
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Participant Topicalisation code
C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ??? Total
7 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (5) 5 (5) 11 (12)
12 3 (5) 2 (3) 3 (3) 1 (1) 9 (12)
1 4 (4) 2 (2) 0 (1) 2 (5) 8 (12)
10 1 (1) 1 (2) 2 (3) 4 (5) 0 (1) 8 (12)
2 0 (1) 1 (1) 3 (4) 1 (2) 2 (2) 0 (2) 7 (12)
3 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (4) 0 (2) 2 (3) 0 (1) 7 (12)
8 2 (3) 1 (1) 1 (2) 3 (4) 0 (2) 7 (12)
4 2 (2) 0 (2) 2 (2) 2 (5) 0 (1) 6 (12)
6 1 (1) 2 (4) 1 (1) 1 (3) 0 (2) 1 (1) 6 (12)
13 1 (1) 0 (2) 2 (3) 2 (4) 0 (2) 5 (12)
5 1 (2) 2 (4) 1 (5) 0 (1) 4 (12)
9 1 (1) 1 (4) 1 (1) 0 (5) 0 (1) 3 (12)
11 1 (1) 0 (3) 0 (1) 1 (1) 0 (5) 0 (1) 2 (12)
Total 10 (12) 16 (32) 3 (4) 22 (30) 21 (49) 2 (4) 7 (22) 2 (3) 83 (156)
Table 4.14: Distribution of correct responses by participant and topicalisation code, in
reverse order by total. (Overall totals from Table 4.12 in brackets.)
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Participant Topicalisation code
C10 C01 C11 T00 T10 T01 T11 ??? Total
13 2 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) 5 (5)
1 2 (3) 1 (1) 3 (4)
6 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (4)
3 0 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 0 (1) 1 (1) 5 (7)
10 1 (2) 1 (2) 3 (4) 1 (1) 6 (9)
2 0 (1) 0 (1) 2 (4) 1 (1) 2 (2) 5 (9)
4 1 (2) 1 (2)
7 0 (1) 2 (4) 2 (3) 4 (8)
9 2 (4) 0 (1) 2 (5) 1 (1) 5 (11)
5 0 (1) 1 (4) 2 (5) 1 (1) 4 (11)
8 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (2) 1 (4)
11 1 (2) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (4) 0 (1) 2 (9)
12 0 (4) 1 (2) 0 (1) 1 (7)
Total 0 (2) 6 (20) 1 (2) 12 (24) 18 (31) 6 (9) 2 (2) 45 (90)
Table 4.15: Distribution of AC conclusions by participant and topicalisation code, in
reverse ratio order by total. (Overall totals in either valid term ordering in brackets.)
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4.4 Discussion
The results support well the general hypothesis that the assignment of information
structure, as revealed by intonation, is a factor in the performance of syllogistic rea-
soning by untrained participants. That is, there is systemaic v riation in participants’
patterns of intonation when reciting syllogisms they have completed and this is re-
flected in differences in their answers to them. As expected,variation in sentential
focussing occurs in second premises but not first and in figureAB-CB but notBA-BC,
while concomitant variation in the intonation of topics occurs in the second premises
of both figures and is linked in surprisingly detailed fashion t structural features that
create distinctive patterns of continuation from and contrast with first premises. Also,
the use ofCC intonation is in general associated with a greater degree ofconclusion
drawing than the use ofCN and, in fact, turns out to be associated with a greater degree
of correctness as well. The one major surprise is that information structure sensitivity,
as evidenced by intonational variation and its associated eff cts, is a trait that differen-
tiates between individuals in the participant population.
In spite of this last finding, the behaviours uncovered in this study are distinct in
character. C10 clearly represents a very specific response to the negated predicate
which leads to the correct answer that no conclusion follows. T00 is the comple-
mentary response, by and large, which registers the linkingterm when a conclusion
does follow and typically produces the right one. C01, in contrast, shows complete
insensitivity to informational status and relative lack ofdiscrimination in the answers
it generates. Indeed, although its performance is still significantly better than chance,
compared to C10 and T00 it seems almost like guesswork. T10 might be described
similarly, except that it is on a generally harder set of problems that it equals the scores
of C01 and it does so with acknowledgement of the status of thelinking term. T11, on
the other hand, appears to carry the hallmarks of a general “don’t know” response in
its disregard of information status, much poorer performance, and extensive reliance
on NVC. Whereas with C10 and T00, at least,NVC seems to be employed positively
as the right conclusion, with T11 it suggests a failure to conclude which is sometimes
merely accidentally correct.
In short, these responses might even be paraphrased as ”There is no conclusion.”
(C10), ”There is a conclusion and it is ...” (T00), ”I think the conclusion might be ...”
(T10), ”I don’t really know but I’m going to say the conclusion is ...” (C01), and ”I
don’t know what the conclusion is.” (T11). It would be very easy to conceive of such
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behaviours being exhibited by groups of participants with dfferent tendencies, but the
results do not bear this out. It cannot be said that some of these participants respect
latent information structure more than others, nor that some find different structures
from others. Rather, it seems that all of them express the appropriate structure as
and when they find such coherence between the premises as generates an answer of
one sort or another. This points instead to the various intonati al behaviours perhaps
being common indicators of at least some of the different outc mes of reasoning at
which any participant might arrive, instead of representing riggers that produce those
outcomes.
There is then something of a puzzle here. Neither Stenning and Cox’s (2006)
conception of information packaging nor the one employed inth s thesis appear to
provide a fully adequate, or an adequately full, account. While t e latter keys into the
substance of conclusion drawing but fails to demonstrate causation, the former evinces
a positive effect but only of one part of information packaging and largely confined
to the form of the conclusion drawn. Either the two are not truly addressing the same
issue, or there is a piece of the puzzle remaining to be found.
The first of these possibilities requires Stenning and Cox’snotion of grammar to
be distinguished more clearly from information structure as being purely a matter of
surface ordering rather than relations between constituents or entities. Then, quite sim-
ply, ordering in premises influences ordering in conclusion, but differently according
to participants’ varying sensitivity to such ordering. This leaves the content of their
reasoning open to expression through information structure. With regard to this, it
is perhaps suggestive that such term ordering variation as is discernible in the results
above is more suggestive of Stenning and Yule’s (1997) Source Founding Model than
Stenning and Cox’s individual differences account.
Briefly put, that model’s heuristics for identifying a unique source premise select,
first of all, one with an existential quantifier over one with auniversal quantifier and
then, failing that, a positive over a negative. Applied to the subset of syllogisms used in
the present study, this resolves into always choosing the premise that does not contain
No. This results in an equal division of first and second source premises which is
orthogonal to the figural distinction. Now, interestingly,it is only in relation to term
ordering that premise order appears as a significant organising factor in the results
above. Both of the main concordant codes are, with minor exceptions, associated with
higher numbers ofAC conclusions thanCA conclusions whereNo is in the second
premise and equal or lower numbers where it is in the first, essentially in line with
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the Source Founding Hypothesis. In contrast, the two neutral codes generate no such
split in the data, instead favouringCA in figure AB-CB andAC in BA-BC more or less
across the board. This may be considered a recency effect, asit pl cesC in the same
position in the conclusion as it occupied in the second premis , both grammatically
and informationally.6
It is only fair, however, to address the alternative possibility mentioned. One ad-
vantage of Stenning and Cox’s approach is that it is based on apre-test that gives good
reason to believe that the traits it identifies are indeed operativ from the outset. In
contrast, it was admitted above that the data in the present study represent the products
of the task, not the processes involved in it. This leaves it open for the missing piece of
the puzzle to be some prior, as yet unknown factor that induces a participant to adopt
a particular information structure and, as a result of that,arrive at a particular conclu-
sion. If it were possible to pre-define the information strucures in the materials, this
theory could be tested. The development of the means for doing th s is the subject of
the next chapter.
4.5 Coda
Given how closely the patterns found in this study match the ones derived theoretically
in Chapter 3 from the latent information structures of the set of syllogisms, consid-
eration must be given to the possibility that they were foundprecisely because they
were the ones the investigator expected or hoped to find. One drawback of the ToBI
approach, is that its apparent simplicity is bought at the expense of a degree of inter-
pretation on the part of the annotator. Given that the investigator here had no prior
expertise in the art and that even those experienced in it do not necessarily produce
consistent results (Steedman, 2004), this is a possibilityno to be overlooked.
In point of fact, a post-test was carried out to verify the consistency and replicability
of the annotations produced here, but there is insufficient space to report it in full. It
comprised two parts, both utilising a subset of syllogisms drawn half from the subset of
12 analysed above and half not previously annotated. The investigator’s performance
proved to be consistent with his own earlier performance andthat of one out of two
independent annotators.
6It will be recalled that virtually all non-NVC conclusions are predicate-focussed.
Chapter 5
Controlling syllogism intonation using
voice synthesis
5.1 Introduction
The study reported in Chapter 4 shows a connection between manifestations of in-
formation structure and performance in the syllogistic reasoning task. It is possible,
however, that the intonation structures observed there aremer ly by-products of the
reasoning process rather than integral to it. This may have been due to participants
having been left free to select appropriate information structures for themselves. In
order to pursue the connection further, then, it is desirable to be able to specify partic-
ular structures in the delivery of the materials. This requires the delivery to be spoken
in a precisely controlled manner. There are effectively twoways in which this might
be achieved. One is to employ a professional speaker to read fom a suitably anno-
tated script. The other is to use a voice synthesiser whose control parameters include
specification of intonation.
The logistics of employing a professional speaker, as well as the expense, are quite
prohibitive. First, a number of scripts must be prepared, inorder to distribute the
conditions properly. Each of them would then have to be read by the speaker either
to a group of participants in a venue of appropriate size and acoustics or to individual
participants on a one-to-one basis. In any event, an error-free performance on the
day can not be guaranteed, leading to the likelihood of inaccurate and inconsistent
presentation of the stimuli across the participant population. This is all the more likely
in the present context, as professional talents lie mainly in the realm of situated natural
speech and its felicitous realisation, not the artificial and largely context-free utterances
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involved here and their sometimes deliberately infelicitous realisation.
The cost of developing a limited domain synthetic voice, in co trast, is quite mod-
est. Such voices can be developed rapidly, as only a restricted set of speech sounds
and contexts is drawn upon. The restricted scope of the target domain also increases
the quality of the output, as sounds are only used in the contexts o which they are ap-
propriate.1 Voice quality is an important factor in this project, in spite of the artificial
nature of the utterances, as it is the influence of human natural language mechanisms
that is at issue. It is for this reason that the particular synthesis method preferred is
‘unit selection’ (Black and Taylor, 1997). Unit selection uses a database of recorded
speech to supply the building blocks for synthesised utterances. One advantage of this
is that many of the features of the speech output, such as duration, pitch, and stress,
do not need to be predicted or calculated, as they simply inhere in the database, in all
their ill-understood subtlety. Furthermore, although it requires a human speaker to be
recorded in the first place, any errors can be gone over and corrected before the voice
is built. As a result, the method produces high quality, naturalistic output.
In general, though, unit selection does not allow for intonaion to be specified in the
input. Instead, the output carries whatever intonation is associated with the best fitting
speech units that make up the utterance requested. That is, astandard unit selection
synthesiser will always generate a given utterance with thesame, ‘optimal’ intonation,
irrespective of its degree of appropriateness in a given discourse context. However,
FESTIVAL 2, the latest version of the FESTIVAL open source speech synthesiser (Taylor
et al., 1998; Clarket al., 2004), includes both a general purpose unit selection engin ,
calledmultisyn, and support for theAPML markup language.APML is an XML-based
markup language for specifying the turn-taking, performative, affective, and, crucially
for present purposes, intonational aspects of texts, aimedat liciting believable spoken
and facial-gestural behaviour from virtual characters (deCaroliset al., 2004). Coming
from the same tradition as ToBI, it enables annotation at exactly the right level of
granularity for present purposes.2
Prior to the present work, voices exploiting these facilities had already been built
to tailor the intonation of utterances to defined contexts ascomponents of theFLIGHTS
andCOMIC projects (Bakeret al., 2004; Foster, 2004, ,respectively). Both the speaker
used and the linguistic resources developed in the latter were available to the author.
1Of course, the drawback is that use outwith the target domainis likely to produce very poor results,
but this is not a concern here.
2In fact, FESTIVAL includes support for ToBI labelling also. However, it is geared towards research
into improving the ToBI specification rather than real worldsynthesis.
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Furthermore, among the design criteria for multisyn are:
“[T]he system is designed to be robust enough to be used as a real world
synthesiser, rather than just a research tool which works for a few restricted
examples.”
and
“[T]he voice building process is designed to be simple enough that only
very limited specialist knowledge is required to build new voices.”
(Clark et al., 2004)
The first of these was considered a desirable feature in allowing the possibility of con-
structing self-directed, self-paced experiments. The second was considered desirable
in relation to the voice being developed by the present author, as was the local presence
at the University of Edinburgh of the FESTIVAL development team. For these reasons,
it was decided to use FESTIVAL 2 to construct a limited domain unit selection voice
for the controlled intonation of syllogistic premises.
5.2 The voice building process
5.2.1 Overview
The phase crucial to the success of systems using unit selection is the preliminary one
of constructing the database of recorded speech. Particulaly important are the selec-
tion of the speaker, the specification of the set of utterances to record (the ‘script’),
and the annotation of the recorded utterances for linguistic structure. The full pro-
cess of building a new multisyn voice for FESTIVAL 2 is a semi-automated procedure
comprising the following steps:
• Choosing the speaker.
• Designing the script.
• Recording the voice.
• Specifying linguistic resources.
• Labelling the recorded speech sounds.
• Building the database of annotated utterances.
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• Specifying synthesis parameters.
Each of these steps in the construction of the syllogism voice is described in the
subsections that follow. The technical detail, although considerable, is beyond the
scope of this work and is mostly omitted. Some points, however, ar relevant to the
investigation being pursued and are therefore covered in some depth, as are those that
proved problematic and required additional effort to correct or modify the working
of the standard system. In particular, development and testing of the voice revealed
a less than complete dovetailing of the multisyn andAPML modules which had to
be overcome. To assist in these more detailed areas, the following paragraph briefly
introduces some terminology and outlines the synthesis process.
With a suitable voice built and loaded and an output utterance requested, FESTIVAL
2 first produces a target list of the required fundamental speech sounds (’phones’) an-
notated with the target linguistic structure. Next, pairs of adjacent phones (’diphones’)
from the database are formed into candidate lists for all thetarget diphones. Every
candidate diphone is then costed for how well it can be spliced with every candidate
for the preceding overlapping diphone and how well it matches t linguistic features
of the target diphone. The candidate lists are then searchedto find an optimal sequence
that minimises the join and target costs. This favours chains of diphones from the same
source utterance, for which the join cost is zero, as long as they are consistent with the
target context. Next to the quality of the database, the joinand target cost functions are
the most important factors determining the quality of the output.
5.2.2 Choice of speaker
As has already been indicated, this choice was effectively made at the outset. For the
record, however, it should be noted that the chosen speaker possessed the following
essential qualities:
• a clear voice.
• a natural-sounding, intonationally-varied delivery.
• a consistent delivery.
• all of the above over periods of up to three hours.
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In addition to these, the speaker brought experience of the gen ral procedure and a
degree of linguistic and domain knowledge which proved usefl in understanding and
performing his task.
5.2.3 Script design
The fundamental requirement of the recording script is thatit provide complete cov-
erage of the target utterance space. That is, minimally, it should feature at least one
instance of each potential output diphone (Clarket al., 2004).3 Furthermore, diphone
here means diphonein context: it is a complex combining the diphone itself with its
positions in the syllable, word, and phrase in which it appears, the stressing of the syl-
lable, the accenting and grammatical category of the word, an other relevant linguistic
features, including aspects of the preceding and followingcontexts. Limited domain
synthesis provides an advantage here, in that coverage of each word in context effec-
tively ensures coverage of each diphone. The task, therefor, is to distribute each word
in the domain vocabulary systematically across all its potential contexts of occurrence.
Ideally, in fact, the system should have several instances of ach such occurrence to
choose from, so as to enable it to maximise the join quality. However, this desideratum
takes second place to that of producing a script of a manageable size and in the major-
ity of cases this results in attempting to achieve complete cov rage as parsimoniously
as possible. As points of reference, theFLIGHTS script contained 149 sentences and
the COMIC script 308 (Baker, 2003; Foster, 2004). Reporting on the development of
the FLIGHTS system, Baker (2003) analyses the script design task into three compo-
nents, each of which will be dealt with in turn in the next three subsections: variables,
sentence types, and prosodic context.
Having enumerated each of these components, Baker goes on topresent an algo-
rithm for combining them in the fewest number of sentences. This is useful where, as
there, there are sentence types and lists of variables of varying lengths. It is not nec-
essary in the present case, however, as the sentence types are highly uniform and the
variables completely interchangeable, making the combinatrics involved much more
straightforward. The final subsection, therefore, simply deals with the manner in which
the script sentences are presented to the speaker.
3Although FESTIVAL 2 implements a ‘back-off’ procedure for finding replacements for missing
diphones, this necessarily leads to uncontrolled results and is to be avoided where at all possible.
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5.2.3.1 Variables
These are the words, usually but not necessarily nouns or noun phrases, that instantiate
situational parameters. In theFLIGHTS domain of airline bookings, they include the
names of specific airlines, airports, and cities, plus timesof day and so on. In the
syllogism domain, they are the terms of the syllogism. Now, in the observational study,
the terms were nonsense words, but that was only to assist thepeech analysis software
in determining intonation contours. Human listeners have much greater facility in this
regard, so it was decided that known words denoting real-life categories would be
used. Of course, this raises the spectre of belief bias (see Chapter 1), but the plethora
of previous studies of syllogistic reasoning provide a wealth of choice of sets of terms
that have been compiled with this in mind.
The set of terms chosen was that published as Table 17 in Stenning a d Yule (1997).
This lists three classes of terms, denoting professions, nationalities, and interests or
pastimes, each containing 32 entries. As such, it is far too large to use in its entirety.
Pre-empting a little the discussions to come, if it is assumed that
(a) each quantifier takes a differentCCcontour in the second premise of each figure,
plus oneCN contour for all of them, and
(b) each script premise accounts both for an instance of one term in subject position
and an instance of another in predicate position and therefore terms only count
once, not twice,
then there are a minimum of 4×5×3×32= 1920 sentences to be recorded, without
even accounting for first premises or repetition of quantifiers!
Clearly, reducing the pool of terms on which to draw increases the potential for
participants becoming confused by repetition of terms in successive syllogisms, so a
balance must be struck. It was decided that 8 terms from each cl ss was the minimum
acceptable number, producing 480 combinations on the assumptions above. This is
still considerably more than was required for either of the earli r voices, and yet to be
increased by the additional factors mentioned, but the advice received was that a script
double that size could be recorded in under 3 hours, so it was deemed acceptable.
The next step was to identify which members of each class to keep. Here, it was
possible to exploit what Baker (2003) calls ‘systematic overlap’, which occurs when
every member of a class of words contains the same phone at thesam boundary, i.e.
start or end, as a regular feature and is therefore interchangeable at that boundary with










Table 5.1: Final lists of terms included in voice, by category
every other member of the class without affecting the boundary iphone. This results
in only one instance of a given context being needed in order to supply that context to
all members of the class. In the syllogism case, this ensuresthat each term only needs
to be recorded once in the subject for each context and once inthe predicate, as the
two can be completely cross-matched at the diphone boundaryof the subject term and
the copula.4
Since the Table 17 terms are all plural, this favours selecting those with the regular
plural ending ‘-s’. This can be realised by either of the phones [ z ] or [ s ] according
to whether the previous phone is voiced or unvoiced, respectively. Tone is carried by
voice, so the [ z ] instances were chosen. This, however, still lef 20 professions, 24
nationalities, and 26 interests. Extending the approach to‘-ns’ for nationalities and
’-ers’ for interests only reduced these to 17 and 21 respectiv ly, so thereafter an ad hoc
approach was adopted, eliminating any terms that might yet be unduly semantically
loaded or over-conceptualised (e.g. “politicians”, “Australians”) or trigger stereotyp-
ical conceptions when in combination with certain other terms (e.g. “Russians” with
“chessplayers”). The final set is shown in Table 5.1.
5.2.3.2 Sentence types
These are the sentence ‘templates’ that contain the slots int which variables fit. In the
syllogism domain, these would seem to be clearly generated by the various combina-
tions of the quantifiers, the copula, and the negative particle. However, the asymmetry
4It is, in fact, for this reason that the initial calculation given was not 4×5×3×32× (3×32−1) =
182400!
Chapter 5. Controlling syllogism intonation using voice synthesis 73
of the quantifiers raises the question whether or not there are in fact only two sentence
types - with or without the negative particle - and the three subject quantifiers are better
considered as variables. In the result, the permutations are the same whether the subject
quantifiers are treated as sentence types or variables, while the restriction of a negative
sentence type toSomealone only serves to obscure the potential cross-matches be-
tween the three positively predicated quantifiers. Consequently, it was concluded that
the four quantifiers generate one sentence type each.
5.2.3.3 Phonetic coverage
Having already effectively dealt with the issues relating to diphones in combination,
this component of the task resolves into enumerating the setof possible intonation
contours that each sentence type may carry. This, of course,was already covered in
Chapter 3. Allowing for the redundancy found therein, however, eliminates 28 of the
64 contours produced there. For each of the three unitary quantifiers, there remain the
same two subsets of four contours, two per figure, corresponding to whether or not
the quantifier in question is the same as that in the first premis . ForSome...not, there
remain three subsets, one each for following itself, following Some, and followingAll
or No.
The CN pattern for second premises is characterised by secondary accenting of
the subject term and focussing of the predicate. This is the same as one or other of
theCC patterns produced for each quantifier in figureAB-BC and is therefore already
accounted for. First premises, being discourse-initial, are considered also to beCN
but nonetheless generate distinct contours on account of ‘continuation rise’ at the end.
However, being first andCN they are necessarily unaffected by mood or figure and
therefore contribute only one further contour to the inventory of each sentence type.5
There are, then, in total,(3×2×4)+(3×4)+4= 40 phonetic contexts to incorporate
into the recording script.
Factoring in the variables, this results in 40× 24 = 960 sentences in all, which,
as it happens, is exactly the 2×480 contemplated earlier. That is not the end of the
matter, though, because the set of phonetic contexts identified still contains redundan-
cies that enable further cross-matching to be done. Earlier, only cross-matching within
each context was contemplated, but now cross-matching between contexts proves to
be possible. To illustrate this, consider the following examples:
5The possibility of anticipatory contrast was touched on in Chapter 3 and will be passed over here.
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(5.1) a.
All butchers are Hungarians.
H* H* LH%
b.
All Koreans are beerdrinkers.
H* H* LH%
(5.2) a.
No nurses are squashplayers.
H* LL%
b.
No Tibetans are waiters.
H* LL%
Now, cross-matching within the contexts represented by (5.1) and (5.2) generates
the instances in (5.3), among others, but cross-matching between them additionally
generates the likes of those in (5.4):
(5.3) a.
All butchers are beerdrinkers.
H* H* LH%
b.
No Tibetans are squashplayers.
H* LL%
(5.4) a.
All Koreans are squashplayers.
H* LL%
b.
No nurses are Hungarians.
H* H* LH%
The intonational isomorphism of the contexts identified forthe unitary quantifiers
and the obvious overlap betweenSomeandSome...notenable a considerable amount of
such cross-matching to be done. The constraining factor is ensuring coverage of all the
variables in the subject phrase of each context, while the greatest slack is found in the
contexts forSome, which overlap those for the other two unitary quantifiers aswell as
those forSome...not. In the result, one each of the contexts forAll andNo, four of those
for Some...not, and five of those forSomecould be dispensed with. The final tally of
sentences to be included in the recording script therefore cmes to 29×24= 696.
5.2.3.4 Script presentation
The script was generated automatically using a Prolog program to combine the sets
of variables with the set of phonetic contexts. It was printed for presentation to the
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speaker, with each page containing half of the 24 sentences ia particular context.
This was to enable the speaker to familiarise himself with each context in turn and
record all the sentences in it together, for maximum consistency.
The intonational contour of each sentence was represented by typographical cues.
Experience from theCOMIC project had shown that this was easier for the speaker
to interpret than annotating the words with analytical symbols. Bold face was used
for standard pitch accents, while italics indicated exaggerated emphasis. Punctuation
was used to signal boundary tones, with full stops indicating low tones and ellipsis
signifying continuation rise. Examples 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate these devices for a first
and a second premise context, respectively.
(5.5) All Egyptians aremusicians...
(5.6) Someteachersare notdogowners.
As indicated in Chapter 3, many if not all of the script sentences are likely, strictly
speaking, to be composed of more than one intermediate phrase, e ch with its own
boundary tone. Given their brevity and structural simplicity, however, pitch accents
and final boundary tones were considered sufficient to conveythe intended contours to
the speaker and intermediate tones, indeed, feared intrusive and confusing. In effect,
the speaker’s own linguistic intuitions were trusted to findthe most natural phrasing in
each case.
In the FLIGHTS script, each sentence was prefaced by a context-setting question,
delivered during recording by another interlocutor. This suited the overall conver-
sational dialogue context for which the voice was intended.It was not considered
helpful in the present case, though, to include contextualising premises before or after
sentences to be recorded, on the grounds that it was likely tooverwhelm the speaker
with an excess of highly similar and repetitious utterances. In tead, a ‘crib sheet’ was
produced that illustrated each context in pairs of sample premises, both presented us-
ing the typographical conventions described. In the result, however, the absence of a
partner premise to each sentence in the script proved to be anobstacle to achieving
the correct intonation. Consequently, in the later stages of recording, the speaker re-
sorted to constructing such premises for himself ‘on the fly’. It was here that his prior
experience and knowledge of syllogisms and linguistics proved invaluable.
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5.2.4 Voice recording
Clark et al. (2004) observes that the quality of the recording environmet and equip-
ment is not in fact a major concern in the building of a voice and that acceptable results
can be obtained using relatively rudimentary facilities. Nonetheless, better results are
got from better facilities and they were available for this project. The speaker was
recorded in a sound-proofed, acoustically damped recording studio fitted with profes-
sional quality equipment. The recorded speech was saved dirctly to computer disk as
a series of sampled data files in WAV format, each file containing batches of sentences
of varying lengths.
5.2.5 Specification of linguistic resources
The computational phase of the voice building process requis a number of files spec-
ifying linguistic information to be provided. Included in these are an inventory of the
phones used and their permitted replacements, a lexicon listing every vocabulary item
and its pronunciation in the given phone set, and rules for determining phrase types
and boundaries. For the syllogism voice, these were copies in their entirety of those
used to build theCOMIC voice. To these was added a file of lexical entries for the 24
terms, which did not feature in the domain of the earlier voice.
Also required is a set of files, one for each script sentence, containing the words of
each recorded utterance marked up inAPML for their intonation.6 For present purposes,
only the subset of theAPML tagset that deals with intonation needed to be used. This
is based on Steedman’s (2004) theory of information structue and intonation, but this
is not a bar to exploiting it. The relationship between theAPML and multisyn modules
in FESTIVAL is essentially ‘theory-neutral’, in that the former is useddescriptively, not
prescriptively. It will be recalled that the unit selectionmodule does not generate the
various elements of the linguistic signal themselves, but merely reproduces the prere-
corded bundles of them that reside in the database, according to the selection criteria
it is given. TheAPML module enables those criteria to include intonational markup.
Provided the script sentences are both consistently markedup and consistently intoned,
then, the specification of a given tag will be reliably associated with whatever intona-
tion the speaker actually used for items so tagged, rather than whatever intonation any
particular theory dictates ought to be used. Briefly put, in Humpty Dumpty style, the
tags mean what the voice builder wants them to mean.
6Such files are also used to drive synthesis using the finished voice.
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As with the FLIGHTS voice, the machinery required by Steedman’s handling of
mutual belief and contentiousness is not needed and only theH* and L+H* accents
are adopted. The former is used to represent ordinary pitch ac ents, including focal
accents, and the latter to represent exaggerated emphasis.Similarly, the only tone
accents used are LH% and LL%, for continuation rise and standard falling tone, i.e.
first and second premises, respectively. Following the decision made in respect of
presentation of the script, intermediate tone boundaries were ignored.
5.2.6 Phone labelling
The phone-level labelling of the recorded utterances is a ‘forced alignment’ procedure
consisting of a series of automated steps using the resources described above and a
Hidden Markov Models toolkit. Its aim is to specify the boundaries between successive
phones as time points in the sampled speech waveforms. In summary, this is achieved
in two stages. First, the synthesiser, not in unit selectionmode, is used to generate
the correct sequence of phone labels for each utterance. Then, t toolkit is used to
iteratively approximate the corresponding phone boundaries. The end result is a set of
label files describing the phonetic segmentation of the speech database.
Join costs are calculated with reference to phone boundaries nd therefore the accu-
racy of this phase is vital to the quality of the voice. On the syllogism set of utterances,
the toolkit performed extremely poorly. In nearly every case, there were single phone
labels spanning sequences of three or four recorded phones,followed by sequences
of labels covering minimal spans. In very few cases were any phone boundaries ac-
curately placed. The practical outcome of this was that the majority of phones in the
database were placed effectively out of use and the only way of generating output that
conformed to an input specification at all was to disable the join cost function com-
pletely, producing very low quality synthesis. Unfortunately, the models used in the
HMM toolkit are fixed, so the only means of correcting these errors was to exam-
ine every one of the 696 pairs of label and waveform files individually and manually
adjust the labels. The end result of this laboriously time-consuming task was a vast
improvement in voice quality.
5.2.7 Utterance building
The final phase of database construction involves augmenting the labelled utterances
produced in the previous phase with various levels of linguistic analysis. Once again,
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the synthesiser is used to generate the phone sequence for each sentence in the script.
This time, however, it builds on top of it the descriptions ofthe sentence’s syllabic,
grammatical, and other linguistic structures, known in FESTIVAL as ‘relations’. In-
cluded in these are relations for its intonational make-up as given in itsAPML spec-
ification. The two phone sequences are then unified, producing the final database of
recorded phones linked to a variety of interrelated structural annotations.
5.2.8 Specification of synthesis parameters
At run time, the only component of the system with a significant impact on voice
quality that can be changed by the user is the target cost calculation. Join costs are
precomputed according to a fixed formula, but target costs are computed on demand
according to one of several formulae provided by the system,as selected by the user.
Each of these is a weighted sum of normalised components repres nting linguistic
features, such as lexical stress, position in syllable, word, and phrase, part of speech,
preceding phonetic context, following phonetic context, and punctuation. Included in
the set is one formula, intended for use inAPML-based synthesis, which also contains
components representing pitch accents and boundary tones.In t ts, however, it proved
unreliable, producing output that featured accents where none was specified, and vice
versa, and incorrect boundary tones. Investigation of the problem revealed there to be
two flaws in the calculation.
The primary fault lay in the two disjoint sets of relations for intonational mark-
ing supported by FESTIVAL. APML tags are recorded in the SemStructure, Emphasis,
and Boundary relations, which register theme and rheme, pitch accents, and bound-
ary tones, respectively. Each of these relates its tags to XML-derived tokens for text
components in the Token relation and thereby, via the Word, SylStructure, and finally
Segment relations, to individual phones. Alongside this, ToBI-style accents and tones
are stored in the IntEvent relation. These are linked via theIntonation relation to syl-
lables and thereby, via the SylStructure and Segment relations, again to phones.
The function of the latter set of relations is to register intonation events predicted
by the system when synthesising in some mode other than unit selection mode. When
synthesising directly fromAPML input in such a case, the prediction method is actually
a forced selection or ‘pass-through’ of the accents and tones sp cified in the markup,
resulting in the two sets of relations agreeing. In the unit selection voice building
process, however, a different prediction method is used andthe two are left out of
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step. This ought not to matter, as the predicted set can simply be ignored in the target
cost calculation.7 Unfortunately, though, the implementedAPML formula assumes
the pass-through method has been used and tests only the predicted set of intonation
events, leading to the selection of potentially inappropriate units.
A new, ‘strict’ APML target cost function was implemented to correct this fault.
However, while it delivered output that conformed to the specification of pitch accents
in the input, that output proved still to be defective in respct of boundary tones. Fur-
ther investigation revealed that this was due to the accent and tone tests both being
applied only to vowels. This is satisfactory in the case of pitch accents, as they are
associated with syllables and therefore effectively with at le st one vowel in each in-
stance. Boundary tones, in contrast, occur at the very ends of words, which, in English,
frequently consist of clusters of consonants. In fact, the pervasive presence of terms
ending with ‘-ns’ in the syllogism domain as defined was sufficient to render the test
largely useless. In the final version of the cost function, then, it was extended to voiced
consonants.
5.3 Conclusion
The completed voice demonstrably produces high quality synthesis that conforms to
its input specification. The output utterances can be shown tconsist overwhelmingly
of substantial single-source phone sequences drawn from appropriate input utterances,
which is the goal of unit selection. The voice is capable of delivering any of the desired
combinations of terms, mood, figure, and intonation on demand. This amounts to 40×
24×23= 22080 distinct premise utterances in total. Beyond this there is an indefinite
number of utterances, of no doubt variable quality, that areill-formed formally (e.g.
“All Mexicans are not butchers.”), grammatically (e.g. “noare hillwalkers no some.”),
semantically (e.g. “No golfers are golfers.”), and intonationally (e.g. with no pitch
accents at all).
The successful development of this voice, though, leaves onissue outstanding.
Substantive corrective measures were required here in order to ensure that the synthe-
sised output matched the input specification. Specifically,both the join and target costs
7There are other reasons why perhaps it ought not to matter, such as that the markup and the speaker’s
rendition of it are prescriptively accurate. However, the earli r discussion ofAPML’s theory-neutral
implementation explains why this can not be relied on. Furthermore, in the context of the present
application, there are alternative intonations of identical wordings to accommodate, which text-based
predictive methods can not deal with.
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were shown to be severely compromised, requiring labellinga d cost function correc-
tion. That being so, an explanation is required of why this wanot so in the cases of
theFLIGHTS andCOMIC voices. Two are offered here.
First, both of the earlier projects focussed on the generation ofcontextually appro-
priate intonation in much more natural and contextualised utterances than those in the
syllogism domain. This might have led the intonation eventspredicted by the synthe-
siser during the build process to approximate the specified contours quite well, in fact,
leading to accidentally correct selection in the majority of cases. This applies equally
to the ‘inappropriate’ ones tested in theFLIGHTS evaluation, which were appropriate
to the contexts in which they were recorded and intended for and merely used out of
context for evaluative purposes. Their contours were presumably significantly differ-
ent from those of the utterances appropriate to the context of use and therefore capable
of being distinguished from them by the synthesiser, but again not actually on the basis
of theAPML markup.
Second, both projects relied on user preference studies forevaluation of their out-
put, rather than detailed analysis of the synthesised structures themselves. In such
studies, participants do not have precisely detailed expectations of the intonation con-
tours they hear and are merely required to state which ones they find more acceptable.
In theFLIGHTS case, at least, the results as reported leave open the possibility that the
synthesised utterances presented to participants did not co form exactly to the input
specifications. Furthermore, only rather modest preferences were elicited there and not
in all cases. Given that the original recordings received much higher ratings, this really
ought not to be so if the synthesiser is reproducing the same contours faithfully.
Chapter 6
Syllogism solving using spoken
materials
6.1 Introduction
To resume the primary course of this thesis, it will be recalled that the study reported
earlier led to a rather surprising outcome. The intonation patterns actually used by
participants were shown to be either neutral or concordant,i.e. based on the latent
information structure of premises, and to be clearly related to the conclusions they
drew, especially in respect of number and correctness, yet it remained unclear that they
were instrumental in arriving at those conclusions. If Stenning and Cox’s (2006) theory
holds true here, then they should be, but the fact that individual participants seem only
sometimes to respect the latent structure suggests otherwise, unless a further, as yet
unknown, prior cause is at play.
The experiment described in this chapter addresses this question by imposing pre-
specified intonation patterns on premises, using the synthetic voice introduced in the
last chapter. The exercise is exactly the same as that given to par icipants in the stan-
dard conclusion generation task, save only that instead of reading the premises, they
hear them spoken aloud. This might be thought to render an already quite difficult test
inordinately so, but Gilhoolyet al. (1993) have shown that the increase is but modest
for aural as compared to visual presentation of premises.1
Table 6.1 summarises the degrees of correct andNVC responding to the subset of
syllogisms in figuresAB-CB andBA-BC with respect to the five major topicalisation
1In fact, their definition of correctness is unclear and leaves open the possibility that the increase in
difficulty is less even than they suggest.
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Topicalisation Conclusions
code NVC ratio Accuracy Term ordering model?
Concordant: C10 very high very high n/a
T00 low high source founding
T10 proportionate proportionate source founding
Neutral: C01 proportionate proportionate recency
T11 high low recency
Table 6.1: Characterisations of the five major topicalisation patterns in terms of three
general properties of conclusions.
patterns, as discussed in Chapter 4. Extrapolating from this and the assumption that in-
formation structure does indeed play some part in the reasoning process, the following
two hypotheses can be derived.
1. Syllogisms delivered withCC intonation patterns should generate more correct
responses than those delivered withCN patterns (at least in figuresAB-CB and
BA-BC).
2. Syllogisms delivered withCC intonation patterns should generate fewerNVC
responses than those delivered withCN patterns (at least in figuresAB-CB and
BA-BC).
The table also associates term ordering models with four of the five patterns, draw-
ing on the speculation in Chapter 4 that Stenning and Cox’s (2006) findings relate to a
conception of grammar distinct from information structurep operly so called. On this
basis, a third hypothesis can be tentatively put forward.
3. Syllogisms delivered withCC intonation patterns should generate non-NVC re-
sponses whose terms are ordered according to the Source Founding Model,
whereas those withCN patterns should generate such responses ordered accord-
ing to recency (at least in figuresAB-CB andBA-BC).
If the two main hypotheses are borne out, confirmation of thisthird would reconcile
the different sets of findings.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Materials
The primary materials used in the experiment were sound filessynthesised on demand
from APML specifications using the limited domain voice built for thispurpose. The
APML files were created in advance by a Prolog program similar to that used in the
construction of the voice. In addition to these, a log file wasautomatically generated
for each participant, listing the sequence of conditions used.
The program generated 64 such files per participant, constituting the full, stan-
dard set of syllogisms, half of which were marked up withCC contours and half with
CN. Ideally, all 128 combinations of mood, figure, and intonation would have been
presented to each participant, but this was considered excessively onerous. Each syl-
logism was instantiated with one of each of the three categori s f terms (nationality,
profession, and interest) at random and the ordering of the set of syllogisms was also
randomised.
The two classes of intonation contours were distributed over th set of syllogisms
according to one of three patterns. This was necessitated bythe three orthogonal divi-
sions into which the four quantifiers fall: positive vs. negative, universal vs. existential,
and fully convertible vs. partially or non-convertible. Accounting for all of these re-
quires three pairs of complementary contour assignments, as hown in Table 6.2, but
these cannot be distributed equally across 64 instances. Consequently, the three pat-
terns were formed by first dropping one of the complement pairs and then rotating the
resultant square column-wise. Each of these was in turn rotated square-wise for each
successive participant.
Quantifier Polarity Scope Convertibility Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
All positive universal partial CC CN CC CN CC CN
Some positive existential full CC CN CN CC CN CC
No negative universal full CN CC CC CN CN CC
Some...not negative existential none CN CC CN CC CC CN
Table 6.2: Pairs of complementary patterns of distribution of classes of intonation con-
tours across the four quantifiers
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6.2.2 Participants
The participants were 35 students drawn from across the University of Edinburgh.
Each had responded to an advertisement placed in the university’s student employ-
ment service and on the online forum run by the students’ associati n. They were
required to be native speakers of British English with no training in logic and no hear-
ing impairments. Each was paid 5.05 for their participation.
The results of a further 6 participants were discarded for failure to satisfy the native
language condition and yet another 7 for systematically ill-formed responses resulting
from misinterpretation of the instructions.2 Given the design of the experiment, the
remaining 35 participants constituted 2 cohorts of 12 and 1 of 11, corresponding to the
3 intonation contour distribution patterns.
6.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted remotely, via the World Wide Web. Since the stan-
dard task is essentially self-directed and self-paced, there s emed to be no reason why
participants should not be given the facility to run the experim nt for themselves at
their convenience. It was considered that this would encourage take-up while reducing
the administrative and logistical overheads of arranging to test significant numbers of
participants. Participants were directed to a page on the World Wide Web which was
dynamically generated by a PHP script. This displayed the instructions for the exper-
iment and allowed the participant to verify their sound reproduction capability, then
created a sequence of interactive forms corresponding to the 64 syllogisms, here called
‘statement pairs’.
Each form constrained the participant to a single course of action. First, the partic-
ipant was given a button for listening to the statement pair.Activating this button sent
a request to the speech synthesiser to generate the utterance spe ified in theAPML file
for this participant and sequence number. This having been done, the participant was
given a button for submitting a conclusion typed into a text entry box that was also pro-
vided. Activating this button validated and stored the conclusion, then generated the
form for the next statement pair. At the end of the sequence, the script generated a data
file combining the information listed in the participant’s log file with the participant’s
responses, ready for analysis.
2In each of these cases, the entire response set consisted of instances of the following five statements:
“All Xs are Ys”, “Some Xs are Ys”, “No Xs are Ys”, “Some Xs are not Ys”, “No valid conclusion”.
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Consideration was given to presenting the materials visually in tandem with the au-
ditory presentation, to make the task more closely comparable to the standard version
of it. In the end, however, technical and logistical considerations militated against this.
With a parallel visual presentation arises the question of whether it should be static
or windowed. A static presentation might enable participants to assist or bypass their
auditory faculties using visuo-spatial strategies, whilea windowed presentation raises
technical issues of reading/hearing speed, fixation, and sychronisation. Additionally,
there would have been a requirement for a control condition consisting of the visual
presentation alone as well as the two auditory conditions. Given the structural factors
already requiring to be taken into account, it was considereundesirable to increase
the number of conditions further.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Correctness and NVC-responding
Table 6.3 summarises the numbers of logically correct andNVC responses given by
participants. The overall totals are within the normal bounds for the conclusion gener-
ation task, confirming Gilhoolyet al.’s (1993) finding that the change in modality of
presentation of the materials does not make it very much moredifficult. The analysis
by class of intonation contour reveals no significant difference in either accuracy or
NVC-responding.
Contrary to hypothesis 1,CN intonation produced more correct conclusions than
CC intonation. However, as the means and standard deviations indicate, the difference
is not at all significant (t =−1.09/F = 1.19,d f = 34, p> 0.05). In line with hypothe-
sis 2,CN contours produced moreNVC responses thanCC, but only slightly and again
(a) Correct responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 455 40.6 13.00 6.42
CN 474 42.3 13.54 6.76
Total 929 41.5 13.27 6.55
(b) NVC responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 332 29.6 9.49 6.23
CN 335 29.9 9.57 6.43
Total 667 29.8 9.53 6.28
Table 6.3: Summary of frequencies of correct and NVC responses to syllogisms given
concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 35)
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 112 40.0 3.20 1.71
CN 118 42.1 3.37 2.04
Total 230 41.1 3.29 1.87
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 111 39.6 3.17 1.89
CN 105 37.5 3.00 1.99
Total 216 38.6 3.09 1.92
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 114 40.7 3.26 1.75
CN 124 44.3 3.54 1.80
Total 238 42.5 3.40 1.77
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 118 42.1 3.37 1.93
CN 127 45.4 3.63 2.04
Total 245 43.8 3.50 1.98
Table 6.4: Summary of frequencies of correct responses to syllogisms in each of the
four figures given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 35)
the difference is in no way significant (t =−0.19/F = 0.04,d f = 34, p > 0.05).
In Table 6.4, the results for correctness are broken down by figure. They are broadly
in line with the figural effect on difficulty, both in the totalfrequencies and in the ones
for the separate contour classes. FigureAB-BC presents a slight anomaly, in being
the second hardest, afterBA-CB, instead of the easiest. This perhaps represents an
increase in the difficulty of problems with counterfigural con lusions brought about by
sequential presentation. However, the main effect of figureapproaches, but does not
reach, significance (F = 2.41,d f = 102, p > 0.05).
The general trend of the analysis by intonation contour matches the overall trend of
CN generating marginally more correct answers thanCC. Unsurprisingly, then, there is
no significant interaction between contour and figure (F = 0.53,d f = 102, p > 0.05).
The exception to the trend is in figureBA-CB, whereCC generates marginally more
than CN. These results remain contrary to hypothesis 1, which postulated thatCC
should result in increased accuracy in the symmetrical figures, if nowhere else.
Table 6.5 shows the analysis by figure ofNVC responses toCC andCN intonation.
In line with earlier results, figureBA-BC generates moreNVCs thanAB-CB. Perhaps
surprisingly, owing to the level of difficulty reported above, the other two figures pro-
duce the lowest numbers ofNVCs. There is, however, no significant main effect of
figure onNVC responding (F = 1.26,d f = 102, p > 0.05).
With respect to the two intonation classes, figuresAB-BC andAB-CB are near iden-
tical. In figureBA-CBCN gives fewerNVC responses thanCC, while in figureBA-BCit
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 78 27.9 2.23 1.82
CN 79 28.2 2.26 2.05
Total 157 28.0 2.24 1.92
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 84 30.0 2.40 1.82
CN 76 27.1 2.17 1.81
Total 160 28.6 2.29 1.80
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 85 30.4 2.43 1.84
CN 84 30.0 2.40 1.82
Total 169 30.2 2.41 1.81
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 85 30.4 2.43 1.56
CN 96 34.3 2.74 1.84
Total 181 32.3 2.59 1.70
Table 6.5: Summary of frequencies of NVC responses to syllogisms in each of the four
figures given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 35)
produces more. It is this last that is responsible for the overall marginal compliance
with hypothesis 2. The pattern is a curious one, being effectiv ly orthogonal to trends
in difficulty and the diagonal/symmetrical distinction, but the interaction is not signif-
icant (F = 1.03,d f = 102, p > 0.05).
6.3.2 Term ordering
Table 6.6 presents the frequencies of well-formed, non-NVC responses according to the
two term ordering models, source founding and recency. (In interpreting these results,
it should be borne in mind that the predictions of the two models are not disjoint sets.)
Recency is manifested in two thirds of the relevant responses, which is to be expected,
as it incorporates the well-established and robust figural effect on term ordering in
(a) Source-founded responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 238 35.6 6.80 2.61
CN 251 38.2 7.17 2.12
Total 489 36.9 6.99 2.37
(b) Recency-based responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 433 64.8 12.37 4.45
CN 435 66.2 12.43 5.00
Total 868 65.5 12.40 4.70
Table 6.6: Summary of frequencies of source- and recency-based, well-formed, non-
NVC responses to syllogisms given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation pat-
terns (n = 35)
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 68 38.2 1.94 1.03
CN 70 39.5 2.00 0.87
Total 138 38.9 1.97 0.95
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 49 29.3 1.40 0.88
CN 51 31.7 1.46 0.85
Total 100 30.5 1.43 0.86
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 54 33.5 1.54 1.04
CN 63 38.7 1.80 0.90
Total 117 36.1 1.67 0.97
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 67 41.4 1.91 1.12
CN 67 42.9 1.91 1.15
Total 134 42.1 1.91 1.13
Table 6.7: Summary of frequencies of source-founded, well-formed, non-NVC re-
sponses to syllogisms in each of the four figures given concordant (CC) and neutral
(CN) intonation patterns (n = 35)
figuresAB-BC andBA-CB. Source-founding, on the other hand, accounts for just over
a third of the responses, which is considerably lower than inStenning and Yule (1997).
As with the results for correct andNVC conclusions, there is no significant main
effect of intonation. Both classes of contour make near ident cal contributions to
the numbers of recency-based conclusions, contrary to hypot esis 3, and therefore
evidently have no significant effect there (t = −0.10/F = 0.01,d f = 34, p > 0.05).
Even further counter to the hypothesis,CN contours generate more source-founded
responses thanCC, but once again the difference is not significant (t = −1.03/F =
1.07,d f = 34, p > 0.05).
The numbers of source-founded responses are analysed by figure in Table 6.7. The
numbers remain low across the board, but another curious pattern, different from that
for NVC responses, emerges. FiguresAB-BC andBA-BC produce the largest numbers
of source-founded conclusions, followed byAB-CB and thenBA-CB, and this time the
effect is significant (F = 7.28,d f = 102, p < 0.01).
The relative frequencies ofCC andCN intonation patterns, by contrast, show little
variation. Only in figureAB-CB is there an appreciable difference between them, with
CN generating more source-founded conclusions thanCC, contrary to hypothesis 3.
The interaction between contour and figure is not significant(F = 0.21,d f = 102, p>
0.05).
Finally, Table 6.8 presents the figural analysis for recency-based conclusions. The
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 144 80.9 4.11 2.11
CN 141 79.7 4.03 1.99
Total 285 80.3 4.07 2.04
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 127 76.0 3.63 1.72
CN 124 77.0 3.54 1.74
Total 251 76.5 3.59 1.72
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 65 40.4 1.86 1.26
CN 79 48.5 2.26 1.74
Total 144 44.4 2.06 1.52
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 97 59.9 2.77 1.46
CN 91 58.3 2.60 1.75
Total 188 59.1 2.69 1.60
Table 6.8: Summary of frequencies of recency-based, well-formed, non-NVC responses
to syllogisms in each of the four figures given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) into-
nation patterns (n = 35)
totals are clearly weighted towards the established effectin figuresAB-BC and BA-
CB. Figure BA-BC also shows a similar, albeit reduced, tendency, while figureAB-
CB is the only one to evidence a modest leaning away from recency-based responses.
Again, the differences are large enough for the main effect of figure to be significant
(F = 21.05,d f = 102, p = 0.00).
The comparison between intonation contour classes essentially mirrors that for
source-founding. In figureAB-CB, it is againCN patterns that feature more promi-
nently, this time in line with the hypothesis, but in the other three figures there is, if
anything at all, a slight preponderance ofCC patterns. The interaction with figure is,
once again, not significant (F = 0.73,d f = 102, p > 0.05).
6.3.3 Other factors
Summaries of the interactions between intonation and mood are omitted as they add
nothing material to the results already presented. That is,while they illustrate main
effects for the quantifiers of both premises, there is no significant interaction between
either of them and intonation.
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6.4 Discussion
As they stand, these results completely refute the hypotheses xtrapolated from the
earlier study in the introduction to this chapter. No significant differences at all are
seen to exist between the two classes of intonation contourson the measures used. In
fact, the two can be seen to mirror each other right down to thelev l of individual par-
ticipants. This extends to such minor disparities as do exist between these results and
those of previous experiments. In all, performance of the task is effectively dominated
by established figural effects, all the more so if the increased difficulty of figureAB-BC
relative to the others is taken as an enhanced counter-figural effect.
This raises the question whether any effect that intonationmight have is not simply
being overwhelmed by those of figure, which are, after all, know to be powerful.
This possibility can not be definitively discounted, but it should be remembered that
the effects of figure do not for the most part actually reach significant levels in this
experiment, although they do come close. That being so, the fact that the results for
the two contour classes are so similar within each figure, including AB-BC, is surely
telling. Of course, both of these facts could be accounted for as being in turn part of a
floor effect induced by the increased difficulty of the task. However, it should also be
remembered that the scores here, although a little depressed compared to the average,
are still within normal bounds, just as in Gilhoolyet al. (1993).
Alternatively, it is perhaps the case that initial differenc s in responses to the two
classes of intonation patterns are lost over time. That is, allowing participants to take
as long as they like to solve a syllogism enables them to work and rework the problem
and thereby discard the import of intonation. If this is so, then it is hard to see how to
overcome it. Experiments have been conducted in which participants were required to
respond within a short time (e.g. Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984), but combined with
aural presentation this might well render the task too difficult. However, the real ques-
tion that underlies this issue concerns the degree to which different components of
working memory are involved in the reasoning process. The standard model of work-
ing memory divides it into three: the ‘visuo-spatial scratch-pad’, which enables spatial
storage and rearrangement of limited amounts of visually-oriented input; the ‘phono-
logical loop’, which enables sequential storage and rehearsal of limited amounts of
aurally-oriented input; and the ‘central executive’, which maintains overall control
over processing and allocation of resources (Baddeley, 1990). What little evidence
there is on the respective involvement of these three components in syllogistic reason-
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ing is far from conclusive.
Gilhooly et al.’s (1993) comparison of visual and verbal modes of presentation p-
pears to indicate that the phonological loop is used only forinitial coding and storage,
as verbal presentation engenders only a modest increase in th number of errors made
and this is comprised of a class of errors peculiar to it, in which conclusions contain
the middle term. When suppression techniques were used, though, to load each of the
three memory components separately throughout the reasoning task, they had a small
but significant impact in respect of the phonological loop (albeit only of the reason-
ing task on the suppression task, not the other way round), whereas there was none
at all in respect of the visuo-spatial scratch-pad. The onlymajor effect produced was
in respect of the central executive. In contrast, Quayle andBall (2000) used tests of
spatial and articulatory recall to classify participants prior to the reasoning task. Their
results showed a significant difference in performance betwe n high and low spatial
recall ability, but none at all between high and low articulatory recall ability.
Both of these sets of findings must be treated with caution, thoug . The reason-
ing tasks used by Gilhoolyet al. in conjunction with the suppression tasks and by
Quayle and Ball were such that each syllogism was visually avail ble to the partici-
pant throughout the reasoning process. This has no bearing on mental models accounts
of reasoning, with which both studies were primarily concered, as these nonetheless
require some form of internalised representation and manipulation of the problem, but
in general it fails to preclude the possibility that participants exploit the external rep-
resentation of a problem directly when one is available and thereby largely obviate the
need for working memory storage. This would certainly account for the findings of the
former study, in which only the central executive was seen toplay a major rôle.
As for the latter, it should also be noted that the two tests ofrecall ability, although
drawn from prior published work in each case, were both visually presented and se-
quentially oriented. At the very least, this seems to blur the distinction between the two
kinds of ability. In fact, whereas the articulatory recall tes consisted of reproducing
strings of letters presented all at once, the spatial recalltest consisted of reproducing
random temporal sequences of colour changes in a non-symmetrical array of boxes.
This, taken together with the point concerning external representation, would render
it unsurprising that it was those who scored highly in the latter hat performed better
in the reasoning task. On balance, then, it is suggested that, if anything, the weight
of the evidence is in Gilhoolyet al.’s favour and that the phonological loop plays an
ongoing part in the reasoning process, one which might be amplified in the absence of
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any continuing visual presentation of the problem.
Moving on from considerations relating to the nature of the task, then, there is
the complementary possibility that the particular manipulation employed here is not
powerful enough to produce effects of sufficient magnitude to be noticeable. That is,
that merelyneutralintonation does not stand in clear enough opposition to concordant
intonation to produce an adequately large effect. True, a third class of contextually
‘discordant’ intonation patterns can be conceived, such asimpose patterns of topi-
calisation and focussing that are directly at odds with the corresponding contextually
concordant ones, and this would be an interesting avenue of exploration in further ex-
periments. However, in the context of the present investigation, such patterns are not
motivated either theoretically or by the observations madein the initial study. As such,
it would have been difficult to derive detailed predictions con erning them and, in any
case, to relate the results of using them to credulous and skeptical reasoning.
Another potential source of lack of power might be derived from an alternative
characterisation of the increased difficulty of problems infigure AB-BC, namely that,
overall, the symmetrical figures proved easier than the diagon l ones. This might sug-
gest that the source of the change lies in the theoretical projecti ns of intonation pat-
terns produced in Chapter 3, or perhaps in their implementation in the artificial voice,
on the ground that only projections for the symmetrical figures were empirically veri-
fied in the initial observational study. Further analysis ofthe speech corpus produced
there and comparison with the output of the speech synthesiser are therefore required
to confirm or deny this possibility.
Nonetheless, that effect is statistically non-significant. The only one that is not is
that of figure (and mood) on term ordering. With respect to therecency model, it has
already been indicated that the diagonal figures are largelyresponsible for this. The
results for the other two are considerably closer to 50%. As for the source-founding
model, the results perhaps represent a failure to replicatethose of Stenning and Yule
(1997). However, the purpose of this experiment was not to support or contradict the
source-founding hypothesisper se, but, in part, to discover whether or not different
classes of intonation pattern produce different degrees ofcompliance with it. As with
accuracy andNVC responding, the pattern of results forCC andCN intonation match
each other closely and no such difference can be found.
Taking all of the above into consideration, the issue of the power of the manipula-
tion against the power of figure would seem to be the crucial obstacle in the way of a
positive outcome here. Now, given that the effects of figure are known largely on the
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basis of experiments carried out in the conclusion generation paradigm since its intro-
duction by Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978), a possible means of overcoming that
obstacle is to employ one of the alternative paradigms of either conclusion selection or
conclusion evaluation. Returning to the process/product distinction raised at the end of
Chapter 4, it is argued that conclusion evaluation is the better choice, as the experimen-
tal materials would then resemble reports of completed syllogisms. The question then
becomes whether or not manipulation of the intonation of such reports significantly
affects judgements of their logical validity. The main drawback of this choice is, of
course, that it would not address the issue of causation in respect of syllogism solving.
However, a positive result from it would not only demonstrate that the intonation pat-
terns that have been identified and observed are not merely redundant embellishments
of finished products, it would also validate the projected intonation contours and the
synthetic voice based on them and thereby bolster the outcome of the experiment in
this chapter.
Chapter 7
Syllogism evaluation using spoken
materials
7.1 Introduction
Even in the rarefied environment of the laboratory there exists the notion of a hearer
for whom a speaker’s utterances are intended, be it the technician, the researcher, or
some other, more abstract personality. The results of the study presented in Chapter 4
leave open the possibility that the purpose of the intonatiopatterns observed there is
to guide such a hearer’s processing of completed syllogisms. By adopting the change
in paradigm put forward at the end of the last chapter, the experimental participant is
cast in the rôle of hearer and therefore this possibility can be investigated.
The experiment reported in this chapter, then, employs a vari nt of the conclusion
evaluation task that is akin to the version of the conclusionge eration task described
in the previous chapter. As in that case, the only material departure from the standard
task is that participants hear the syllogisms, now completewi h conclusions, spoken
aloud rather than read them from written sources.
The data from the initial study does not include evaluationsf conclusions based
on the spoken reports of them and so provides no empirical foundation on which to
base a specific hypothesis to test in the present experiment.However, returning to the
theoretical connection between different classes of intonati contours and credulous
and skeptical reasoning does enable a hypothesis to be derive . Credulous reasoning
assumes that there is a coherent and consistent model being conveyed, whereas skepti-
cal reasoning does not and considers alternatives. Therefor , i CC intonation induces
credulousness whileCN induces skepticism, the former should lead to higher numbers
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of conclusions being judged valid than the latter.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Materials
As in the previous experiment, the primary materials used were sound files synthesised
on demand fromAPML specifications using the purpose-built, limited domain synthetic
voice. Again, a Prolog program was created to generate theAPML and log files for each
participant in advance. This time, though, the 64APML files per participant specified
the full, standard set of syllogisms together with conclusion . Selecting appropriate
conclusions to use necessitated the resolution of two issues. The first was whether or
not to presentNVC conclusions as well as non-NVC conclusions and the second was
how to control for the difference in difficulty of assessmentof alternative conclusions
to individual syllogisms.
If NVC conclusions are included, there is an imbalance in respect of available can-
didate conclusions between syllogisms for whichNVC is the correct answer and those
for which it is not. In the former case, any non-NVC conclusion is incorrect, whereas in
the latter there is at least one correct non-NVC conclusion as well as multiple incorrect
non-NVC conclusions and an incorrectNVC one. That is, when this is factored into
validity, there are two possible conditions forNVC problems but three for non-NVC
ones. If, on the other hand, only non-NVC conclusions are offered, thenNVC problems
are never presented with correct conclusions, again unbalacing the conditions. In-
deed, participants may induce from this that there are noNVC problems in the problem
space, potentially skewing their judgements.
Since the arguments generate some form of imbalance either way, this last point
was the deciding factor, as it was considered important to maintain a conception of the
problem space as similar as possible to those presented in the earlier tasks. Therefore,
NVC conclusions were included, but not across the board. Since validity was one
of the variables of primary interest, it was decided to restrict the conditions to one
correct and one incorrect conclusion for bothNVC and non-NVC problems. Presenting
some incorrectNVC conclusions was necessary in order to avoid the possibilityof
participants inducing that it was always correct, but to do so in every case would have
meant that no non-NVC problem was presented with both a correct and an incorrect
non-NVC conclusion.
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Of course, this meant thatNVC conclusions also needed to be accounted for in
terms of the second issue, that of matching the relative levels of difficulty of the correct
and incorrect versions of each syllogism. There is very little n the way of guidance on
this point unless a particular theoretical stance is taken,but it is obviously important to
proceed on as empirical a footing as possible. Fortunately,Johnson-Laird and Steed-
man’s (1978) study details, for every individual syllogism, not only the predictions of
their model as it was formulated at that time, but also the frequencies, in terms of actual
numbers of participants, with which different conclusionswere drawn, includingNVC.
This, then, was used as a basis for selecting an incorrect conlusion with as similar a
frequency to the correct one as the sparsity of data allowed.
The procedure adopted was as follows. ForNVC problems, the non-NVC conclu-
sion whose frequency was closest to that ofNVC was chosen. For non-NVC problems,
if at least one incorrect non-NVC conclusion was available, then again the one with the
closest matching frequency was selected. If none was available, thenNVC was selected.
In a number of cases, the frequency match was not close, but was the best afforded by
the data. In a few cases, a tie between competing candidates ws decided arbitrarily.
The resultant set contained 17 non-NVC problems with two non-NVC conclusions each
and 10 with oneNVC and one non-NVC conclusion. Of course, the remaining 37 were
NVC problems with, again, oneNVC and one non-NVC conclusion.
As in the previous experiment, half of the problems were marked up withCC in-
tonation contours and the other half withCN, again distributed according to the three
patterns used there. Additionally, though, equal numbers of correct and incorrect con-
clusions were distributed according to a complementary setof patterns in order to
produce systematic variation of the two primary conditions, i tonation and validity.
Finally, as before, each syllogism was instantiated with one f each of the three cate-
gories of terms (nationality, profession, and interest) atrandom and the ordering of the
set of syllogisms also randomised.
7.2.2 Participants
The participants were 24 students drawn from across the University of Edinburgh.
Each had responded to an advertisement placed in the university’s student employ-
ment service and on the online forum run by the students’ associati n. They were
required to be native speakers of British English with no training in logic and no hear-
ing impairments. Each was paid 4.00 for their participation.
Chapter 7. Syllogism evaluation using spoken materials 97
(a) Correct responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 433 56.4 18.04 3.67
CN 413 53.8 17.21 3.99
Total 846 55.1 17.63 3.81
(b) “Not valid” responses
Total % Mean SD
CC 337 43.9 14.04 2.14
CN 309 40.2 12.88 3.35
Total 646 42.1 13.46 2.84
Table 7.1: Summary of frequencies of correct and “Not valid” responses to syllogisms
given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 24)
7.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was again conducted via the World Wide Web. Aspreviously, partici-
pants were directed to a page dynamically generated by a PHP script which presented
the instructions for the experiment and gave the participant the opportunity to verify
their sound reproduction capability. It then generated a sequence of interactive forms
corresponding to the 64 syllogisms, this time referred to as‘arguments’.
The forms were very similar to those used in the conclusion generation experiment,
each one limiting the participant’s options to a single course of action. The participant
was first given a button for listening to the argument. Clicking this button requested
from the speech synthesiser the utterance corresponding tothe description in theAPML
file for this participant and sequence number. The participant was then presented with
a choice of two buttons, one labelled “Valid” and the other “Not valid”, with which to
register their evaluation of the argument they had just heard. Clicking either of these
stored the appropriate response and then produced the form for the next argument.
Having reached the end of the sequence, the script combined the information from
the participant’s log file with their responses to produce a single data file, ready for
analysis.
7.3 Results
Table 7.1 summarises participants’ evaluations with respect to logical correctness and
the specific response “Not valid”. These two are, of course, interdependent: “Not
valid” is the correct response to invalid syllogisms and theincorrect response to valid
ones. As explained in the introductory section, it is considere here as a potential
‘Don’t know’ or ‘Not sure’ response, similar to the apparentuse of NVC with CN
intonation observed in the initial study.
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 101 52.6 4.21 1.28
CN 98 51.0 4.08 1.59
Total 199 51.8 4.15 1.43
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 92 47.9 3.83 1.49
CN 108 56.3 4.50 1.32
Total 200 52.1 4.17 1.43
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 113 58.9 4.71 1.40
CN 98 51.0 4.08 1.64
Total 211 54.9 4.40 1.54
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 127 66.1 5.29 1.04
CN 109 56.8 4.54 1.35
Total 236 61.5 4.92 1.25
Table 7.2: Summary of frequencies of correct responses to syllogisms in each of the
four figures given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 24)
(a) Valid syllogisms
Total % Mean SD
CC 240 62.5 10.00 1.89
CN 244 63.5 10.17 2.43
Total 484 63.0 10.08 2.15
(b) Invalid syllogisms
Total % Mean SD
CC 193 50.3 8.04 2.33
CN 169 44.0 7.04 2.77
Total 362 47.1 7.54 2.58
Table 7.3: Summary of frequencies of correct responses to valid and invalid syllogisms
given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 24)
Overall accuracy is higher than in the conclusion evaluation ask and well within
normal bounds.CC intonation patterns generate more correct responses thanCN ones,
but the difference is not significant (t = 1.11/F = 1.23,d f = 23, p > 0.05). Intrigu-
ingly, they also produce more “Not valid” responses thanCN, but again the difference
is not significant (t = 1.54/F = 2.38,d f = 23, p > 0.05). The more detailed analyses
are illuminating on this point.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 analyse correct responses by figure and validity of syllogism,
respectively. There is a definite gradation of accuracy across the figures, with the two
diagonal figures producing the fewest correct answers, followed byAB-CB, and then
BA-BC.. This effect is significant (F = 4.06,d f = 69, p = 0.01). Moreover, with the
exception ofBA-CB, this trend is mirrored in an increasing superiority ofCC over
CNintonation contours. The interaction between intonation and figure is also signifi-
cant (F = 3.93,d f = 69, p < 0.05).
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(a) AB-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 87 45.3 3.63 1.56
CN 72 37.5 3.00 1.79
Total 159 41.4 3.31 1.69
(b) BA-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 92 47.9 3.83 1.24
CN 86 44.8 3.58 1.47
Total 178 46.4 3.71 1.35
(c) AB-CB
Total % Mean SD
CC 71 37.0 2.96 1.30
CN 88 45.8 3.67 1.71
Total 159 41.4 3.31 1.55
(d) BA-BC
Total % Mean SD
CC 87 45.3 3.63 1.21
CN 63 32.8 2.63 1.24
Total 150 39.1 3.13 1.31
Table 7.4: Summary of frequencies of “Not valid” responses to syllogisms in each of the
four figures given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 24)
(a) Valid syllogisms
Total % Mean SD
CC 144 37.5 6.00 1.89
CN 140 36.5 5.83 2.43
Total 284 37.0 5.92 2.15
(b) Invalid syllogisms
Total % Mean SD
CC 193 50.3 8.04 2.33
CN 169 44.0 7.04 2.77
Total 362 47.1 7.54 2.58
Table 7.5: Summary of frequencies of “Not valid” responses to valid and invalid syllo-
gisms given concordant (CC) and neutral (CN) intonation patterns (n = 24)
In fact, CC andCN pattern very differently across the four figures in respect of
accuracy.CN produces identical numbers of correct responses in figuresAB-BC and
AB-CBand near identical, but higher, numbers in figuresBA-CB andBA-BC. CC, on
the other hand, shows a steady increase in correctness fromBA-CB up to BA-BC, by
way of AB-BC andAB-CB, respectively.
Validity has a very evident impact an accuracy, with valid syllogisms generating
significantly more correct answers than invalid ones (F = 34.64,d f = 23, p = 0.00).
Within that context, invalid syllogisms are judged correctly more often when givenCC
contours than when givenCN, but intonation makes no difference to the evaluation of
valid syllogisms and the interaction between intonation and validity is not significant
(F = 2.38,d f = 23, p > 0.05). There is, however, a significant three-way interaction
between intonation, validity, and figure (F = 2.97,d f = 69, p < 0.05).
In tables 7.4 and 7.5, the figural and validity-based analyses ar repeated with re-
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spect to responses of the form “Not valid”. This time, figureBA-CB generates the
highest number of responses andBA-BC the lowest, with the other two figures tied in
between, but the effect is not significant (F = 1.34,d f = 69, p > 0.05). In spite of this
reverse, the increasing superiority ofCC overCN follows the same general course as
in the results for correctness, though the exception here isfigureAB-CB, and the inter-
action between contour and figure remains significant (F = 2.97,d f = 69, p < 0.05).
The patterns of results for the two classes of contours separately are both very
different from each other and from those observed in the earlier tables.CC produces
its fewest “Not valid” responses in figureAB-CB and its most inBA-CB, with figures
AB-BC and BA-BC contributing equal numbers in between.CN progresses from its
fewest inBA-BC to its most inAB-CB via AB-BC and thenBA-CB.
Validity again has a significant effect, with invalid syllogisms gaining more “Not
valid” responses than valid syllogisms (F = 5.61,d f = 23, p < 0.05). This is not sur-
prising, given the overall level of correctness and the facttha these figures are identi-
cal to those for correctness in respect of invalid syllogisms and the exact complements
of them for valid ones. Also unsurprisingly, therefore, this minor change is not suffi-
cient to render the interaction between contour and validity significant (F = 1.23,d f =
23, p > 0.05). It does, however, lead to a significant interaction betwe n validity and
figure (F = 4.06,d f = 69, p = 0.01), as well as a three-way interaction between con-
tour, validity, and figure (F = 3.93,d f = 69, p < 0.05).
7.4 Discussion
The results presented above refute the specific hypothesis drive at the beginning of
this chapter, in thatCC intonation contours show, albeit not to a significant degree, a
greater tendency towards responding “Not Valid” than doCN contours. The effect of
validity is powerfully evident across the board and serves to wamp the results some-
what, which, combined with the unusual figural interactions, makes them difficult to
interpret. However, although no main effect of intonation has been shown, the exis-
tence of significant interactions between it and both validity and figure indicate that it
does influence the evaluation of syllogisms.
Most interestingly,CC intonation generates more correct responses thanCN does,
but this is almost entirely accounted for by responses of theform “Not Valid” - the
numbers of correct responses of the form “Valid” are about the same. That is, con-
cordant intonation patterns appear to assist in the correctid ntification of invalid syl-
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logisms, but make no difference to the identification of valid ones. If this is to be
accommodated within a framework of credulous and skepticalreasoning, then it cer-
tainly needs to be a more sophisticated one than that used in the i troduction to this
chapter. A possibility is that the assumption of coherence implicit in credulous reason-
ing is contingent upon consistency with the implicatures licensed by such reasoning
and breaks down when an inconsistent statement is encountered. In other words, a
credulously processed syllogism is ‘scaffolded’ with all the other statements that are
logically consistent with it, leading to a clash when an invalid conclusion is presented.
Valid conclusions, by contrast, give rise to no such clash and so credulous reasoning
affords no advantage over skeptical reasoning in respect ofthem.
However, this pattern of results is similar to certain interactions with validity known
to exist and it is appropriate, therefore, to consider them in those lights. Atmosphere,
as was mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.1), has a more prnounced effect in valid
syllogisms than in invalid ones. This is the complete opposite of the pattern seen here
and so the relevance of this effect to the present case is doubtful. Moreover, as Johnson-
Laird and Steedman (1978) pointed out, atmosphere is incapable of accounting for
the conclusionNo valid conclusionunder any circumstances. Instances of both valid
and invalid conclusions of this type were included in the present experiment, further
reducing the likelihood of these results being due to an interaction with atmosphere..
The influence of belief on syllogistic reasoning was touchedon in the Introduction
(Chapter 1). Studies of belief bias have shown, besides maineffects for both the be-
lievability and the validity of conclusions, an interaction between the two, such that
the effect of believability is greater for invalid syllogisms than for valid ones (see, gen-
erally Evanset al., 1993). This is the same pattern as found for intonation hereand
so provides a more promising fit. There is no one agreed account of the logic-belief
interaction; instead, explanations fall into three categories
The first of these posits the selective falsification of putative conclusions, such that
the search for falsifying models is contingent upon the unbelievability of the conclu-
sion. Some versions suggest that believable conclusions receive effectively no logical
processing at all (e.g. Evans, 1989); others, including theorthodox mental models ac-
count (Oakhill and Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhillet al., 1989), propose that all conclu-
sions are generated from or tested against an initial, minimal odel of the premises,
but that only unbelievable ones are then subjected to further scrutiny. The second
category of explanations proposes that participants misinterpret the notion of logical
necessity and use believability as a fall-back heuristic inthe face of uncertainty (Evans
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et al., 1983; Quayle and Ball, 2000). That is, in the case of indeterminately invalid syl-
logisms, which admit of both confirmatory and disconfirmatory models, participants
resolve the question on the basis of the believability or unbelievability of the conclu-
sion. Lastly, there are accounts that suggest that a conclusion is only subjected to
either confirmatory or disconfirmatory processing and that such processing is selected
in the first place according to the believability or unbelievability, respectively, of the
conclusion (Klaueret al., 2000; Evanset al., 2001).
Now, it would be easy to dismiss the first and third of these (selective falsification
and selective processing) as inapplicable here, on the grounds that they fail to accom-
modate the results of the experiment reported in the previous chapter. The fact that
some effect of intonation has been shown in the present chapter lends weight to the
argument that those results constitute a genuinely negative outcome. that could not be
the case, however, if intonation were allied to believability and believability determined
some or all of the processing whereby a conclusion was reached. While this is indeed
fatal to the standard mental models account, though, most ofthese theories assume that
processing in the conclusion generation and conclusion evaluation paradigms proceed
in opposite directions, the latter starting from the conclusion and working backwards,
and therefore make no claims about the former.
However, none of these varieties of explanation accommodates the results of the
initial observational study reported in Chapter 4. The pattern of usage observed there
suggests that concordant intonation is employed when a partici nt arrives at a deter-
mination of the problem, whereas neutral is used when they are unsure of their answer
or fail to reach one. The effect of believability, in any account, is to increase the like-
lihood of a conclusion being accepted, i.e. producing the response “Valid”, while that
of unbelievability is to increase the likelihood of its rejection, i.e. of the response “Not
Valid”. Therefore, according to the results in this chapter, CC intonation has the same
effect as unbelievability andCN intonation has that of believability. That is, if there
is a link between intonation and believability, then it is the former that induces doubt
in the answer given, not the latter. On the face of it, then, this paints the curiously
paradoxical picture of participants engaging in the self-dfeating behaviour of casting
doubt on the answers they are most sure of.
An additional reason for denying the applicability of belief bias to these results is
that, like atmosphere, it does not extend to conclusions of the formNo valid conclusion.
As already mentioned, such conclusions were, however, included in the materials used
in the present experiment. Moreover, the initial study in Chapter 4 demonstrated a
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connection between the different classes of intonation contour and differential use of
the responseNVC. Indeed, variation in intonation there appeared to have as much to do
with the validity of the response, whetherNVC or otherwise, as with apparent certainty.
This suggests an alternative interpretation of the results.
As has already been noted, studies of the logic-belief interac ion have also consis-
tently shown a significant effect of validity on its own, suchthat valid syllogisms are
evaluated correctly more than invalid ones. This is strongly borne out by the present re-
sults: nearly two thirds of valid syllogisms in both intonation conditions were correctly
evaluated, as against just over a third of neutrally intonedan half of concordantly in-
toned invalid ones. Perhaps, then,CC intonation does in some way assist in getting to
the substance of the problem, but this is obscured by a ceiling effect in the case of the
much easier valid syllogisms.
Finally, there are some more pragmatic possibilities that deserve to be noted. One
is that these results are due to faulty implementation of thesynthetic voice, such that
its CC intonation is over-exaggerated and unnatural and thereby engenders doubt as to
the genuineness of what is being said, while itsCN intonation is more straightforward-
sounding and therefore credible. Alternatively, it could be that the experimental setting
or task itself is too artificial for contextually concordanti onation to be perceived
as natural, whereas contextually neutral intonation is more appropriately ‘clinical’.
However, neither of these on its own explains the restriction of the effect to invalid
syllogisms and both resort again to believability, so the above discussion on that issue
applies to them also.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary and discussion of results
This thesis presents an innovative approach to the study of sll gistic reasoning and
types of argumentative discourse. The experiments reported here are the first to attempt
to capture, analyse, and control for intonational aspects of inf rmation structure in this
context. They have produced materials of practical value toresearchers wishing to
mine this vein of investigation further and their results lead to a significant advance in
understanding of discourse types and the rôle of information structure in them.
There are, in fact, three items of potential practical benefit to future researchers.
The first is the corpus of recorded spoken responses to the conclusion generation task.
Admittedly, it is only partially annotated at present, but even that portion demonstrably
contains examples of both credulous and skeptical interpretations, while the remainder
has at least been collected and awaits only labelling. Secondly, there is the systematic
analysis of syllogistic premises in respect of latent information structure. Having been
shown to be significant in both the production and comprehension of syllogisms, this
is an aspect of the interaction of figure and mood to be considered and accounted for
in future studies employing syllogisms. Third is the domain-specific, synthetic voice,
which has been shown to be a valuable tool for conducting controlled experiments of
the kind just adverted to.
Turning to the intellectual capital gained from the resultsreported here, it has been
shown that information structure, as manifested in intonati , is a significant element
in the both the presentation and comprehension of syllogisms. The initial study con-
firms that participants distinguish intonationally between sound and unsound argu-
ments they have completed themselves. The two follow-up experiments show that this
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distinction does not have the power to sway the completion ofarguments one way or
the other, but that it can be effective in mediating the assessm nt of unsound argu-
ments. Characterised thus, these findings bear considerably on Stenning and Cox’s
(2006) account of interpreting and solving syllogisms, particularly its use of Stenning
and van Lambalgen’s (2005) distinction between expositiveand deductive discourse
types, as well as more broadly held conceptions of syllogisms.
Stenning and van Lambalgen highlight the importance of recognising the experi-
mental situation itself as affording the potential for multiple, alternative interpretations
of the type of discourse involved and, indeed, intended. Stenning and Cox apply this
to syllogistic reasoning experiments in the specific context of the conclusion genera-
tion task, arguing that the problems presented in it can be construed in terms of either
exposition or deduction, leading to different reactions toinf rmation packaging, and
using individual differences in performance of the task as evidence of this occurring.
In the present work, though, differences in information struc ure were seen to express
differences in conclusion generation without producing them, but instead to influence
conclusion evaluation.
One possible construal of this state of affairs is that Stenning and Cox’s conception
of information packaging is impoverished and their resultsare best interpreted purely
at the syntactic level of problem grammar inducing solutiongrammar. If it is intona-
tion, though, that gives the true guide to discourse types, then he distinction no longer
appears to be that between exposition and deduction. Those tw are both supposedly
available as alternative interpretations at the problem-stting stage, giving rise to alter-
native forms of processing and conclusions. The distinctiohere, on the other hand, is
between the syllogism presented as a problem and the syllogism presented as a solu-
tion, be it by the participant having completed it or by the exp rimenter for evaluation.
Only in the latter case do intonation patterns appear to be significant.
Just what significance they have, though, is not clear. On thebasis of the obser-
vational study, it is tempting to suggest thatCC contours indicate what participants
believe to be coherent proofs, whereasCN contours suggest dubious or inconclusive
reasoning. Since there is an apparent association also withcorrectness, the purpose
of such differential structuring would presumably be to assist in the interpretation of
completed syllogisms as either sound or questionable, respectively, by whomever the
participant conceives as being the recipient of their respon es. However, if the results
of the conclusion evaluation experiment are taken as symptoatic of believability, then
these same contours have, if anything, the opposite effect from that intended. An alter-
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native construal of these results is thatCC intonation, by inducing credulous process-
ing, allows the content of syllogisms to be ‘scaffolded’ with implicatures and thereby
facilitates the detection of inconsistent, i.e. invalid, con lusions. As this is an expla-
nation within the framework of Stenning and Cox’s analysis of discourse types and
processing, though, it is necessary to consider why these studie found no intonational
correlate of Stenning and Cox’s (2006) distinction.
The crucial difference between problem and solution in the conclusion generation
task is, of course, the conclusion. This is not as facile an observation as it may at first
seem, because, in the context of discourse types, it concerns the make-up of the whole.
That is, a conclusion is not merely something added, or subtracted, but an integral part
of a completed argument. Viewed from this perspective, the incomplete arguments
presented as problems in the conclusion generation task arein sense ‘broken’. At the
level of information structure, this might have the effect of neutralising the contextual
component, through which relationships between statements are conveyed, and thereby
rendering concordant intonation inapplicable. The lack ofeffect this class of intonation
pattern has when applied to syllogisms requiring completion can therefore be put down
to its being entirely inappropriate to that type of discourse.
In argument against this might be cited what Steedman (2000)calls ‘isolated themes’,
or ‘all-theme’ utterances. As these appellations imply, these are considered not to con-
vey any genuinely new information and therefore to be incomplete. Rather, the hearer
is invited to work out the rheme for themselves precisely by wa of their very marked
intonation. This consists of a highly contrastive low-highpitch accent and a low-high
boundary tone that is like a continuation rise, as in 8.1 (from Ward and Hirschberg,
1985; Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg, 1990). If intonation encourages the hearer to-
wards drawing an appropriate conclusion in these cases of inc mpleteness, then the
idea of its inapplicability to broken syllogistic arguments is questionable.
(8.1) A: Harry is such a klutz.
B: He’s a good BADMINTON player.
L*+H LH%
There are several ways in which this objection might be countered. First, in im-
plying contradiction of some part of what has gone before, thintonation pattern of
these utterances is neither concordant nor neutral, as those erms have been used here.
Concordant intonation, as its name suggests, fits in with andbuil s on what has gone
before, while neutral delivers its content as though nothing has preceded it. Indeed,
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contradictory intonation does not even fall within the class of ‘discordant’ contours
mooted in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), as those would be manifestations of outright inco-
herence. (If a cognate term is desired, then ‘contrapuntal’might fit the bill.) The fact
that such intonation has inferential consequences, then, does not require the same to
be true of other kinds. If, on the other hand, the argument is simply thatanyintonation
should have inferential consequences, it is enough to note tha neutral intonation is not
the same as no intonation and this is therefore not the point of difference between it
and concordant intonation..
Secondly, the analysis of such utterances as all-theme is byno means uncontrover-
sial. It is necessitated in the context of Steedman’s framework by the strict association
asserted there between specific tunes and tones and specific informational constituents.
Setting that aside, the fact that part of what is implied by such an utterance is that its
content is already well known to the hearer is no bar to the pitch accent being analysed
as focal. As was pointed out in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.1), theconcept of ‘newness’
does not require the information to be completely new, either o the hearer or even to
the current discourse. In 8.1, the fact of which B reminds A is, at that point, new to
the issue A is considering, due to oversight, deliberate omission, or some other cause.
These utterances, therefore, are not necessarily broken orincomplete at all.
Lastly, even if all-theme utterances are incomplete, they ar not so in the same way
that syllogisms as problems are. As Steedman (2000) observes, th former work as
indirect speech acts, the reasoning triggered being in the nature of conversational im-
plicature in order to complete the individual utterance around which they are drawn.
They might, in other words, be considered as exhibiting a form f ellipsis. The fleshing
out of the premises of a syllogism by way of implicature, on the other hand, is yet dis-
tinct from the coherent combination of them with an explicitconclusion. That is, none
of the statements in a syllogism is incomplete in itself, intonationally or otherwise; it
is the discourse as a connected whole that is ‘broken’ if the conclusion is missing.
Furthermore, this explanation accords quite well with the empirical data. First of
all, although they were not used in the analysis, the responses of the four trial par-
ticipants in the initial study are instructive. Delivered prior to the completion of the
syllogism in each case, they are uniformly models of neutralintonation. Secondly,
the main body of data from that study suggests thatCN contours are associated with
uncertain or inconclusive responses, i.e. ones that remainproblematic.
If this is correct, though, it brings into question Stenningand Cox’s use of different
interpretations of the discourse type at the problem-setting stage to explain the differ-
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ences in behaviour they found. Construing the problem as a kind of exposition suppos-
edly induces credulous processing, but in that caseCC intonation patterns would likely
have appeared among the four excluded participants also. Itis necessary to maintain
the distinction between discourse types and processing modes, as well as bear in mind
the potential for individual differences, in order to accommodate all of the phenomena
that have been identified.
Even assuming that the problem itself and its associated rubric are strongly sug-
gestive of deductive discourse, individuals nonetheless bring to it their personal biases
towards credulity or skepticism. Notwithstanding these biases, though, either a credu-
lous or a skeptical processor may generate either a sound or an unsound argument and,
in the former case, thereby transform a problem into a solution. In this way, a discourse
type essentially lacking a contextual dimension can be processed differentially and the
outcome thereof manifested largely in the grammatical confines of the conclusion, yet
the resultant whole be expressed simply according to whether or not a context is now
seen to be present.
This resolution of the two previously seemingly incompatible views of information
packaging and discourse types also embraces the ‘scaffolding’ explanation offered for
the results of the final experiment. In melding the conceptualisations of the two, the
discourse types originally proposed as being operative at the problem-setting stage,
namely Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2005) exposition and deduction, have been
mapped onto the ones claimed to be operative at the solution-givi g stage. This is in
spite of exposition being supposedly misappropriated to this context in the first place
through the mistaken application of conversational assumptions. Moreover, since it
contains the contextual connections that generate the concordant intonation contours
that have been shown to be associated with them, it is this discour e type that is taken
to be assigned to sound arguments, while deduction and its neu ral contours are given
over to unsound arguments.
The reason for this apparently topsy-turvy state of affairsis that intonation is, by
itself, a relatively blunt instrument whose potential for signification is very limited.
What the two concordant cases have in common is the relation of logical dependence
between statements. The precise nature and number of implicatures this warrants will
depend on the discourse context and its associated contextualised logic. In fact, then,
the only genuinely incongruous aspect of this here is the name, ‘exposition’, which
might therefore be replace with, say, ‘demonstration’. Similarly, the neutral cases
share the relation of logical independence and might be better termed ‘examination’
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at the problem-setting stage and, it is suggested more hesitantly, ‘submission’ at the
responding stage.
In this light, it should be noted that Stenning and Cox’s fundamental point that, con-
trary to Newstead (1989, 1995), interpretation does play a part in syllogistic reasoning,
is supported and, indeed, extended. The combined results reveal interpretational effects
in the processing of both examinations and submissions, even if not demonstrations.
In fact, an even larger point can be argued. Aristotle’s logic of the syllogism revolved
around demonstration, not examination, and its relationship to its different possible
modes of expression, referred to by therhetorical term ‘figure’ (in Greek, actually
σχηµα, ‘schema’). Completing ‘broken’ syllogisms, then, is perhaps a strange thing
to ask people to do and one to which they may well bring more than logic. Moreover,
though, given the pervasive influence of figure that has been shown in countless exper-
iments and its interactions with validity and, as is now know, information structure, it
seems reasonable to say that the human capacity exposed by studies of syllogistic rea-
soning is not that for logic alone but that for combining all three of the ancienttrivium
of logic, grammar, and rhetoric.
The major drawback of framing the discussion in terms of discourse types, how-
ever, is that it over-emphasises pragmatics at the expense of semantics. Participants’
reactions to the experimental setting, their interpretations of the task, their notional in-
teractions with the speaker/hearer, and so on are all aspects of ontext more to do with
the discourse situation than the discourse content. True, the idea of ‘scaffolding’ - in-
deed, of implicature drawing in general - concerns the augmentation of some model of
the propositional content conveyed by statements, but attention has not yet been paid
to the grounding of this in a conception of the world of discourse. This is important
because it harks back to the core difference between the classes of intonation contour
studied here and their relationship to the notion of logicalindependence.
The fundamental distinction between concordant and neutral in onation was stated
to be the inclusion or exclusion, respectively, of the contextual element of information
structure (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). In syllogisms this is minimal, limited as it
is to three sets of entities which, standardly, are either completely abstract or at least
semantically unrelated and are embedded in a highly underspecified scenario. It is
possible that this is not enough for the contrasts expressedby concordant intonation to
be genuinely meaningful and so for the ability of such intonaion to imply coherence
or logical dependence is largely lost. This is an alternative explanation for the failure
to produce stronger effects using the synthetic voice. The fact thatCC intonation was
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found in the initial study could be due to participants constructing a sufficiently rich
representation of the semantic space in the course of reaching t eir conclusions.
Of course, the use of semantically richer materials can giverise to the sorts of dif-
ficulties that were mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. The most notable of
these, though, is belief bias, which has already been put forward as a potential expla-
nation for the results in Chapter 7. Although significant doubts were raised about its
applicability there, the possibility of a more general connection between it and infor-
mation structure by way of rich contextualisation of the problem is not to be dismissed
out of hand. Indeed, it would be making a virtue of necessity to use explicitly biased
materials to investigate the effects of intonation and believability in combination.
Looked at this way, and bearing in mind the link with validityseen in both the initial
study and the conclusion evaluation experiment, intonatioand information structure
are best seen as logical factors according to the three-way classification of factors in-
fluencing syllogistic reasoning presented in Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. The discourse
types view is much more integrative, drawing in both structural factors, such as figure
and grammar, and individual differences as to interpretation and reasoning. Indeed,
the division of these factors into structural, logical, andi ividual now appears to cor-
respond at least crudely to the linguistic distinctions between syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics.
Pursuing this idea further, though, belief can be separatedin o semantic and prag-
matic components. As indicated above, the semantic component concerns the degree
of congruence between the discourse situation and a participant’s own prior knowledge
and understanding of such situations. The pragmatic component, on the other hand,
concerns the degree of confidence in or commitment to the coherenc of the discourse
as a legitimate progression of statements. Arguably, it is the latter which is reflected in
the differential use ofCC andCN intonation demonstrated in the observational study.
If that is so, then it is no bar to the relevance of the logic-belief interaction to the re-
sults of the conclusion evaluation experiment after all, rooted as that interaction is in
the semantic component of belief.
However, against this must be set the fact that the materialsused in that experiment
were designed to be belief-neutral. It is not easy to see how intonation geared to
the pragmatic expression of coherence could colour the content of those materials to
such an extent as to trigger a biasing effect, at least not in adirection opposite to the
one pragmatically intended. Perhaps, then, the influence isthe other way round, with
concordant intonation being made to seem like over-compensation in the face of the
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lack of semantic substance and therefore insincere.
In the light of these considerations, it is unfortunate thatt e analytical approach
taken in this thesis affords no basis for distinguishing betwe n these two aspects of
belief. With hindsight, it might have proved more fruitful to have adopted Steedman’s
(2000) framework, which incorporates a third dimension of information structure that
reflects differences between speaker and hearer in individual commitment to and agree-
ment upon the contents of particular constituents. These are xpressed by various com-
binations of specific pitch accents and phrasal boundary tones. It is perhaps through
these extra subtleties, which of course were not controlledfor in the building of the
synthetic voice, that unbelievability can be generated from indifferent content.
Turning briefly, and finally, to the other interaction with validity considered in
Chapter 7, atmosphere can probably be discounted as a distinct co tributing factor
to the results of the present work. Even leaving aside the poor fit f that interaction
with the one observed in the conclusion evaluation experiment and the inapplicability
of atmosphere toNVC conclusions, it seems likely that it is essentially simply avalid-
ity effect in disguise. As Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978) observe, the majority
of valid conclusions happen to be consistent with atmosphere. Unless experimenters
are careful to choose an equal representation of atmospheric but invalid conclusions,
which historically they have not, then atmosphere will accidentally pattern with valid-
ity more in valid syllogisms than invalid ones. Given this and the point concerning
NVC conclusions already made, it has been argued that atmosphere is best considered
merely descriptive, and only partially so at that, rather than explanatory (Eysenck and
Keane, 1995). This leaves validity alone as the relevant factor, whose connection with
intonation has been shown independently here.
8.2 Further work
8.2.1 Retrospective
There are some pieces of consolidatory work that could usefully be done. To begin
with, the remainder of the corpus of recorded responses gathered in the initial study
needs to be analysed and annotated. Indeed, the part that haslre dy been analysed
could be rechecked for consistency during this process. Besides improving the corpus
as a resource, this would exhaustively confirm or refute the details of the theoretical
informational analysis.
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Secondly, it is possible that the synthetic voice could be improved. This would, of
course, be required if the full corpus annotation led to revisions of the analysis. Even
in the absence of that, though, the knowledge and experiencegain d from building
the first version could feed forward to create a higher quality one. For example, re-
designing the recording script to embedCC contexts in pairs of premises or completed
syllogisms ought to produce more natural and convincing output from the speaker.
Thirdly, previous experiments could be replicated with theaddition of the artificial
voice in order to determine the reproducibility of their result with the added factor
of intonation controlled for. Earlier experiments using the conclusion evaluation task
would certainly be candidates for this, the potential beingthere for further light to be
shed on some of the more well-established effects, such as conversion. For that matter,
applying it to the immediate inference task might uncover hitherto unnoticed relation-
ships. Conclusion generation experiments ought not to be overlooked, however. The
theory and data from the present work indicate that their results should remain unaf-
fected by the use of the voice, but this ought to be verified.
8.2.2 Prospective
Having reason to respect the importance of the conclusion asan integrated part of an
argument, as opposed to an answer distinct from a question, icould be instructive to
present both of these experiments in a more explicitly discourse-oriented light. The
conclusion generation task, for example, could be recast asan argument completion
task, the question being along the lines of, “What is the voice going to say next?” The
idea behind this is that one aspect of a well-formed argumentis that the intonationally
signalled information structure anticipates the conclusion. In other words, in a more
normal, communicative context, the conclusion is what the producer of the argument
wants it to be, rather than necessarily the logically correct one, and it is this that the
receiver looks for.
Similar considerations apply to the evaluation task and, ineed, provide an alter-
native explanation that should be investigated for the modest results of the experiment
reported in Chapter 7. There is some anecdotal support for this idea from one of
the participants in that experiment. He stated afterwards that he found the task hard
because the voice was “too fast”, in spite of the fact that thesp ech output is quite
measured. His subsequent elaboration of the point, however, r v aled that he wanted a
pause after hearing the two premises, during which he could frm his own conclusion,
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before then hearing the conclusion to evaluate. Hearing it straight after the premises
interfered with his processing.
The instructions for the task were virtually identical to those for the generation
task before it, i.e. heavily oriented towards problem-solving, with assumption of the
premises and evaluation of the conclusion presented as distinct eps to take. Arguably,
then, they were simply not appropriate to the discourse typeactually presented. Had
the instructions been, say, to indicate acceptance or rejection of the speaker’s argument,
it is possible that a different pattern of results would havebe n obtained.
These ideas in turn generate a fairly obvious line of consequent investigation, which
is to probe the informational aspects of conclusions. The studies reported here con-
centrated mainly on the intonational expression of information structure in second
premises, because that was where the clearest and widest variation was found. How-
ever, since the importance of including the conclusion as part of the argument has been
shown, it should now receive the same attention.
The observational study has already shown that conclusions, like first premises,
are overwhelmingly rheme-focussed, so the next step is to investigate the nature of
topicalisation in them. Theory is not so clear a guide here, as both terms are given
and, more often than not, so is the quantifier. It would be interesting, for that reason,
to analyse responses in the speech corpus to the minority of sll gisms whose valid
conclusion introduces a new quantifier, as well as seeking out instances of participants
doing this erroneously.
Obviously, though, the aim would not simply be to characterise conclusions in
themselves, but to relate their information structuring tothat of the preceding premises.
If conclusions are anticipated by their premises in some way, then one might expect to
see topicalisation in the latter systematically related topatterns in the former. A useful
additional light on this might be gained from what might be called ‘B-conclusions’.
these are the significant minority of ill-formed conclusions which feature the middle
term instead of one of the end terms. Assuming investigations such as these produced
useful results, more sophisticated conclusion evaluationexperiments could then be run
using the artificial voice.
To finish on an alternative note, a parallel line of investigation might examine the
effects of orthography instead of intonation. It will be recalled that bold and italic
fonts were used to represent accenting in the recording script fo building the synthetic
voice. The differential effects of varying these and other devices, such as capitalisation
and underlining, in experimental syllogistic reasoning tasks would be interesting to
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compare with those from the intonationally-oriented track.
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A.1 Screen capture of annotation using xwaves
Figure A.1: Typical ensemble of windows used for annotation. Upper windows (grey)
are for controls, lower windows (green) are for data. Data windows show aligned sec-
tions of the sampled speech waveform (top), the computed f0 contour (middle), and the
label files (bottom) for the miscellaneous, word, and tone layers, respectively.
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A.2 Sample portions of annotation files




comment created using xlabel Mon Mar 28 14:59:51 2005
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comment created using xlabel Tue Apr 26 16:37:08 2005
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A.2.4 Combined, formatted annotation file
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B.1 Patterns for distribution of intonation and validity
conditions across the 64 syllogisms
% Intonation contour/validity groupings
cvgroup(0, [cvset(a1,ac1), cvset(b1,bc1), cvset(a2,ac2), cvset(b2,bc2)]).
cvgroup(1, [cvset(a1,ab1), cvset(c1,bc1), cvset(a2,ab2), cvset(c2,bc2)]).
cvgroup(2, [cvset(b1,ab1), cvset(c1,ac1), cvset(b2,ab2), cvset(c2,ac2)]).
contourset(a1, [neutral, neutral, concordant, concordant]).
contourset(a2, [concordant, concordant, neutral, neutral]).
contourset(b1, [neutral, concordant, concordant, neutral]).
contourset(b2, [concordant, neutral, neutral, concordant]).
contourset(c1, [neutral, concordant, neutral, concordant]).
contourset(c2, [concordant, neutral, concordant, neutral]).
validityset(ab1, [valid, invalid, valid, invalid]).
validityset(ab2, [invalid, valid, invalid, valid]).
validityset(ac1, [valid, invalid, invalid, valid]).
validityset(ac2, [invalid, valid, valid, invalid]).
validityset(bc1, [valid, valid, invalid, invalid]).
validityset(bc2, [invalid, invalid, valid, valid]).
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B.2 Specifications of intonation contours derived fro
mlatent information structure of syllogisms
% Intonation contours
% contour(Premise, Figure, Quantifiers, Type, Accents).
contour(1, _, [a, _], _, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, lh]).
contour(1, _, [i, _], _, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, lh]).
contour(1, _, [e, _], _, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, lh]).
contour(1, _, [o, _], _, [hstar, hstar, none, none, hstar, lh]).
contour(2, _, [_, a], neutral, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, _, [_, i], neutral, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, _, [_, e], neutral, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, _, [_, o], neutral, [hstar, hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [a, a], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [i, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [e, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [o, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [a, a], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [i, a], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [e, a], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [o, a], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [a, a], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [i, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [e, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [o, a], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [a, a], concordant, [none, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [i, a], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [e, a], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [o, a], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
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contour(2, 1, [a, i], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [i, i], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [e, i], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [o, i], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [a, i], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [i, i], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [e, i], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [o, i], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [a, i], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [i, i], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [e, i], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [o, i], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [a, i], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [i, i], concordant, [none, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [e, i], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [o, i], concordant, [none, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [a, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [i, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [e, e], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [o, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [a, e], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [i, e], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [e, e], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [o, e], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [a, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [i, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [e, e], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [o, e], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, none, ll]).
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contour(2, 4, [a, e], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [i, e], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [e, e], concordant, [none, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [o, e], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [a, o], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [i, o], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [e, o], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 1, [o, o], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [a, o], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [i, o], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [e, o], concordant, [hstar, lplushstar, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 2, [o, o], concordant, [none, lplushstar, none, none, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [a, o], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [i, o], concordant, [none, hstar, none, hstar, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [e, o], concordant, [hstar, hstar, none, hstar, none, ll]).
contour(2, 3, [o, o], concordant, [none, hstar, none, none, none, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [a, o], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [i, o], concordant, [none, none, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [e, o], concordant, [hstar, none, none, hstar, hstar, ll]).
contour(2, 4, [o, o], concordant, [none, none, none, none, hstar, ll]).
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B.3 Conclusions taken from Johnson-Laird and Steed-
man (1978) for use in Experiment 3
% Conclusions
conc(n, _, [’Therefore,’, ’no’, ’valid’, ’conclusion’]).
conc(a, terms(A, C), [’Therefore,’, ’all’, A, ’are’, C]).
conc(i, terms(A, C), [’Therefore,’, ’some’, A, ’are’, C]).
conc(e, terms(A, C), [’Therefore,’, ’no’, A, ’are’, C]).
conc(o, terms(A, C), [’Therefore,’, ’some’, A, ’are’, ’not’, C]).
% conclusion(Figure, Quantifiers, Type, Terms, Conclusion).
conclusion(1, [a,a], valid, [A,_,C], [a, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,a], valid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,a], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(1, [e,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(1, [o,a], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,i], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(1, [e,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,e], valid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
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conclusion(1, [o,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [a,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [i,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [e,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(1, [o,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [a,a], valid, [A,_,C], [a, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [a,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,a], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [e,a], valid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [e,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [o,a], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [o,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [a,i], valid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [a,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [e,i], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [e,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [o,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [o,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [a,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [a,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [e,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
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conclusion(2, [e,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [o,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [o,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [a,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [a,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [i,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [i,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [e,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [e,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(2, [o,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(2, [o,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [a,a], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [a,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [a, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [i,a], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [e,a], valid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [e,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,a], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [a,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [a,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [i,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [e,i], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [e,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [o,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [a,e], valid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [a,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
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conclusion(3, [e,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [e,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [a,o], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [a,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [i,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [e,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [e,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(3, [o,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(3, [o,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,a], valid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [a, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,a], valid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,a], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [e,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [o,a], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [o,a], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,i], valid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [i, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,i], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [e,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,i], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,i], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [a,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,e], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
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conclusion(4, [i,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [e, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,e], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,e], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [a,o], valid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [a,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
conclusion(4, [i,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [i,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [e,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,o], valid, [A,_,C], [n, terms(A, C)]).
conclusion(4, [o,o], invalid, [A,_,C], [o, terms(C, A)]).
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